作者/Author(s): Michael Bennon and Francis Fukuyama 

網站來源/Source: Foreign Affairs 

日期/Date: 08/22/2023 

關鍵字/Keywords: Economic, Belt and Road 

摘要：

「一帶一路倡議」作為習近平至下規模最大、最具雄心的國際基礎設施發展項目，終於迎來它的第一個是年，成功擴大了中國在全球的實力與影響力。然而，許多發展中國家無力償還一帶一路貸款，或者無法繼續為建設中項目提供資金，為此一帶一路被西方觀察家批評是一種「債務陷阱外交」。除此之外，許多已經建設完的設置品質不佳，無法為開發中國家帶來利益，卻又加重了這些貸款的債務負擔，最終導致貸款國只能將這些基礎設施讓渡給中國，並嘗試向國際貨幣基金組織或其他西方國際金融機構尋求幫助，紓解貸款壓力。但是，中國和西方國家都是無情的債權國，債務的不透明和寬鬆程度有限等問題可能反而會侵蝕掉中國好不容易在全球南方建立起來的經濟影響力，同時加劇新興市場的債務危機。為防止開發中國家債務危機惡化，美國和西方主要貸款國應改革國際貨幣基金組織，對尋求救助的國家提出更苛刻的條件，並要求成員國提高債務透明度。 

當債務人擁有更高的議價能力 

  • 早有研究顯示，對於高度渴望發展的國家來說，擁有資本和知識來建設基礎設施的投資者在談判交易時會更具優勢，促使這些交易對自己有利，同時將風險轉嫁給貸款方。然而，當這些項目完工時，投資者就不能移走它們，此時的借款人將有更多籌碼來重新協商償還債務或所有權條款。
  • 中國也面臨著類似的情況，尤其是大多數中國投資的項目，並沒有像政策制定者所預測的那樣產生回報或刺激經濟增長，甚至有一些項目導致原住民社區流離失所，造成環境破壞，遭遇挫折，並引發當地人與中國承包商之間的衝突。 
  • 其實，債務還是最嚴重的問題。中國資助的「大白象」項目在貸款國持續造成高額債務，甚至侵占該國國內生產總值的比例，引發國際收支危機。逼得一些債權國政府掩蓋實際債務水平，然後將負擔轉嫁給繼任者，這種情況在專制政權中特別容易發生。
  • 雖然條件性負債很常見，但「一帶一路」借款人欠的是中國政策性銀行的錢，而非私人機構的錢，因此中國有錢以雙邊談判方式強硬地與債務國進行債務重組談判。鑒於談判與負債壓力太大，一帶一路債務國寧願屈服於國際貨幣基金組織更加嚴苛的救助條件尋求幫助，而非繼續與北京進行減免談判。 
  • 「一帶一路」債務危機對本就脆弱的經濟體造成了深遠的經濟損害，這些債務國政府疲於應付曠日廢時的談判。同時，造成這些問題的債權人不僅是世界上最大的雙邊貸款機構，也是一些債務國最大的貿易夥伴，不少私人貸款人在了解風險後，會更加不願意借錢給一帶一路債務國，而陷入困境的國家將發現自己夾在債權人之間，無法獲得維持經濟所需的資金。 
Summary：
As the BRI enters its first decade as Xi Jinping's largest and most ambitious international infrastructure development project, it successfully expands Chinese global power and influence. However, Western observers criticized the BRI as a "debt trap diplomacy" after many developing country BRI lenders struggled to repay the loans or to continue financing ongoing projects. Further, some projects have poor quality or fail to generate returns, exacerbating lenders' debt burden and forcing them to cede these infrastructures to Chinese institutions. These debt-stressed countries may seek help from the IMF or other Western international financial institutions to relieve their debt stress. Yet, like its Western counterparts, China is a relentless and obstinate creditor, which may squander its hard-built economic influence in the global south and aggravate emerging markets' debt crisis. To prevent the debt crisis from worsening, the US and leading Western lenders should reform the IMF by imposing tougher conditions on countries seeking bailouts and demanding higher transparency from member countries.
 

When debtors have higher bargaining power 

  • Previous research showed investors with capital and knowledge to build infrastructures have an advantage when negotiating deals with highly desperate developing countries, making these deals favorable to themselves while shifting the risks to the lenders. However, once investors complete these projects, they cannot take them away, so borrowers have more leverage to renegotiate debtrepayment or ownership terms.
  • China faces a similar situation, especially when most Chinese-funded projects did not generate returns or stimulate the economic growth that policymakers predicted. Worse, some of these projects displaced indigenous communities, caused environmental damage, faced setbacks, and stirred conflicts between locals and Chinese contractors. 
  • However, debt became the most critical problem. Chinese-funded white elephant projects caused unsustainable debt-to-GDP ratios and balance-of-payment crises in lending countries. Some governments, especially authoritarian ones, made contingent liabilities to hide the real levels of liable debts and then pass the burden to their successor. 
  • Although contingent liabilities are common, BRI borrowers owe money to Chinese policy banks, not private institutions, and China opts to conduct debt renegotiations bilaterally and toughly. Due to the pressure, BRI borrowers sought help from the IMF to service their BRI debts rather than continue relief negotiations with Beijing, although IMF's bailout conditions are harsher. 
  • The BRI debt crisis caused profound economic damage to vulnerable economies, and laden their governments with protracted negotiations. The problematic creditor is the world's largest bilateral lender and the largest trading partner of some of the debtor countries. Distressed countries will find themselves in between arguing creditors and unable to access the capital needed to sustain their economies when private lenders are more reluctant to lend money to BRI countries after knowing the risks. ​​​​​​​
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