作者/Author(s): Philip C. Saunders and Melodie Ha 

網站來源/Source: The Diplomat 

日期/Date: 07/05/2025 

關鍵字/Keywords: 軍事、中國、外交 

摘要：

在解放軍推動現代化的同時，中國的全球軍事參與逐漸成為推動外交政策目標的輔助工具。 

  • 中國的軍事外交是一個重要的外交政策工具，它塑造了對北京有利的國際環境，有助於拓展海外通道，以及從外國軍隊收集情報和作戰經驗。 
  • 解放軍的軍事外交活動自2002年至2008年穩定上升，於2009年至2019年間達到高峰，後於COVID-19疫情期間驟減。雖然近年逐漸恢復交流，但尚未達到疫情前水準。 
  • 高層互訪仍是最常見的互動模式，然而，自2009年起，停靠港口與聯合演習的次數亦有所增加，並在2015年之後逐漸下降，可能反映出習近平將重點轉向內部現代化而非對外參與。 
  • 中國的軍事參與集中於亞洲地區，顯示出解放軍的區域優先事項與與鄰近國家的關係。一些與中國有領土糾紛的國家也與解放軍一同進行過軍事演習，但這並不代表他們具有實質戰略聯盟關係。 
  • 解放軍參與多邊安全對話的頻率也持續增加，顯示出其已經不同於以往偏好雙邊互動的行為模式。中國在多邊場域中展現出對敘事控制的自信與雄心，透過主辦或積極參與定期的多邊防務對話以推動其優先事項。 
  • 隨著中國國際地位提升，越來越多外國軍方願意依照中方條件與之接觸，而不再要求完全對等互惠。大多數此類訪問亦結合國防與外交高層會晤，以加強協調安全與外交事務。 
  • 海軍訪港自 2008 年起穩步增加，並於 2017 年達到高峰，顯示解放軍的影響力持續擴大。中國在吉布地建立軍事基地，減少了對其他外國港口的補給訪問需求。 
  • 中國參與的軍事演習多聚焦於非傳統安全議題，意在展現其作為「全球利益相關者」的合作與負責形象。 
  • 國防大學的研究亦指出，解放軍的軍事參與深受外交情勢影響。 
  1. 中國會在外交緊張局勢下暫停軍事接觸，就像南韓和澳洲等案例。
  2. 中國的主要軍事演習夥伴是俄羅斯。與其說他們是正式的聯盟關係，倒不如說是一種務實的結果和權宜之計。 
  • 雖然中國藉試著藉由軍事外交推動其戰略目標，但受限於高度政治控制、重形式輕實質、缺乏夥伴能力建構，以及不願促進實質互通操作等因素，此舉成效有限。 
  • 美國可以告知其盟友解放軍軍事外交的背景。與其完全禁止，美國應告知其盟友潛在的危險，並協助他們降低風險。 
 

 Summary: 

Along with PLA's modernization, China's global military engagement becomes a supporting instrument to advance its foreign policy objectives. A recent report from the U.S. National Defense University evaluated the PLA's military diplomacy from 2002 to 2024, with an emphasis on senior-level visits, naval port calls, and joint exercises. 

  • China's military diplomacy is a crucial foreign policy instrument that shapes the international environment in favor of Beijing, paving the way for overseas access and facilitating intelligence collection and operational learning from foreign militaries. 
  • PLA's military diplomacy activities rose steadily from 2002 to 2008, peaked from 2009 to 2019, and plunged during the COVID-19 pandemic. Although military engagements had rebounded, they had not reached pre-pandemic levels. 
  • Senior-level visits are still the most common form of interaction. However, port calls and joint exercises have increased since 2009 and declined from 2015 onwards, possibly due to Xi's prioritization of internal modernization over outward engagement. 
  • China's military engagement is concentrated in Asia, signifying the PLA's regional priorities and relations with countries within the region. Some countries with territorial disputes with China have also conducted military exercises with the PLA, yet this does not necessarily reflect a strategic alignment. 
  • The PLA has increased its presence in multilateral discussions, shifting from its traditional preference for bilateral engagement. China became less wary of narrative control and more confident and ambitious in shaping regional security based on its priorities by actively hosting or participating in recurring multilateral defense dialogues. 
  • As China gained international stature, foreign militaries were willing to engage China on its terms without demanding full reciprocity. Most of these visits also combined meetings among defense and foreign affairs officials to enhance coordination in security and diplomatic affairs. 
  • Naval port calls, which steadily increased since 2008 and peaked in 2017, showed the PLA's expanding reach. China's establishment of a military base in Djibouti reduced the need for replenishment visits to other foreign ports. 
  • China's participation in military exercises primarily focuses on non-traditional security issues, aiming to project its image of cooperation and responsibility as a global stakeholder. 
  • The NDU study also showed that the PLA's military engagement is susceptible to diplomatic contexts. 
  1. China suspended military engagements amid diplomatic tensions similar to those seen in cases such as South Korea and Australia. 
  2. China's primary military exercise partner is Russia. Rather than a formal alliance, their relationship is more of a pragmatic consequence and marriage of convenience.
  • Although China employs military diplomacy to support its strategic objectives, stringent political control, a focus on form over substance, a lack of partner capacity building, and hesitancy to build real interoperability limit practical returns. 
  • The U.S. could inform its allies of the context of PLA's military diplomacy. Instead of a complete ban, the U.S. could advise its allies on the potential dangers and assist them in mitigating the risks. 
回上層