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The Diplomat: 台灣對潛艦的渴望是很冒險的
摘要:
潛艦國造在戰略上是無效的:
台灣的反潛作戰能力:
The IDS is strategically ineffective:
Taiwan’s ASW capabilities:
作者/Author(s): Holmes Liao
原文來源/Source: The Diplomat
日期/Date: 09/10/2022
主題/Key Topics: Defense, Asymmetric Warfare, Submarine Warfare
摘要:
台灣的自製防禦潛艦(以下簡稱潛艦國造) 計劃耗資巨大,而且在戰略上無法有效應對解放軍的威脅。相反的,台灣應該優先發展反潛作戰 (ASW) 來對抗解放軍的船隻。
潛艦國造計畫的問題:
潛艦國造計畫的問題:
- 該項目的承包商台灣國際造船股份有限公司(CSBC Corporation Taiwan)在建造防禦潛艦和系統工程方面缺乏經驗。
- 台灣無法在當地為其柴油潛艦生產特定的子系統,需要進口它們,這與美國維吉尼亞級核動力攻擊潛艦的成本相當。
- 台灣政府沒有進行「獨立驗證及確認」 (IV&V),這會讓潛艦有可能產生技術風險。
- 中國懷疑潛艦國造計劃的成功也沒有停止對該計劃的外國援助。
潛艦國造在戰略上是無效的:
- 對中國反介入/區域拒止戰略 (Anti-Access/Area Denial , A2/AD) 至關重要的解放軍海軍 (PLAN) 潛艦數量超過台灣和美國海軍的潛艦數量。
- 中國海軍的現代柴電潛艦(039C/D 型)安靜且對水面部隊構成嚴重威脅,增強了中國的水下反介入/區域拒止能力。
- 解放軍海軍擁有先進的反艦飛彈,可以輕鬆摧毀台灣的水面部隊。
- 解放軍的空中入侵涉及負責反潛作戰的運-8飛機。運-8 入侵可能是針對外國潛艦,但中國可能會在台灣周邊海域測試其反潛作戰能力。
- 解放軍的海陸空聯合力量在入侵期間會對台進行反潛作戰,使台灣潛艦面臨危險,無法進行有效的水下作戰。
台灣的反潛作戰能力:
- 中國海軍潛艦入侵台灣水下空間的可能性很大,但台灣國防部 (MND) 並未公開這一問題。
- 國防部擔心丟臉,因為他們無法反制中國海軍的潛艦。
- 台灣沒有意識到水下威脅,因為他們沒有合適的水中聽音器來找出敵方潛艦。
- 台灣應該優先使用反潛裝置來發現和消滅解放軍潛艦。例如,水下聽音器(SOSUS 和 SURTASS LFA)、水雷和反潛飛彈。
Summary:
Taiwan’s indigenous defense submarine (IDS) program is expensive and strategically ineffective against PLA’s threats. Instead, Taiwan should prioritize anti-submarine warfare (ASW) to counter PLA’s submarines.
The Problems with the IDS Program:
The Problems with the IDS Program:
- CSBC Corp, the program’s contractor, was inexperienced in building defense submarines and systems engineering.
- Taiwan cannot produce specific subsystems for its diesel submarines locally and needs to import them, matching the cost of a U.S. Virginia-class nuclear submarine.
- Taiwan’s government did not conduct independent verification and validation (IV&V), exposing the submarines to technological risks.
- China doubts the IDS program’s success and does not stop foreign assistance for the program.
The IDS is strategically ineffective:
- PLA Navy’s (PLAN) submarines, which are crucial for China’s A2/AD strategy, outnumber Taiwan and U.S. Navy’s submarines.
- PLAN’s modern diesel-electric submarines (Type 039C/D), which are silent and pose serious threats to surface forces, enhance China’s underwater A2/AD ability.
- PLAN has sophisticated anti-ship cruise missiles that can easily take down Taiwan’s surface forces.
- PLA’s air incursions involved Y-8 aircraft that are responsible for ASW warfare. The Y-8 intrusions were presumably directed at foreign submarines, but China may test its ASW ability in Taiwan’s sea space.
- PLA’s combination of air, sea, and underwater forces supports ASW against Taiwan during the invasion, exposing Taiwan’s submarines to dangers and incapable of conducting effective underwater warfare.
Taiwan’s ASW capabilities:
- Although PLAN’s submarine incursions into Taiwan’s underwater space are highly possible, Taiwan’s defense ministry (MND) did not publicize this problem.
- The MND fears losing face because they cannot subdue PLAN submarines.
- Taiwan is unaware of underwater threats because they do not have suitable hydrophones to pinpoint hostile submarines.
- Taiwan should prioritize anti-submarine instruments to spot and eliminate PLAN submarines. E.g., underwater hydrophones (SOSUS and SURTASS LFA), underwater mines, and anti-submarine rockets.