編輯器
FA: 進攻中的中國 

圖/習近平21日上午在博鰲亞洲論壇2022年年會開幕式上以視訊發表主旨演講。（央視截圖）(取自聯合新聞網) 

作者/Author(s): Bonny Lin and Jude Blanchette 

原文來源/Source:《外交事務》 Foreign Affairs 

日期/Date: 08/01/2022 

主題/Key Topics : Grand Strategy, International Order 

摘要:

北京對於烏克蘭危機後國際秩序的看法： 

  • 中國面臨著一個因民主國家和非民主國家之間的裂痕而加劇的更為惡劣之環境。 
  • 美國和志同道合的民主國家將尋求遏制中國，阻礙北京實現台灣統一的目標。 
  • 覺得美國及其盟友不理解或不同情中國的國家和安全利益。
  • 中國將更加自信地確保自己的利益，並尋求替代方案來挑戰美國的聯盟。 
  • 中國了解到擴大經濟、政治和安全關係以抵御制裁影響之必要性。 
  • 表現出以武力威懾第三方介入台灣的決心。 
  • 對被美國及其盟友忽視或對西方聯盟不滿的國家進行外交政策調整。 

提出全球安全倡議 (GSI) (Global Security Initiative)作為美國主導國際秩序之競爭者:
  • 角色：削弱美國作為區域和安全提供者的角色； 抵制對中國強硬和修正主義的看法； 勸阻各國與美國領導的軍事派別結盟。
  • 對美國不滿的南方國家稱讚GSI更具包容性、綜合性和穩定性。
  • 金磚五國(BRICS)作為一個經濟集團與四方安全對話(QUAD)、七大工業國組織(G7)(Group of Seven)和二十大工業國(G20)(Group of Twenty)競爭。 
  • 數字經濟、貿易、投資、供應鍊等新合作。 
  • 俄羅斯建議建立新的世界儲備貨幣，以為金磚國家的經濟利益服務。
全球安全倡議 (GSI) (Global Security Initiative)會實現嗎? 
  • 過去的倡議並沒有達到中國的期望， 但現在它擁有更多的外交和經濟槓桿能力 
  • 金磚五國和上海合作組織在擴張時，也須面對自身能力是否足夠，以及成員國團結與否等障礙。 
  • GSI 需要時間才能實現。 如果GSI損害了美中鄰國的利益，美中鄰國將及時進行報復。 
  • 中共二十大的開會內容中可能會為GSI的具體內容提供更多線索。 
 
Summary: 
Beijing’s perception of post-Ukrainian Crisis international order: 
  • China faces a more hostile environment fueled by rift among democracies and non-democracies.
  • The US and like-minded democracies will seek to contain China and hinder Beijing’s aim of Taiwan reunification. 
  • Feels that the US and its allies do not understand or sympathize with China’s national and security interests.
  • China will be more assertive to secure its interest and seek alternatives to challenge the US coalition. 
  • Understood the need to expand economic, political, and security relations to withstand the impact of sanctions. 
  • Showing resolve through force to intimidate third-party intervention in Taiwan. 
  • Foreign policy reorientation to countries ignored by the US and its allies or dissatisfied with the Western coalition.
Global Security Initiative (GSI) as a contender to US-led international order:
  • Role: Erode US’s role as a regional and security provider; ward off beliefs of Chinese assertiveness and revisionism; dissuade countries from aligning with the US-led military faction. 
  • Global South countries that are discontent with the US lauded GSI, which is more inclusive, comprehensive, and stable. 
  • BRICS as an economic bloc to compete with Quad, G7, and G20. 
  • New cooperation in the digital economy, trade, investment, and supply chain. 
  • Gained interest from new dialogue partners. 
  • Russia suggested a new world reserve currency to serve BRICS economic interest. 
  • SCO as a “non-Western power” axis: 
  • Increased cooperation in international security and economy. 
  • Proposal of SCO exclusive FTA and bank.  
Will GSI materialize? 
  • China did not meet its expectations in previous initiatives but now has more diplomatic and economic leverages. 
  • BRICS and SCO expansion faces capability and unity obstacles. 
  • GSI will take time to materialize. The US and China’s neighbors will retaliate timely if GSI harms their interests. 
  • The 20th Party congress may offer clues on GSI. 
回上層