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CSIS China Power Project: 專家調查:中國對台灣的態度
 

作者/Author(s): China Power Team 

原文來源/Source: 中國實力(戰略暨國際研究中心) China Power Project, CSIS  

日期/Date: 09/12/2022 

主題/Key Topics : Cross-Strait relations, US-Taiwan relations, Grand Strategy 


摘要:
在中國圍繞台灣進行密集的軍事演習之後,台灣海峽可能成為威脅地區和國際和平的全球衝突的爆炸中心點。CSIS中國實力團隊調查了64位兩岸關係專家,以了解他們對第四次台海危機後台灣統一問題的看法。 

主要論點:
  • 中國沒有明確的台灣和平統一戰略。 (80%)   
  1.  這與台灣公民在目睹香港「一國兩制」方案的消亡和中國日益增長的敵意後越來越多地拒絕與中國統一的做法相一致 
  • 台灣與中國的統一是最終的命運,北京可以耐心等待。(84%) 
  1. 北京絕不會允許台灣獨立,也不可能維持現狀或以最快的速度統一台灣
  • 對台灣被統一最後的期限有不同之意見
  1. 44%的受訪者認為最後期限是2049年,42%的人認為中國可以無限期等待。 
  2. 在美國前政府高級官員中,50% 的人認為中國可以無止境地等待,而 39% 的人認為統一將在 2049 年實現,而其他受訪者則相反(分別為 36% 和 47%)。 
  • 解放軍在佩洛西訪問後在台灣周邊的軍事演習並不是加速使用武力進行封鎖或入侵的指標。 (80%) 
  • 直到2027 年以前,中國不太可能對台灣動用大量軍事力量。(83%) 
  1. 但習近平將專注於遏制台灣在法律上或事實上的獨立,並通過其他強制手段加速和平統一 
  • 習近平將在二十大之後優先考慮和平統一台灣。然而,專家們對習近平是否會動用軍隊存在分歧 
  1. 41% 的受訪者認為習近平願意使用大規模武力,38% 的受訪者不這麼認為。  
  2. 54% 的前美國政府官員認為習近平願意使用大規模武力,25% 的人不這麼認為,但其他受訪者的意見比例分別為 47% 和 31%。 ​​​​​​​
  • 中國可能在未來十年內對台灣發動兩棲入侵。 (所有受訪者有63%支持此觀點,前美國政府官員79%,以及其他受訪者50%。) ​​​​​​​
  1. 在其他選項中,大多數專家認為中國絕不會或不太可能對台灣發動兩棲入侵(佔所有受訪者29%,前美國政府官員22%,其他受訪者33%)。 
  2. 在其他選項中,大多數專家同意中國永遠不會或不太可能發動兩棲入侵台灣(29% 的受訪者,22 % 的前美國政府高級官員和 33% 的其他受訪者)。 
  3. 前美國政府高級官員中沒有人認為中國會發動兩棲入侵台灣,但 17% 的其他受訪者認為可能性很大 ​​​​​​​
  • 中國在未來十年內可能會使用除入侵以外的其他脅迫手段。 (52%) 
  • 未來十年,台灣海峽可能會出現意外的軍事碰撞事故。(56%) 
  • 如果台灣宣布獨立,北京將在六個月內入侵台灣。 (77%)。 
  • 如果美國結束在台灣問題上的戰略模糊性,大多數受訪者認為中國將進行負面報復,但沒有人認為中國會入侵台灣。  ​​​​​​​
  1. 64% 的人認為這將升級為危機。 
  2. 31% 的人認為有限衝突更有可能發生,主要是通過外交抗議 
  • 受訪者認為,如果中國入侵,美國將保衛台灣,但支持的程度不同 ​​​​​​​
  1. 66%的受訪者認為美國已經準備好承擔巨大的代價,但會將衝突控制在印太地區。 
  2. 5% 的受訪者認為美國將接受所有代價,包括對美國領土的攻擊和全球戰爭 
  3. 30%的受訪者認為美國不想承擔巨額成本。 
  4. 如果中國無端入侵台灣,美國更有可能向台灣提供援助,但如果台灣宣布獨立或首先攻擊中國,美國的援助意願可能會下降
  • ​​​​​​​北京對其兩棲入侵的軍事能力沒有自信,但是
  1. ​​​​​​​55% 的受訪者認為美軍仍有優勢
  2. 41%的受訪者認為中國對其軍事能力的信心正在增強。 
結論:
  • 北京決心統一台灣,但沒有明確一致的戰略 
  • 中國在 2022 年 8 月的軍事演習並不表明它會加速對台灣的入侵,而是可能會無限期地等待 
  • 習近平認為,他仍有希望達成和平統一 
  • 台海在不久的將來可能會發生軍事危機或衝突 
  • 如果台灣宣布獨立,中國將立即入侵 
  • 中國認為,如果台灣遭到攻擊,美國將進行干預 
Summary:
The Taiwan Strait could be a ground zero for a global conflict that threatens regional and international peace after China’s intensive military drills around Taiwan. The CSIS China Power Project surveyed 64 experts in cross-strait relations to understand their views on the Taiwan reunification issue after the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis. 
Key Takeaways: 
  • ​​​​​​​China does not have a clear strategy for Taiwan’s peaceful reunification. (80%) 
  1. Coherent with Taiwan’s citizens increasing refusal of reunification with China after watching the demise of Hong Kong’s “One Country, Two Systems” proposal and China’s increasing hostility. ​​​​​​​
  • Taiwan’s reunification with China is an eventual fate, and Beijing can be patient. (84%) ​​​​​​​
  1. Beijing will never allow Taiwan’s independence and is unlikely to preserve the status quo or reunify Taiwan at the fastest possibility. ​​​​​​​
  • Divided opinions on the deadline for Taiwan reunification: ​​​​​​​
  1. 44% of all respondents think the deadline is 2049 and 42% suggest that China can wait indefinitely. 
  2. Among former senior US government officials, 50% assume China can wait forever, while 39% think reunification will occur by 2049, and vice versa for other respondents (36% and 47%, respectively). ​​​​​​​
  • PLA’s military drills around Taiwan after Pelosi’s visit is not an indicator of hastening the use of force for blockade or invasion. (80%) 
  • China is unlikely to use significant military forces against Taiwan by 2027. (83%)
  1. ​​​​​​​But Xi will focus on deterring Taiwan’s de jure or de facto independence and accelerate peaceful reunification through other coercive means. 
  • Xi Jinping will prioritize peaceful Taiwan reunification after the 20th Party Congress. However, experts have divided on whether Xi will use military forces. ​​​​​​​
  1. 41% of all respondents think Xi is willing to use large-scale force, and 38% think otherwise. 
  2. 54% of former USG officials think Xi is willing to use large-scale force, and 25% think otherwise, but 47% and 31%, respectively, for other respondents. ​​​​​​​
  • China may launch an amphibious invasion of Taiwan in the next ten years. (63% of all respondents, 79% of former USG officials, and 50% of other respondents.) ​​​​​​​
  1. Among other options, most experts agreed China would never or is unlikely to launch an amphibious invasion of Taiwan (29% of all respondents, 22% of former USG officials, and 33% of other respondents). 
  2. None of the former senior USG officials think China will launch an amphibious invasion of Taiwan, but 17% of other respondents believe there is a high possibility. ​​​​​​​
  • China may use other coercive means short of invasion in the next ten years. (52%) 
  • The Taiwan Strait may observe accidental military collisions in the next ten years. (56%)
  • Beijing will invade Taiwan within six months if Taiwan declares independence. (77%)
  • If the US ends strategic ambiguity over Taiwan, most respondents believe China will retaliate negatively, but none assumed China would invade Taiwan. 
  1. 64% think it will escalate into a crisis. 
  2. 31% think a limited conflict is more likely, mainly through diplomatic protests. 
  • The respondents believe the US will defend Taiwan if China invades but differ in the extent of support. ​​​​​​​
  1. 66% of all respondents think the US is ready to carry significant costs but will contain the conflict within Indo-Pacific. 
  2. 5% of all respondents think the US will accept all costs, including an attack on US soil and a global war.
  3. 30% of all respondents think the US does not want to bear massive costs. 
  4. The US is more likely to come to Taiwan’s aid if China invades unprovoked but is less willing if Taiwan declares independence or attacks China firsthand.
  • ​​​​​​​Beijing is unconfident about its military ability for amphibious invasion, but: 
  1. 55% of all respondents believe the US military still has the edge. 
  2. 41% of all respondents believe China’s confidence in its military ability is growing. 
Conclusions: 
  • Beijing is determined to reunify Taiwan but does not have a clear and consistent strategy. 
  • China’s August 2022 military drills do not indicate it will hasten Taiwan’s invasion and would wait indefinitely. 
  • Xi Jinping thinks there is still hope for peaceful reunification. 
  • Taiwan Strait may experience military crises or conflict in the near future. 
  • If Taiwan declares independence, China will invade instantly. 
  • China believes the US will intervene if Taiwan is attacked.