保護網路與太空安全：美國如何破壞中國的封鎖計畫

近期中共解放軍的軍事演習與作戰準則顯示，他們極有可能封鎖台灣。封鎖行動可以迫使台灣投降，同時提升美國和日本援助力量的風險。此外，中國甚至可能在承平時期透過太空與網路手段實施封鎖。因此，美國必須針對這兩個領域持續嚇阻中國，以在實際危機爆發前，削弱中國的脅迫能力。

• 封鎖是一個傳統的軍事概念，旨在透過外交和經濟策略扼殺並孤立對手。傳統的封鎖行動是現代封鎖的基石，但網路和太空等新興領域的封鎖行動也是必要的。 
• 解放軍設計的聯合作戰封鎖，已經包含傳統與新興領域，也是中國入侵台灣計畫的主要部分，旨在迫使台灣屈服並阻止外國介入。如果網路脅迫（networked coercion）計畫有效，北京甚至不需依賴實體封鎖即可達成目標。 
• 因此，嚇阻中國的網路與太空領域至關重要。然而，這些領域十分特殊，主要仰賴私人企業，且攻擊的門檻較低。
• 中國正在加強網路戰能力，且已證明他們具備此種能力。北京可能在台海危機期間透過網路阻礙美軍動員，擾亂台灣的關鍵設施。美國有幾種方法可以妨礙中國對私營部門的依賴： 

1. 美國應優先蒐集中國網路代理人的情報，包括他們的專業能力、雙邊關係及弱點。 
2. 美國可與民間網路基礎設施業者合作，預先辨識並打擊解放軍相關網路行動。
3. 美國可限制中國取得西方網路基礎設施與服務，同時確保美國私營部門的創新能力。但此類行動必須謹慎規劃，防止意料之外的成果。
4. 美國必須提升盟國與合作夥伴的網路基礎設施，以對抗可能的中國網路攻擊。 

• 中國的太空領域主要依賴民間企業，美國必須找到間接方法，阻礙中國利用商業太空資源進行封鎖行動。 

1. 中國已透過「一帶一路」擴展太空網路，甚至吸引西方投資。 
2. 美國可以利用法規管制、制裁與外交斡旋，迫使企業從與中共政權關係密切的中國太空公司撤資。 

• A blockade is an antique military concept that chokes and isolates an adversary through diplomacy and economic statecraft. Traditional domains are critical in modern blockades, but new domains, especially cyber and space, are also imperative. 
• The PLA designs a joint blockade involving traditional and new domains as part of China's Taiwan invasion plan. It aims to choke Taiwan into submission and impede any foreign assistance. If networked coercion worked against Taiwan, Beijing would not have to rely on physical blockade.  
• Therefore, deterring China in cyber and space domains is essential. However, these domains present unique challenges because they depend on the private sector and can happen at a lower threshold. 
• China is enhancing its cyberwarfare capabilities and has proven its abilities. Beijing may deploy its cyber capabilities to hinder U.S. mobilization during a Taiwan contingency and disrupt Taiwan's critical services. The U.S. has several ways to obstruct China's reliance on the private sector. 

1. The U.S. must prioritize intelligence collection of China's network of cyber agents, their specialties, relations, and vulnerabilities. 
2. The U.S. could cooperate with private internet infrastructure operators to identify and negate PLA-related cyber operations before they can be used. 
3. The U.S. can restrict China's access to Western cyber infrastructure and services while ensuring the innovation of its private sector. However, the U.S. must plan carefully to prevent unintended implications. 
4. The U.S. must reinforce allied and partner cyber infrastructures against potential Chinese cyber attacks.

• Since China's space sector relied on private enterprises, the U.S. must find indirect methods to hinder China's utilization of commercial space resources for blockade operations. 

1. China had expanded its space networks through the BRI and even found Western investments in its projects. 
2.