作者/Author(s): Sean Monaghan 

網站來源/Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies 

日期/Date: 03/24/2025 

關鍵字/Keywords: 軍事、台灣海峽、川普 


摘要：
隨著川普新政府上台之際，美國可能會加速在台海地區對中國嚇阻的力度。美國政府試圖在堅持「一個中國」的同時，強調自身與台灣的軍事拒止（denial）能力。然而，中國可能會將美國的拒止戰略視為「戰略清晰」，反而提高了衝突升級的可能性。雖然美國專注於嚇阻戰略是正確的選擇，但仍需清楚區分一般性嚇阻與立即性嚇阻，以確保台海的穩定。
不穩定的台海局勢 
  • 如果美中競爭演變為軍事衝突，台海將成為最可能爆發戰事的地區。北京與華府都希望嚇阻彼此避免戰爭，但效果不如預期。中國大幅增加對台灣的軍事施壓，以嚇阻台北與華府；而美國則屢次表現出猶豫不決或嚇阻能力不足的情形。 
  • 台海局勢已不再穩定，任何微小的均衡變化都可能破壞穩定局勢，進而改變全球政治版圖。自布希政府以來，美國持續提升嚇阻能力，以回應中國的崛起。 
  • 拜登政府則是歷來最積極建立區域嚇阻戰略。他在任內將美國的軍事預算增加至少三倍，並發展新的軍事概念以拒止中國。然而，美國的軍事成長速度仍落後於中國，對第一和第二島鏈投資也嚴重不足。 
急於採取拒止戰略的危險性 
  • 近期美國在印太地區的前線部署，顯示出從「懲罰性嚇阻」轉向「拒止性嚇阻」的趨勢。美國新任主管對中政策的國防部次長柯伯吉長期倡導拒止性嚇阻優於懲罰性嚇阻，認為前者能更有效地約束北京，後者則易引發邊緣政策風險。 
  • 然而，美、中、台之間的微妙平衡會導致拒止性嚇阻變得更加危險，容易導致對方的反制行動。此外，安全困境與威脅感知可能會使本已脆弱的局勢雪上加霜，最終導致嚇阻失敗，反而提高了危機爆發的可能性。 
 
Summary: 
The U.S. may accelerate its deterrence against China in the Taiwan Strait amid a new administration. The administration aims to emphasize its and Taiwan's military denial capabilities while adhering to the "one China" principle. However, China may view the U.S.'s military denial strategies as "strategic clarity," thereby increasing the probability of escalation. Although the U.S. is right to focus on deterrence, it should distinguish between general and immediate deterrence to ensure stability in the Taiwan Strait. 
An Unstable Strait 
  • The Taiwan Strait will be the most possible hotspot if the U.S.-China rivalry spills into a military clash. Both Beijing and Washington relied on deterrence to prevent a war, but the deterrence was not as strong as expected. China had drastically increased its military pressure campaign on Taiwan to deter Taipei and Washington, while the U.S. showed repeated reluctance or weakened deterrence. 
  • The Taiwan Strait situation is no longer stable. Any changes to the equilibrium may unravel stability and change global politics. Since the Bush administration, the U.S. has increased deterrence in response to China's rise.  
  • The Biden administration was the most proactive in regional deterrence. It has tripled military funding and conceptualized new operating concepts to deny China. Despite that, the U.S. is still outpaced by China's military growth and faces underinvestment in the First and Second island chains. 
The Dangers of Rushing to Denial 
  • Recent changes in the U.S. forward posture in the Indo-Pacific indicated a shift from deterrence by punishment to denial. Elbridge Colby, the new U.S. undersecretary for defense policy focusing on China, has long advocated for deterrence by denial rather than punishment. The former would better constrain Beijing, while the latter would lead to brinkmanship. 
  • However, the delicate U.S.-China-Taiwan balance renders denial more dangerous and risks counteractions. Furthermore, security dilemmas and threat perception may add fuel to the fragile balance, failing deterrence and increasing the probability of crisis. 
 
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