作者/Author(s): Joel Wuthnow 

網站來源/Source: War on the Rocks  

日期/Date: 05/27/2025 

關鍵字/Keywords: 軍事、中國、美國、台海 


摘要：
北京的四種選擇 
  • 系統破壞戰（直接，軍事）： 利用飛彈、電子戰等軍事手段，破壞美國在西太平洋的軍力部署與關鍵系統。此舉雖具戰略效果，卻極具挑釁性，可能導致中國陷入無法控制的升級螺旋。此外，美軍仍擁有最強大的軍事實力，系統破壞戰可能無法有效對付美國的軍事能力。 
  • 既成事實（間接，軍事）：由於直接與美軍對抗的風險很大，中國可能以規模軍演掩護實質入侵行動，從而擴大其在台灣周圍的影響力。然而，美國一旦掌握演習的龐大武力規模，便會有所警惕，並發出預警，挫敗中國的入侵。 
  • 主權國施壓（直接、政治）： 中國可能強迫其他國家不讓美軍設置或進出當地的美軍基地。然而，此舉能否成功，取決於北京對各國政府的影響力及各國對北京的態度。 
  • 戰略嚇阻（間接、政治）： 戰略威嚇包括測試美國保衛台灣的決心，混合使用軍事、太空、網路和資訊工具，動搖美國社會穩定，打擊民心士氣，使其不願介入台海戰事，提高中國成功併吞台灣的機會。 
信心至關重要： 
  • 戰略嚇阻可能是解放軍將領最喜歡的選項。北京並不懷疑美國目前的能力和對台灣的承諾，但他們認為美國正在衰落，可能不願展開長期戰爭，中國也認為美國可能會跟進中國統一台灣的論述。 
  • 美國在制定下一階段國防戰略時，必須與中國領導人溝通清楚。 
  1. 首要任務之一是強調印太嚇阻與本土安全的連結性
  2. 其次警告北京勿以攻擊美國本土作為入侵台灣的前奏。 
  3. 此戰略應同時包括削弱中國對戰略嚇阻的信心的說法與策略，並保留與中方進行高層對話的空間，以避免衝突擴大。 
  4. 美國應向中國保證，只要中國不越過紅線，美國就不會改變台灣海峽的現狀。 
 

Summary: 

Beijing's Four Options 

  • System destruction warfare (direct, military): Using military instruments such as missiles and electronic warfare to impede the U.S. military deployment in the Western Pacific and destroy its critical military systems. However, system destruction warfare is provocative and may lead China into an uncontrollable escalation spiral. Furthermore, it may not be effective against U.S. military capabilities as it is still the most formidable force. 
  • Fait accompli (indirect, military): Since confronting the U.S. military directly is risky, China may use limited fait accompli to expand its influence around Taiwan by masking the true nature of its military exercises and invading the island in reality. However, the U.S. will be wary of the sheer scale of force involved in the exercises and will warn Taipei and the world, thwarting China's invasion. 
  • Host nation coercion (direct, political): China may coerce other countries to disallow U.S. military basing and access. However, the success depends on Beijing's influence on the governments and their attitude towards Beijing. 
  • Strategic deterrence (indirect, political): Strategic deterrence involves testing the U.S. resolve in defending Taiwan, using a mixture of military, space, cyber, and informational tools to create chaos in the U.S. and disrupt Americans' daily lives. It may discourage the U.S. from intervening and increase the chances for China to annex Taiwan. 
Confidence Matters: 
  • Strategic deterrence could be the most appealing for Beijing military planners. Beijing does not doubt the U.S.'s current capabilities and commitments toward Taiwan but perceives the U.S. as declining. Therefore, the U.S. may not stomach a long war against China and may follow through with China's discourse on Taiwan unification. 
  • The U.S. must communicate with Chinese leaders clearly when working on its next National Defense Strategy. 
  1.  One priority is emphasizing the link between deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and its homeland security. 
  2. The second involves warning Beijing if it attacks the U.S. homeland as a precursor to the Taiwan invasion. 
  3. The strategy must include other narratives to undermine China's confidence in strategic deterrence while leaving space for high-level dialogue with Beijing for conflict aversion. 
  4. The strategy should reassure China that it will not change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait as long as China does not cross the red line. 
 
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