作者/Author(s): Jacob Stokes, Kareen Hart, Ryan Claffey, and Thomas Corel 

網站來源/Source: Center for a New American Security 

日期/Date: 05/21/2025 

關鍵字/Keywords: 地緣政治、台海危機、區域安全 


摘要：
影響各國反應的特定國家和地區因素 
  • 第一組：地緣前線國家（日本與菲律賓） 
  1. 地理位置接近台灣、與中國存在領土爭端，並與美國有軍事同盟關係，這些國家面臨的風險最高。 
  2. 這些國家的外交部會嚴厲譴責中國的侵略，但由於中國在全球貿易中的中心地位，他們的經濟報復選擇有限。這些國家將優先考慮撤離衝突區域的本國公民，而不直接介入戰事，但會從後方支援美國。 
  • 美國的緊密盟友與夥伴（南韓、澳洲與印度） 
  1. 這些國家與美國關係密切，但距離台海較遠。它們可能會譴責中國的好戰行為，並對中國實施有限度的制裁。雖不會軍事介入，但會支持美國，並在自身邊界附近增加部署，以防止更多衝突。 
  • 第三組：東南亞 
  1. 東南亞國家會試圖保持中立，因為他們害怕公開反對會招致北京的報復。此外，他們將在支持美國干預或支持中國行動之間分裂。 
  • 第四組：歐洲與其他地區
  1. ​​​​​​​歐洲國家可能會在網路作戰上協助台灣與美國，但只有法國與英國有能力將軍事力量投射至印太地區。他們可能會加入對中國的經濟與科技制裁，但他們與中國的經濟整合與互賴，將限制其懲罰的強度。 
  2. 全球南方國家無力進行軍事干預，也無法協助任何一方。除了台灣的邦交國外，多數將同意中國對台灣的主張，並支持兩岸和平統一。 
研究發現與政策建議 
  • 預防台灣危機比讓它爆發更為務實。在對解放軍維持軍事平衡的同時，美國和台灣應避免挑釁中國，因為這可能成為中國侵略的藉口。 
  • 美國和其他國家對台灣的支持有賴於其自我防衛的決心和能力。 
  • 雖然各國對台灣的軍事干預選項有限，但有很多可以協助台灣的方式。 
  • 美國應持續加強與印太地區緊密盟友及其他利害關係國的安全合作，並允許他們發展在沒有美國干預的情況下，獨自抗衡中國的能力。 
  • 鼓勵東南亞各國優先規劃人道救援行動，以防台海發生緊急狀況。 
 
Summary: 
Country- and Region-Specific Factors Shaping States' Responses 
  • Group 1: Geographic Frontline States (Japan and the Philippines) 
  1. They are the most exposed due to their proximity to Taiwan, territorial disputes with China, and military alliance with the U.S. 
  2. Their foreign ministry would harshly condemn Chinese aggression, but due to China's centrality in global trade, they had limited economic retaliation options. They will also prioritize evacuating their civilians from the conflict area without directly intervening and while supporting the U.S. from behind. 
  • Group 2: Close U.S. Allies and Partners (South Korea, Australia, and India) 
  1. They are close U.S. allies but are distant from the Taiwan contingency. They may condemn Chinese belligerence and use limited sanctions on China. They will not intervene militarily but will support the U.S. and increase their presence near their borders to deter additional conflicts. 
  • Group 3: Southeast Asia 
  1. Southeast Asian countries will try to maintain neutrality, fearing Beijing's retaliation for voicing their opposition. Furthermore, they will be divided between supporting the U.S. intervention or siding with Chinese operations. 
  • Group 4: Europe and the Rest of the World 
  1. European countries may assist Taiwan and the U.S. in cyber operations, but only France and the U.K. can project military into the Indo-Pacific. They may join in economic and technological sanctions against China, but their economic integration with China will restrict the intensity of punishment. 
  2. Global South countries are incapable of military intervention or assisting any side. Except for Taiwan's diplomatic allies, they will agree with China's claim on Taiwan and support a peaceful unification process. 
Findings and Recommendations 
  • Preventing a Taiwan crisis is more pragmatic than allowing it to break out. While maintaining a military balance against the PLA, the U.S. and Taiwan should avoid provoking China, which could be a pretext for aggression. 
  • The U.S. and the rest of support for Taiwan relies on its self-defense resolve and capabilities. 
  • There will be limited intervention options, but a wide range of choices exist for assisting Taiwan. 
  • The U.S. must continue to deepen security ties with close Indo-Pacific allies and other stakeholders and allow them to develop capabilities to counter China without U.S. intervention. 
  • Encourage Southeast Asian countries to prioritize and plan for humanitarian evacuation operations in case of a Taiwan contingency. 
 
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