FA:不要為台灣感到恐慌 

作者/Author(s): Jessica Chen Weiss 

原文來源/Source: Foreign Affairs 

日期/Date: 03/21/2023 

主題/Key Topics : Defense, Diplomacy 

摘要:

美國認為國內的挑戰和國力達到巔峰將促使中國入侵台灣，以鞏固國內的信心。與之相反的另種說法認為，北京不會透過入侵台灣來轉移人民的注意力，並會緩和其外交政策以避免更大的衝突。與其誇大中國入侵台灣的風險，美國更應該控制其與中國的衝突不會失控，並試圖修補與北京的破裂關係，同時加強台灣的防衛。 

  • 幾乎沒有證據表明哪一國的領導人會透過發起對外軍事衝突以加強國內的支持，特別是在專制政權中這種狀況更少出現，因為他們可以很容易就可以鎮壓人民。相反，威權主義領導人通常會直面國內挑戰，與鄰國解決邊界爭端，以平息邊界上的動盪。而自毛澤東時代以來，中國就有這些特徵。 
  • 在中國爆發反封城抗議後，北京撤回了其嚴格的COVID-19清零政策，並致力於後疫情復甦，以重建外國投資者的信心。然而同時，北京也抓捕了那些帶起抗議的人，並對其進行調查審訊。 
  • 顯然沒有跡象表明國內不安全感會驅使中共入侵台灣。相反，中共在面對不斷增長的國際威脅和台灣越來越沒有人希望統一的情況下，展示了其自信、耐心的形象。 
  • 北京面對外部威脅或爭端採取積極行動，是為了阻止新型態的威脅出現，而不是分散國內反對聲浪的注意力。 
  • 預先假設北京會把國內問題轉移到外部，是很危險和錯誤的。因為這也表示，美國的行動並不影響中國對台灣問題的考慮。 
  • 習近平入侵台灣的考慮因素是軍事平衡和國內因素。其他因素，特別是美國支持台灣獨立的問題，只會更強烈激起習近平在軍事方面的反應。 
  • 北京更傾向於打出民族主義的旗號，和用非軍事措施懲罰台灣來緩和挑釁行為。 
  • 大多數中國領導人仍然喜歡不戰而勝，把民族復興放在台灣統一之上。 
  • 對美國來說，規避中國入侵台灣的最好辦法是駁斥任何支持台灣獨立的國內或國際呼籲，同時充分提高台灣的自衛能力。 
 
Summary: 
The US believes domestic challenges and peaking power will push China to invade Taiwan to bolster local support and confidence. Contrary to these beliefs, Beijing will not invade Taiwan to divert local attention and will moderate its diplomatic policy to prevent an open conflict. Instead of exaggerating the risk of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, the US must curb its dispute with China from going out of control and attempt to mend broken ties with Beijing while bolstering Taiwan's defenses. 
  • There is little evidence of world leaders initiating military conflict to bolster domestic support, especially among authoritarian leaders, because they can easily repress their people. Instead, authoritarian leaders face domestic challenges head-on and settle border disputes with their neighbors to quell unrest on their borders. China has demonstrated these tendencies since Mao's era. 
  • After anti-lockdown protests erupted in China, Beijing reversed its strict COVID-19 regulations and dedicated effort to post-pandemic recovery to restore foreign investors' confidence. However, Beijing caught and interrogated protestors in the process. 
  • Beijing shows little hints that domestic insecurity will drive them to invade Taiwan. Rather, the CCP projects a confident and patient image amidst rising international threats and the withering desire for reunification in Taiwan. 
  • When Beijing acted aggressively against foreign threats or disputes, it was to stop perceived threats with new capabilities, not distracting from domestic challenges. 
  • It is dangerous and wrong to presume Beijing will divert its domestic problems outside. It also indicates US's actions do not affect China's calculus on Taiwan. 
  • Xi's considerations for invading Taiwan are the military balance of power and domestic factors. Other factors, especially US's support for Taiwan's independence, will incite an armed response from Xi. 
  • Beijing prefers to de-escalate provocations by brandishing nationalism and punishing Taiwan with non-military measures. 
  • Most Chinese leaders still prefer to win without war, putting national rejuvenation over Taiwan reunification. 
  • For the US, the best way to circumvent a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is to refute any domestic or international calls to support Taiwanese independence while sufficiently boosting Taiwan's self-defense capability.  
 
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