作者/Author(s): Joel Wuthnow 

網站來源/Source: War on the Rocks  

日期/Date: 05/27/2025 

關鍵字/Keywords: 軍事、中國、美國、台海


摘要：
美國的介入是中國是否侵台的一項關鍵變數。許多兵棋推演預測中國將率先採取行動，迫使美國介入。然而，隨著北京軍事實力與外交影響力日益強大，「戰略嚇阻美國介入」可能成為北京更好的選擇。 
 

 

美國介入是關鍵變數： 

  • 解放軍正逐漸靠近習近平提出的「2027年具備攻台能力」目標。但台灣自衛的能力以及美國是否會出兵介入，仍是困擾中國軍方的兩大不確定因素。 
  • 從近期軍演觀察，中國靠著海軍與海警的數量優勢，可以對台灣實施封鎖。然而，實戰中此舉可能引發以美國為首的「反封鎖行動」，迫使北京不得不縮限封鎖範圍，導致封鎖效果下降，甚至升級衝突。 
  • 中國是否會對台動武，取決於「可接受的代價」，以及他們是否能夠盡量減少或避免美國的干預。 
  1. 美國曾公開多種軍事嚇阻選項，包括在共軍登陸前加以擊退，或對中國施以毀滅性打擊，迫使北京重新思考其行動。 
  2. 如果美國不展現明確介入意圖，中國可能會透過無限期封鎖或加速迫使台灣向北京屈服，以達成既定事實。 
  • 北京可以從直接或間接、軍事或政治這兩個層面，以四種方式反制美國在台灣緊急情況下的干預。這些反介入的目的已非單純嚇阻，而是先發制人或直接擊敗美國。 

Summary: 

U.S. intervention is a key variable in China's invasion of Taiwan. Many tabletop exercises predicted China would make the first move, forcing the U.S. to intervene. However, given Beijing's growing military capabilities and diplomatic influence, strategic deterrence against the U.S. could be most compelling for Beijing. 

The U.S. intervention as a variable: 

  • The PLA is inching closer to Xi's aim of preparing for a war against Taiwan in 2027. However, uncertainties such as Taiwan's ability to self-defend and the possibility of U.S. intervention concern Chinese military planners.  
  • As recent military exercises suggest, China can blockade Taiwan with its numerical superiority in naval and guard forces. In reality, a blockade may provoke a U.S.-led counter-blockade operation, forcing Beijing to retreat to limit the scope of its blockade, thus reducing its effectiveness or escalating the conflict. 
  • Beijing will invade Taiwan if the costs are acceptable while minimizing or avoiding U.S. intervention. 
  1. The U.S. had touted several military deterrence methods that may stop invasion forces before they land or inflict unbearable tolls on China, forcing Beijing to reconsider. 
  2. If the U.S. shows no signs of intervening, China may subdue Taiwan with an indefinite blockade or quick capitulation of the island. 
  • Beijing can counter U.S. intervention in a Taiwan contingency in four ways across two dimensions: direct or indirect and military or political. These counter-interventions aim to preempt or defeat rather than deter. 
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