FA: 中國選擇安全行事的理由

 

作者/Author(s): Christopher K. Johnson 

原文來源/Source: Foreign Affairs 

日期/Date: 11/14/2022 

主題/Key Topics : Grand Strategy, Foreign Policy, U.S.-China Relations 

摘要:

中國共產黨第 20 次代表大會鞏固了習近平的第三個任期，新的中央政治局常務委員會成立。儘管常委陣容表明中國的軍事實力和經濟實力正在加強，但這並不意味著中國與美國即將發生衝突或會強行統一台灣。反過來說，美國可以假設中國的目標是維護中共的穩定，使其可預測且不那麼敵對。 

掙扎中的中國：經濟發展與安全為首 

  • 在二十大之前，中國領導人認為中國處於一個友好有利的國際環境中。因此，習近平將穩定和持續經濟增長作為全球主要趨勢，並減少了軍事冒險思想。然而，習近平擺脫了前任「韜光養晦」的意識形態，轉變為更加自信和強硬的外交政策。 
  • 西方國家對俄羅斯在烏克蘭的侵略作出了一致的反應，拜登也延續了川普對中國的敵意，這些都改變了習近平的算盤。習近平比以前更沒有信心，認為國際環境對中國來說是悲觀的。因此，在黨的二十大期間，他轉向了「中國的鬥爭」的毛主義言論。 
  • 儘管如此，中國目前的主要政策重點是加強國內工業基礎以實現自給自足並減少外部干擾。同時尋求加強地方國內安全和解放軍來最大限度地實現國家安全。 
 

 

新一屆中常委人選發出的信號 

  • 習近平的新政治局由專門研究科技、國家安全和經濟的技術民族主義者組成。他們也是習近平親信圈的一部分。 
  • 現在看起來中國似乎在增強其戰爭能力，但如果衝突不可避免，它很可能會強化自己，而不是準備進攻台灣。 
  • 美國不應反應過度，發出縮短中國強行統一台灣的最後期限的信號，並對台灣表現出更大的支持，因為它最終將跨越中國的基本紅線。 
  • 美國應該提防習近平的權力和野心，這可能導致他採取大膽的行動。然而，習近平面臨著相當大的國內和國際障礙，減少了他的敵意。美國應將習近平的困境轉化為尋求緩和的機會，阻止美中關係進一步惡化。 
 
 
Summary: 
The 20th CCP Party Congress consolidated Xi’s third term with a new Politburo Standing Committee. Although the standing committee lineup shows Xi is increasing China’s military strength and economic power, it does not signal an imminent clash with the U.S. or a forced reunification with Taiwan. Instead, the U.S. can assume China aims to preserve CCP’s stability, making it predictable and less hostile. 

 A Struggling China: Prioritizing both economic development and security 
  • Before the 20th Party Congress, Xi assumes China is in a friendly and favorable international environment. Therefore, Xi maintained a doctrine of stability and continued economic growth as the primary global trend and scaled down its military adventurism. However, Xi shifted into a more assertive and confident foreign policy by breaking out from his predecessors’ “keeping a low profile” ideology.  
  • The West's united response against Russian aggression in Ukraine and Biden’s continuation of Trump’s hostility against China changed Xi’s calculus. Xi was less confident than before and perceived the international environment as pessimistic for China. Therefore, he shifted to Maoist rhetoric of “China’s struggle” during the 20th Party Congress. 
  • Despite that, China’s current main policy focus is strengthening its domestic industrial base to self-suffice and reduce external interferences. China also seeks to maximize its national security by enhancing local domestic security and the PLA. 

What does the new Standing Committee signal? 
  • Xi’s new Politburo consisted of techno-nationalist who specialized in science and technology, national security, and economics. They are also part of Xi’s close circles.
  • Although China seems to increase its capacity for war, it is most likely fortifying itself if a fight is unavoidable rather than preparing for a Taiwan attack. 
  • The U.S. should not overreact by signaling a shortened deadline for China’s forced unification of Taiwan and showing more significant support for Taiwan as it will ultimately cross China’s fundamental redline.  
  • The U.S. should beware of Xi’s power and ambitions, which may cause him to act daringly. However, Xi faces considerable domestic and international obstacles, reducing his hostility. The U.S. turn Xi’s predicament into an opportunity to seek a détente and stop the U.S.-China relation from further deterioration. 
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