作者/Author(s): Stephen Greenville 

網站來源/Source: The Interpreter 

日期/Date: 09/03/ 2025 

關鍵字/Keywords: 經濟、霸權、美國 


摘要：
美國正逐步卸下國際秩序中安全霸權的角色，同時也正走下經濟霸權的神壇。即使美國不再擔任基於規則的國際經濟秩序的供應者與執行者，該體系還是會存在，但運作效率會大打折扣。 
  • 在第一次世界大戰結束後，特別是 1930 年代，沒有全球經濟霸權導致國際社會爆發大蕭條。著名經濟學家金得伯格（Charles Kindleberger）指出，主要問題在於缺乏穩定的匯率制度與國際資本流動。
  • 因此在二戰結束後，各國設計了布雷頓森林體系來穩定匯率，並創設關稅暨貿易總協定（GATT），後發展為世界貿易組織（WTO），以規範國際貿易。 
  • 美國在這些國際制度中扮演核心角色，並提供具有網路外部性效應的公共財；這些體系的參與者越多，所創造的效益就越大。
  • 然而川普帶領的美國政府，正逐漸撤出這些基於規則的國際秩序，傾向以雙邊方式處理所有外交政策事務。沒有美國參與，這些體系很難保持順暢運作，但美國本身也無法獲得顯著利益。此外，美國在非傳統安全議題上施壓他國的影響力將大打折扣。 
  • 川普承認基於規則的秩序具有價值，但他將關稅視為扭曲秩序以謀取自身利益的工具。除非關稅對美國自身傷害過大，或其他國家成功建立非美國主導的替代性制度，川普才可能停止此作為。 
  • 部分觀點認為中國可能取代美國成為安全與經濟霸權，但這種說法的可能性並不高。人民幣仍缺乏成為全球貨幣所需的深度、監管機制與金融市場開放程度。中國或許不會放棄現有秩序，但會積極爭奪領導權，甚至創建屬於自己的制度。 
 
Summary: 
The US is withdrawing from the international order as a security hegemon and is in the process of retreating as an economic hegemon. Even if the US falls back as a supplier and enforcer of the international rules-based economic order, the system will remain, but not function well. 
  • The absence of an economic hegemon in the years following the end of the First World War, particularly during the 1930s, contributed to the onset of the Great Depression. According to Charles Kindleberger, the primary issue was the absence of a stable exchange rate and international capital flow.  
  • Consequently, as World War II ended, countries devised the Bretton Woods mechanism to stabilize exchange rates and the GATT, subsequently the WTO, to regulate international trade. 
  • The US played a central role in these international regimes and provided other public goods with network externality effects; the more participants these systems have, the more benefits they generate. 
  • Yet, the US is retrenching from these rules-based orders under Trump and preferring a bilateral approach to all foreign policy dealings. These systems will not function smoothly without the US, but the US will not benefit significantly either. Furthermore, the US will have less influence in pressuring others on non-traditional security issues. 
  • Trump acknowledges the value of a rules-based order, but he views tariffs as a tool to distort the order to his favor. Trump may only stop when the tariffs harm the US too much or if other countries manage to build a non-US alternative regime.  
  • Some anticipated that China would replace the US's security and economic hegemony, but they are unlikely. The renminbi still lacks the depth, regulatory mechanism, and financial market openness required of a global currency. China may not abandon current orders, but will actively challenge for leadership or create its own regimes. 
 
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