作者/Author(s): Oriana Skylar Mastro and Brandon Yoder 

網站來源/Source: Foreign Affairs 

日期/Date: 05/20/2025 

關鍵字/Keywords:  防衛、台灣、嚇阻


摘要：
美國對中國的嚇阻政策通常包含三個要素：一是強化美國與台灣的軍事能力，以防衛台灣；二是透過外交手段展現美方捍衛台灣的承諾，同時向中國保證美國不支持台灣獨立；三是運用經濟制裁延緩中國的軍事現代化發展。然而，華府官員對這三者之間的平衡概念存在分歧，這將影響嚇阻的具體效果以及中國是否豪賭對台發動戰爭的機率。 

失言引戰 
  • 美國已大幅擴展在台海周邊，特別是日本與菲律賓的軍事存在。然而，為避免駐在國反彈或激怒中國，美國並未部署最先進的武器系統。 
  • 為避免激怒北京，美國可低調地升級印太地區軍事力量，例如秘密部署台海周邊軍力，或提供台灣與美軍互補的武器系統。這些作法能為加強嚇阻爭取時間，同時向北京保證，沒有美國的援助，台灣不可能單獨行動。 
言與行 
  • 成功的嚇阻策略須伴隨適當的保證，但無論川普或拜登政府，都未能有效做到這點，反而因強化與台灣政府的互動，導致北京認為美方已從「戰略模糊」轉向「戰略清晰」。 
  • 雖然外交互動多為象徵性，但在北京眼中，這些舉動已是支持台灣獨立的實質表態，進一步削弱中方對和平統一的信心，甚至可能引發北京鋌而走險、冒然進攻台灣。 
  • 安撫北京也包括美國應在台灣領導人發表疑似獨立的言論時公開表示不贊同。這種譴責能讓中國相信和平統一的可能性，從而降低對台動武的意圖。 
  • 美國可與盟友和多邊組織協調，達成台海和平共識，重申「一個中國」政策，反對單方面改變現狀，或使用暴力手段達成統一。 
 
Summary: 
The U.S. deterrence against China usually involves three components: increasing the U.S. and Taiwan's military capabilities to defend the island, using diplomacy to signal the U.S.'s commitment to defend Taiwan while reassuring China that the U.S. does not support Taiwanese independence, and deploying economic coercion to slow China's military modernization. However, policymakers in Washington disagree on the correct balance of these components, which will affect the context of deterrence and the odds of China gambling for an invasion. 

Loose Lips Start Wars 
  • The U.S. significantly expanded its military presence around Taiwan, particularly Japan and the Philippines. However, the U.S. refrained from deploying advanced capabilities to avoid political backlash from host countries and provoking China. 
  • The U.S. could avoid infuriating Beijing by concealing military upgrades it deployed around Taiwan and providing Taiwan with weapons that function in tandem with U.S. support. These methods will buy time for enhanced deterrence while reassuring Beijing that Taiwan could not act alone without U.S. assistance. 
Words and Deeds 
  • Successful deterrence requires reassurance, but the Trump and Biden administrations failed to do so and even aggravated Beijing by enhancing interactions with the Taiwan government, indicating a shift from strategic ambiguity to strategic clarity. 
  • Although diplomatic interactions may only seem symbolic, Beijing may see them as a move towards Taiwanese independence, undermining their legitimacy. Instead of deterrence, these interactions could provoke Beijing to risk a cross-strait invasion. 
  • Reassuring Beijing should also include public denunciation when Taiwan's leaders make statements suggesting a move towards independence. These criticisms could convince China that peaceful reunification is attainable, thereby reducing the possibility of an invasion. 
  • The U.S. could coordinate with its allies and multilateral organizations on a consensus for peace in the Taiwan Strait that affirms the "one China" policy, rejects unilateral unification, and objects to the use of violent means. 
 
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