FA: 習近平對安全的渴望可能讓其付出代價

作者/Author(s): Stephen Roach 

原文來源/Source: Foreign Affairs 

日期/Date: November 28, 2022 

主題/Key Topics : Security, Economic 

摘要:

在中共二十大之後,很明顯,習近平在追求絕對安全的同時,犧牲了經濟增長。 COVID-19 爆發以來,中國經濟一直在急劇下滑,大家都認為這是一種衰退。短期、長期、國內和外部的各種因素促成了中國目前的狀態,但習近平選擇最大限度地掌握國內和國際安全,而不是重振奄奄一息的經濟。在試圖平衡經濟增長與國家安全的同時,習近平將發現自己陷入了困境。 

趨緩的原因 

  • 四十年來,中國經歷了勞動力和生產率的增長,支撐了中國經濟的飛速增長,但現在已經結束了 
  • 人口問題,尤其是人口迅速老齡化,正在削弱中國的勞動力 
  • 自從習近平將投資和就業轉移到國有企業而不是盈利和高生產率的私營部門以來,生產力就下降了 
  • 創新的障礙 
  1. 中國依靠外國技術來促進本國的高技術產業,並對相關行業進行了大量的補貼。它的目的是解決中國共產黨的內部安全問題並推動解放軍的發展,但它不太注重經濟增長。
  2. 美國以嚴厲的出口限制作為對策,並帶給中國致命的打擊。該限制擴大了美國和中國之間創新尖端技術的差距,而中國不可能在短時間內縮小差距。 
  3. 中國對頂級互聯網平台公司的打壓弄巧成拙,進一步損害了其經濟生產力 
無法說出的真相 
  • 過度擴張安全並犧牲經濟發展可能會導致一個大國垮台。中國如履薄冰,就像 19 世紀中葉英國在穩定經濟之前擴大海軍的失敗嘗試一樣 
  • 儘管高層一致認為有必要進行重大的結構轉變,但尚未取得任何成功
  •  由習近平的親信組成的中國政治局中央委員會陣容表明,其政策主軸將從經濟轉向國家安全 
  • 習近平有責任認識到對安全的痴迷和經濟增長的悖論,以及這將如何削弱中國的國力 
 
Summary: 
After the 20th CCP National Congress, it is evident that Xi is seeking absolute security while sacrificing economic growth. Since the outbreak of COVID-19, China’s economy has been in acute decline, which the public perceives as a recession. Various short, long, domestic, and external factors contributed to China’s current state, but Xi opted to maximize his grasp on domestic and international security instead of resuscitating the moribund economy. Xi will find himself in hot waters while attempting to balance economic growth with national security.

Cause of slowing down 
  • China experienced workforce and productivity growth over four decades that supported China’s meteoric economic growth, but it is over now.
  • Demographic problems, especially a rapidly aging population, are shriveling China’s workforce. 
  • Productivity declined since Xi shifted investment and employment to state-owned enterprises instead of profitable and highly productive private sectors. 
  • Obstacles to innovation: 
  1. China relied on foreign technologies to boost homegrown high-technology industries, and the government heavily subsidized the sector. It was aimed at addressing CCP’s internal security concerns and advancing the PLA, but it was less focused on economic growth, which became a concern for the U.S.
  2. The U.S. responded with harsh export restrictions, dealing a death blow for China as the limitation widens the innovation gap between the U.S. and China, and China is unlikely to close the gap soon. 
  3. China’s self-defeating crackdown on top internet platform companies further damages its economic productivity. 
The inconvenient truth 
  • Overstretching security at the expense of the economy may cause a great power to fall. China may be on thin ice, like mid-nineteenth-century Great Britain’s failed attempt to expand its navy before stabilizing its economy. 
  • Although the top circles agreed that a drastic structural shift is necessary, there has yet to be any success. 
  • China’s Politburo central committee line-up consisting of Xi’s loyalists suggests a move away from economics towards national security. 
  • It is up to Xi to realize the paradox of security obsession and economic growth and how it will erode China’s national power.