作者/Author(s): Craig Singleton 

網站來源/Source: Foreign Policy 

日期/Date: October 17, 2025 

關鍵字/Keywords: 國際政治、經濟、相互保證擾亂 


摘要：
中美貿易休戰協議已然瓦解，川普指控北京違反休戰協議，透過加強出口管制與其他限制措施破壞現狀，並威脅對中國祭出更高關稅與新一輪貿易制裁，甚至拒絕在十月底的APEC峰會與習近平會面。然而，川普隨即暫停新報復措施，並同意再次與習近平會面。
  • 如同核武理論中的「相互保證毀滅」，美中兩國如今正以「相互保證擾亂」的形式進行邊緣政策對抗，雙方以武器化的相互依賴作為施壓手段。前者的嚇阻主張的是如何在毀滅中倖存，而後者則是透過掌握不穩定、撐得更久並超越對手來維持優勢。 
  • 中國新的出口管制措施有明確的目標與原則，旨在強化對全球材料供應鏈的掌控。而美國則視此舉為背棄現有的停火協議並精準進行經濟脅迫。   
  • 中國新的出口管制措施有明確的目標與原則，旨在強化對全球材料供應鏈的掌控。而美國則視此舉為背棄現有的停火協議並精準進行經濟脅迫。   
  • 在這樣的邏輯下，每一輪對話的目的不是緩和關係，而是用來管理對抗、重新界定雙邊關係的槓桿。邊緣政策在此意義上，是透過糾纏而非毀滅來嚇阻對手。更重要的是，這種擾亂可逆的、可重複且經過謹慎校準的，目的在於控制升級的節奏、減少不穩定性並降低對抗的成本。 
  • 「相互保證擾亂」有三項基本假設： 
  1. 可以精準控制脅迫，不致使市場崩潰。 
  2. 雙方都認為自己能比對方撐更久、適應力更強，且對手實際實力不如表面強大。 
  3. 全球供應鏈可以被拉扯到極限而不會完全斷裂。 
  • 這種新的「相互確保擾亂」邏輯，獎勵的是願意承受最大混亂且撐得最久的一方。 
  • 川普與習近平正面臨一個「相互保證擾亂的悖論」：為了維持政治可信度，他們不得不持續升級，但兩國經濟與政治的承受力已逼近極限。因此雙方都在等待對方率先退讓。 
  • 無論川習在南韓的會晤結果如何，雙方都將持續升級對峙態勢，直至其中一方率先妥協。兩邊各有優勢，但行動更快並在混亂中維持韌性的一方，將笑到最後。 
 
Summary: 
The trade truce between the US and China has crumbled after Trump accused Beijing of breaking the detente by tightening export controls and measures. In response, Trump had threatened massive tariffs and new trade restrictions on China and refused to meet Xi during the APEC meeting in late October. Yet, Trump paused the new retaliatory measures and agreed to meet with Xi again moments later.  
  • Like the "mutually assured destruction" in nuclear doctrine, the US and China are now in a brinkmanship in the form of "mutually assured disruption" using weaponized interdependence as the source of leverage. Deterrence in the former requires surviving destruction, while the latter is about mastering instability, lasting longer, and outcompeting the other. 
  • China's new export control measures are purposeful and principle-driven, aimed at asserting its control over the global materials supply chain. At the same time, the US sees it as a betrayal of the negotiated truce and calibrated coercion.  
  • Yet, leaders from both sides have different reasons to meet: Trump needs a platform to shape his control over instability; Xi needs a mechanism to manage brinkmanship.
  • In this logic, each round of dialogue is not a detente, but a leverage to manage confrontation and define upcoming bilateral relations. Brinkmanship, in this sense, is to deter the adversary through entanglement rather than destruction. Furthermore, the disruption is reversible, repeatable, and calibrated carefully. The aim is to control the pace of escalation, mitigate instability, and reduce the costs of brinkmanship. 
  • Three connecting assumptions underlie mutually assured disruption (MAD): 
  1. Coercion could be calibrated without collapsing markets. 
  2. Each side believes it could endure and adapt faster than the other and anticipates its rival is weaker than it appears. 
  3. Global supply chains can be strained as much as possible without breaking them. 
  • The new MAD rewards the side that is willing to push hard and tolerate disruption. 
  • Trump and Xi face a MAD paradox: they are obliged to escalate to maintain credibility, but both sides are approaching the economic and political limits of tolerance. Consequently, both sides are waiting for the other to blink first. 
  • Regardless of the outcome of the Trump-Xi summit in South Korea, it will last only a short while before both sides resume escalating their confrontation until the other breaks first. Although both sides have their own advantages, the side that can act faster and remain resilient longer will prevail. 
 
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