台海戰爭將如何結束

作者/Author(s): Zack Cooper 

網站來源/Source: Foreign Affairs 

日期/Date: 11/06/2025 

關鍵字/Keywords: 軍事、戰爭、台海 
 

摘要：

美國決策者與學界長期就「嚇阻中國犯台是否有效」展開辯論，而且意見分歧。部分專家認為強大的嚇阻力足以阻止中國入侵，另一些人則預期中國依然會戰到底。在眾說紛紜之際，美國可提升嚇阻能力以防範戰爭，但若嚇阻失效導致戰爭爆發，必須立刻採取懲罰性措施。 
嚇阻的不足 

• 美國是唯一能在全球投射軍力的國家，使其能同時運用「拒止性嚇阻」與「懲罰性嚇阻」。 
• 然而，美國已針對特定任務調整自身及盟友的部隊配置，傾向部署成本較低且更易消耗的系統來嚇阻西太平洋地區的中國，而非採用航空母艦等大型平台。 
• 然而，僅憑消耗性平台並不足以阻止中國。在遏阻中國海空入侵行動時，一些大型作戰平台仍屬必要。 
• 此外，水雷與無人機也不足以形成有效阻絕，因為中國領導人可能不惜一切代價推進目標，甚至可能實施海上封鎖，迫使美軍的消耗性防禦失效。 
• 鑒於拒止性嚇阻的限制，美國必須加入懲罰性措施，讓北京相信若入侵失敗仍強行作戰，將會付出無法承受的代價。 

• 如同烏克蘭危機所示，即使俄羅斯已經面臨損失慘重，嚴厲制裁仍無法阻止他們的入侵行動。這個例子也可能反映中國的行為模式。 
• 此外，中國認為其軍事工業與國內生產能力足以支撐持久作戰。中國亦已實現能源多元化，以減輕美國能源封鎖的影響。 
• 在政治意志方面： 

1. ​​​​​​​北京的意志更為堅定，因為台灣是中共政權的核心利益。若未能奪取台灣，將導致中共政權蒙羞，甚至動搖政權根基。 
2. 相對地，由於台灣地理位置遙遠，美國對台利益遠弱於北京。更重要的是，美國人更傾向避免與中國開戰，而非為台灣而戰。 

• ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​總之，就算作戰初期受挫，中國仍可能選擇持續行動。美國可以透過經濟懲罰或直接攻擊中國關鍵基礎設施迫使中國終止行動，但這也會構成戰略兩難，任何懲罰威脅都變得更複雜。 

• 第一個問題是「金髮姑娘困境」：美國對中國的懲罰後果必須「剛剛好」，既要足夠嚴重，讓北京願意結束其全力投入的戰鬥，但又不能嚴重到引發不可接受的升級，包括核行動的可能性。因此，美中台三方都必須取得微妙的平衡才能避免戰爭。 
• 另一難題在於，美國可能發現「橫向升級」策略已不如過往實用，此障礙恐導致美國軍事資源從拒止能力轉移至懲罰性能力，若美國對中國實施能源封鎖，可能導致台灣的狀況更危急。 

•  The US is the only country that can project military power globally, allowing it to employ deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment simultaneously. 
• However, the US had adjusted its and its allies' forces for specific missions, favoring the deployment of cheaper and more attritable systems to deter China in the Western Pacific, rather than larger platforms such as aircraft carriers. 
• Yet, deterrence using attritable systems is insufficient to stop China because some large platforms are necessary to repel Chinese naval and air incursions. 
• Furthermore, mines and drones are inadequate because Chinese leaders will not stop at any cost, or they can employ a maritime blockade, thereby making the attritable defenses ineffective. 
• Given the limitations of deterrence by denial, the US must also include punitive measures to convince China that it will face insurmountable costs if it continues to fight after an unsuccessful invasion. 

• As demonstrated by the Ukrainian Crisis, sanctions are not enough to stop Russia from continuing its war despite heavy losses. The Russian example could also mirror China's behavior. 
• Moreover, China believes its military industrial and domestic production capacity allow it to fight till the end. China had also diversified its energy profile to mitigate the implications of a US energy blockade. 
• In terms of political will

1. ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​Beijing is more motivated because Taiwan is a core interest for the regime. The failure to capture Taiwan will humiliate the CCP regime, thereby destabilizing the regime. 
2. In contrast, the US interest in Taiwan is weaker than that of Beijing due to Taiwan's remoteness from the US. Furthermore, Americans are more interested in avoiding war with China than fighting on Taiwan's behalf. 

• ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​In short, China is likely to continue fighting even after an initial defeat. The US is capable of coercing China to terminate the war through economic punishment or direct attacks on critical infrastructure. However, it poses a strategic dilemma that complicates any threat of punishment. 

• The first problem is the "Godilocks challenge," where the potential consequences for Beijing must be significant enough to convince them to resolve a conflict in which they are heavily engaged, yet not so severe that they trigger unacceptable escalation, including the possibility of nuclear action. Therefore, the US, China, and Taiwan must strike a delicate balance to prevent a war. 
• Another problem is that the US may not find "horizontal escalation" as practical as it has been in the past. This obstacle risks diverting military funding from denial to punitive capabilities and possibly harming Taiwan more than China if the US employs an energy blockade on China.