作者/Author(s): Scott W. Harold 

網站來源/Source: RAND Corporation (originally appeared in The Diplomat on April 13, 2024) 

日期/Date: 04/15/2024 

關鍵字/Keywords: 假訊息 


摘要：
台灣在五月份即將迎來總統大選，中國很可能利用假訊息作戰來推動其統一野心。解放軍承認，破壞對立社群的作戰意志和領導層的認知領域作戰至關重要。台灣長期以來一直是中國假訊息的受害者，但台灣不是中國唯一的目標。台灣和西方國家應做好準備，防範中國的假訊息行動。 

目標 
  • 中國國內民眾： 讓人民相信中國社會民意支持入侵台灣、台灣迫使中共領導層得要採取行動、外國支持入侵台灣、或者存在阻止中國發展的外部威脅。 
  • 台灣社會： 在社會和領導層之間製造裂痕，破壞公眾對台灣軍隊的信心，讓人民相信如果台灣受到攻擊，不會有外援。
  • 台灣領導層： 引發領導層懷疑台灣軍隊和政府部門的忠誠度和能力，混淆政府決策，迫使領導人對破壞台灣安全的假訊息做出回應。 
  • 台灣的合作夥伴： 模糊解放軍即將行動的指標和警告，形成台灣防衛無能的論述，混淆解放軍行動的真實規模，強調中國奪回台灣的意志。 
  • 其他地區： 利用法律和道義為其軍事行動辯護，削弱台灣在全球的支持。 
台灣和志同道合的夥伴如何對抗中國的假訊息行動？ 
  • 成立跨國工作組，評估中國的假訊息策略和過往的做法，以了解中國假訊息行動的程度。
  • 增加媒體素養工作坊，幫助公民社會對抗假訊息 
  • 建立對問題的共同理解，並制定應對選擇。 
  • 禁止中國社交媒體平台在其國內運營，或確保國內對這些平台的監督。 
Summary: 
As Taiwan will swear in a new president in May, China will likely use information operations to promote its reunification ambition. The PLA acknowledges the importance of cognitive domain operations that undermine an opposition community's will to fight and its leadership. Taiwan is a long-time victim of China's disinformation warfare, but there are other targets. Taiwan and the West should prepare themselves against Chinese disinformation operations.

The Targets 
  • China's domestic population: Convince the public that a Taiwan invasion is popular within Chinese society, Taiwan forced the leadership act, foreign countries support Taiwan's invasion, or there are external threats to stop China's growth. 
  • Taiwanese community: Create cracks between the society and leadership, undermine public confidence in the Taiwanese armed forces, and there will be no external help if Taiwan is attacked. 
  • Taiwan leadership: Induce doubts about the loyalty and competence of Taiwanese armed forces and policymakers, confuse the government decision-making, and force leaders to respond to disinformation that would undermine Taiwan's security. 
  • Taiwan's partners: Blur the indicators and warnings about the PLA's imminent actions, form the discourse that the Taiwanese are defending incompetently, confuse the real scale of PLA's operation, and emphasize China's will to retake Taiwan. 
  • The rest of the world: Foster a legal and moral narrative that justifies its military operation and undermines Taiwan's global support. 
How Taiwan and like-minded partners can counter Chinese disinformation operations? 
  • Form a transnational working group to evaluate China's disinformation tactics and past campaigns to understand the extent of China's disinformation operations. 
  • Increase the number of media literacy workshops that help civil society combat disinformation. 
  • Develop a common understanding of the issue and formulate response options. 
  • Ban Chinese social media platforms from operating in their country or ensure domestic oversight of these platforms. 
 
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