FP: 台灣需要武器以應對中國入侵的前期

 
 

作者/Author(s): Blake Herzinger 

原文來源/Source: Foreign Policy 

日期/Date: 09/08/2022 

主題/Key Topics: Defense, Asymmetric defense

摘要:

解放軍為台灣的入侵做好了充分準備，同時在長期擴張和現代化計劃之後阻止了美國的干預。台灣可能需要從被襲擊的第一天起就全力對抗解放軍，迅速耗盡其庫存彈藥。 
 

  • 台灣擁有自製和進口的飛彈庫存，但在戰爭期間可能會很快耗盡。 
  • 專家計算，台灣至少需要2000枚反艦飛彈來對抗解放軍海軍的660艘艦艇，因為反艦飛彈可以被擊落，而且需要不止一枚飛彈才能使一艘艦船失去能力。
  • 在解放軍的封鎖下，台灣要自製物資會受到原料限制，而且因為台灣的島嶼地理位置，從外國進口幾乎是不可能的。 
  • 解放軍的火箭軍可以輕鬆封鎖台灣並摧毀彈藥庫。
 
解放軍的火箭軍可以輕鬆封鎖台灣並摧毀彈藥庫。
  • 台灣以往的軍事採購優先考慮可以展示能力的現代平台，而不是購買可以防禦裝備和彈藥。 
  • 台灣的國防預算被挪用，導致軍事準備不足，並偏離了備受期待的不對稱整體防衛構想。
  • 美國將其先進彈藥庫存大規模轉移到烏克蘭，超過了平均生產率，可能需要長達四年的時間才能補充庫存。雖然生產商有增加產量的經濟激勵，但補貨速度仍然緩慢。 
  •  美國的官僚限制和 COVID-19 疫情情況使其推遲了台灣急需的軍備。 

可能的改進方式： 
  • 台灣可能被允許接受外國軍事融資 (Foreign Military Financing,   FMF)，使其有資格比傳統採購更快地進行設備轉讓。 
  • FMF 也將優先向台灣運送武器。 
  • 雖然美國不會將其大部分軍火轉移到台灣，但這可以讓台灣更好地準備應對中國的侵略。 
 
Summary: 
The PLA is well prepared for Taiwan’s invasion while forestalling US’s intervention after long-term expansion and modernization programs. Taiwan may need to go all out against the PLA since Day 1 of the attack, depleting its munition reserves quickly. 
 
  • Taiwan has stocks of locally manufactured and imported cruise missiles, but they may be exhausted quickly during a war. 
  • Experts calculated that Taiwan needs at least 2000 anti-ship cruise missiles to combat PLA Navy’s 660 ships since cruise missiles can be shot down and more than one missile is required to incapacitate a ship.  
  • Under PLA’s blockade, local production is limited, and foreign resupply is nearly impossible due to Taiwan’s island geography.
  • The PLA’s rocket force can easily blockade Taiwan and destroy its munition depots. 
  • Bureaucratic and political constraints in the US and Taiwan obstructs Taiwan from obtaining crucial weapons and reserves. 
  • Taiwan’s previous military procurements prioritized modern platforms to demonstrate its capability instead of defensive equipment and munitions to organize a credible defense. 
  • Taiwan’s defense budget is misappropriated, causing inadequate military readiness and diverging away from the highly anticipated asymmetric ODC. 
  • The US diverted its stocks of advanced munitions to Ukraine at a large scale, outpacing the average production rate and may take up to four years to restock. Although the producers have the financial incentives to increase the output, restocking is still slow. 
  • US’s bureaucratic limitations and COVID-19 aftermath delayed the much-required armaments to Taiwan. 
Possible improvements: 
  • Taiwan may be allowed to receive Foreign Military Financing (FMF), making it eligible for equipment transfers faster than conventional purchases. 
  • The FMF will prioritize weapons deliveries to Taiwan as well. 
  • Although the US will not transfer many of its munition reserves to Taiwan, it allows Taiwan to prepare better against China’s aggression.
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