作者/Author(s): Sean Monaghan 

網站來源/Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies 

日期/Date: 03/24/2025 

關鍵字/Keywords: 軍事、台灣海峽、川普
 

一般性與立即性嚇阻 
  • 美國若在西太平洋加速推動「拒止戰略」，可能遠高於專家與決策者所預估的風險。對美國來說，更好的方法是區分一般性嚇阻和立即性嚇阻。如果威脅嚴重且很急，國家行動者應採用立即性嚇阻，反之亦然。  
  • 國家在面對一般性嚇阻時，有足夠的時間建立足以應對危機的軍力與態勢；然而，國家若在嚇阻體系尚未健全時，面臨緊急情境，可能陷入嚴重的安全困境與誤判風險。 
  • 自1949年以來，美中雙方大多採取一般性嚇阻，僅在特定危機中出現立即性嚇阻。雖然兩國尚未爆發直接衝突，台灣海峽已愈來愈接近潛在衝突熱點。 
  • 美國應該加強一般性嚇阻，並向北京澄清其戰略意圖，以防止新的台海危機或更嚴重的情況發生。但是，這樣台灣可能成為北京運用邊緣政策的戰略漏洞。 
  • 美國可以協助區域盟友提升一般性嚇阻的能力，但這與川普政府的「美國第一」政策相違背。 
注意落差 
  • 改善台灣海峽整體嚇阻能力的可行方案不多。然而，在從一般嚇阻升級到立即性嚇阻之前，美國必須關注五個問題。 
  • 首先，不同前線軍事部署的取捨，將影響作戰效率與風險升級。 
  • 第二，美國的政策選擇和決策時機，如何影響北京的威脅感測與反應？
  • 再者，美國必須為嚇阻失敗的可能性預作準備，包括與中國爆發軍事衝突的場景。 
  • 此外，美國必須更深入地理解中國的嚇阻理論。 
  • 最後，美國可以通過提升軍事交流與外交對話，來降低意外升級的風險。
General and Immediate Deterrence 
  • Rushing to denial in the Western Pacific is more dangerous than U.S. experts and policymakers anticipate. A better way for the U.S. is to differentiate between general and immediate deterrence. If a threat is severe and imminent, state actors should employ immediate deterrence and vice versa.  
  • General deterrence allows the state actors to build forces and postures necessary to mitigate crises. However, state actors usually enter immediate deterrence situations with current deterrent forces, which may turn deterrence into a serious security dilemma and create the basis for misperception. 
  • Since 1949, the U.S. and China have resorted to general deterrence, with occasional immediate deterrence during crises. Although the U.S. and China have not directly clashed, the Taiwan Strait has become more prone to conflict. 
  • The U.S. should enhance general deterrence and clarify its intentions to Beijing to prevent a new Taiwan Strait Crisis or something worse. However, it will result in Taiwan becoming a vulnerability that Beijing could exploit for brinkmanship. 
  • The U.S. could bolster regional allies' general eterrence,but it contradicts the Trump administration's "America First" policies.
Mind The Gap 
  • There are few viable options to improve general deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. However, the U.S. must focus on five dimensions before escalating to immediate deterrence from general deterrence. 
  • First, the trade-off between different forward postures will affect the military efficiency and escalation risk. 
  • Second, how do U.S. choices and timing affect Beijing's threat perception and reaction? 
  • Third, the U.S. should prepare for deterrence failure scenarios, even if it involves a war with China. 
  • Fourth, the U.S. must understand the Chinese deterrence doctrine better. 
  • Fifth, the U.S. can reduce risks of unintended escalation by enhancing military-to-military and diplomatic communications. 
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