作者/Author(s): Jeffrey Michaels and Michael John Williams 

網站來源/Source: War on the Rocks 

日期/Date: 10/07/2025 

關鍵字/Keywords: 軍事、兵棋推演、中國 


摘要：
自從北京加大對台施壓後，各國政府機構與智庫紛紛進行兵棋推演，以研擬中國入侵台灣時的應對方案。然而，直到最近一場專門討論「中國如何征服台灣」的兵棋推演舉行之前，外界對北京可能採取的具體行動仍缺乏深入理解。 
  • 三種情境：解讀中國的風險承受程度與對美國決心的假設 
  1. 以有限飛彈轟炸施壓，隨後發出外交最後通牒。 
  2. 升級軍事行動但避免直接攻擊美軍。 
  3. 先癱瘓美軍以孤立台北。 
  • 多數參與者認為，唯一可行的方案是對台灣軍事設施進行精準打擊，同時提出相對寬厚的投降條件。 
  1. 他們假設美國及其盟友僅會在中國直接挑釁時才進行報復，因此先發制人的攻擊既不合邏輯又極具風險。
  2. 然而，在目睹香港「一國兩制」的慘痛教訓後，台灣人勢必會懷疑北京的誠信與承諾，這反而成為中方面臨的首要問題。 
  3. 中國直接入侵台灣的可行性極低，因其自1979年以來未曾參與大規模戰爭；解放軍從未執行過大型兩棲登陸作戰，其後勤與指揮能力存疑；且大規模入侵準備工作（尤其兩棲作戰）極易引發全球警覺。 
  4. 若中國認為透過飛彈轟炸與經濟封鎖即可迫使台灣屈服，便不會冒險發動入侵。這樣既可避免軍事羞辱，又能取得政治勝利；北京當局亦可將行動正當化為內戰，以阻止他國介入。
  • 這些兵棋推演挑戰了傳統的嚇阻思維： 
  1. 嚇阻策略不應僅聚焦於阻斷入侵行動，也包含強化台灣關鍵基礎設施、做好民眾心理準備，及確保台灣政治體系的韌性。 
  2. 比起美國支援台灣的方式有哪些，美國是否介入的「不確定性」才是北京決策的關鍵因素。 
  3. 有效的嚇阻還需阻止中國輕鬆取得政治上的勝利，因為對台灣而言，政治脆弱性比軍事弱點更具殺傷力。 
  • 與會者對中國是否會以封鎖行動作為與台灣對抗的前奏，以及何時啟動統一行動仍存分歧。
  • 這場兵棋推演揭示了中國決策層在台海情境下的戰略考量，讓美台軍事與政策規劃小組得以擬定反制措施。這場兵推也凸顯了同盟凝聚力與國內政治決心在遏制中國行動、維持西太平洋穩定中的關鍵作用。 
 
Summary: 
Since Beijing ramped up its pressure campaign against Taiwan, government agencies and think tanks have conducted various war games to devise responses for a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. However, there was a lack of understanding of how China would subdue Taiwan, until a recent wargame dedicated to that matter.  
  • Three Scenarios: Understanding China's Risk Tolerance and Assumptions about American Resolve 
  1. Coercion using a limited missile barrage followed by a diplomatic ultimatum. 
  2. A military escalation stops short of targeting US forces. 
  3. Isolate Taipei by immobilizing US forces first. 
  • Most participants agreed that the only feasible scenario is the one that involves conducting targeted attacks on Taiwan's military facilities while providing favorable terms for surrender. 
  1. They assume that the US and its allies will only retaliate if China confronts them directly, making preemptive strikes illogical and dangerous. 
  2. Yet, after observing Hong Kong's perilous "One Country, Two Systems," the Taiwanese will doubt Beijing's credibility in adhering to its promises, which in turn would be the primary problem for the Chinese side. 
  3. Direct invasion is not feasible for China because it has not engaged in a major military conflict since 1979; the PLA has never conducted a large-scale amphibious invasion, raising questions about its logistics and command structure; and preparation for large-scale invasion, especially amphibious operations, is conspicuous, which raises global concerns. 
  4. China would not risk an invasion if it felt that missile barrages and economic strangulation were sufficient to subjugate Taiwan. It also prevents military humiliation while securing political victory. Beijing could also justify its actions as a civil war to prevent other countries from intervening. 
  • The wargame challenges conventional deterrence thinking: 
  1. Deterrence should not be entirely focused on thwarting an invasion. It must include bolstering Taiwan's critical infrastructure, preparing the population, and ensuring the resilience of Taiwanese politics. 
  2. Uncertainty about US intervention remains a key factor in Beijing's decision, rather than the type of support the US will deploy. 
  3. Deterrence also requires denying China an easy political victory. For the Taiwanese, political vulnerabilities are more potent than military weaknesses. 
  • The participants remained in disagreement on China's use of a blockade operation as a precursor of confrontation with Taiwan and the timing of when China will launch its unification operation. 
  • The wargame offers insights into the calculus of China's decision-makers in a Taiwan scenario, enabling US and Taiwanese military and political planners to devise countermeasures. Furthermore, it also emphasized the importance of alliance cohesion and domestic political resolve in stopping China and maintaining regional stability in the Western Pacific. 
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