作者/Author(s): Daniel Byman and Seth G. Jones 

網站來源/Source: Foreign Affairs 

日期/Date: 03/13/2025 

關鍵字/Keywords: 防禦、灰色地帶、台灣 


摘要：
鎧甲上的裂痕
  • 雖然台灣已大幅提升整體社會的韌性，但還是有許多工作亟待推動。 
  • 台灣的能源基礎設施高度依賴進口能源與集中式的配電系統，極易遭到中國的海上封鎖與常規攻擊。 
  • 台灣的通訊基礎設施非常容易受到干擾，尤其中國相關船隻多次破壞台灣的海底電纜，而台灣的備援通訊設施也無法滿足需求。 
  • 大部分台灣人民都有保衛台灣的意志，但懷疑美國是否會提供協助。此外，相較於年長世代，年輕台灣人較缺乏上戰場的意願。 
建立韌性 
  • 台灣政府擔心人民會害怕中國與日俱增的威脅，但他們必須對中國的能力與行動提出充分且定期的警告。 
  • 台灣必須緊急分散和升級能源網，並探索新的可信替代方案。 
  • 馬斯克與中國的商業利益關係密切，因此台灣政府不願選擇 Starlink 作為備援通訊供應商。然而，政府必須尋找其他可靠的低軌道衛星供應商，即便中國切斷台灣的海底電纜時，台灣的通訊基礎設施仍能正常運作。 
  • 台灣也應與美國雲端服務供應商合作，將關鍵資料備份儲存在台灣境外，以降低來自中國網路或實體攻擊造成的損害。 
  • 台灣政府必須將民間部門納入能源、通訊、資訊科技及網路防禦韌性的努力之中。 
美國的協助  
  • 美國已協助台灣強化軍事能力，有效嚇阻中國的常態性威脅，但美國也必須幫助台灣對抗灰色地帶侵略行動。
  • 美國可以比照烏克蘭的模式來協助台灣，並幫助台灣向北約成員國尋求建議，以提升國家韌性。 
  • 美國應協助台灣升級民防能力，並鼓勵台灣政府將民眾納入防禦計畫與演習之中。 
Cracks in the Armor 
  • Although Taiwan has extensively improved its resilience, it still has much to do. 
  • Taiwan's energy infrastructure is alarming because it relies heavily on energy imports and the centralized distribution network. Therefore, it is prone to Chinese maritime blockades and conventional strikes.  
  • Taiwan's communication infrastructure is highly vulnerable to disruption, especially since Chinese-linked ships have damaged Taiwan's undersea cables several times. Taiwan's backup communication infrastructure is also insufficient to meet its demands. 
  • Most Taiwanese have the will to defend Taiwan but doubt the U.S. will come to its aid. Furthermore, young Taiwanese are unwilling to fight than older generations. 
Building Resilience 
  • The Taiwanese government is worried that its population will fear China's increasing threat, but it must give adequate and regular warnings about China's capabilities and actions. 
  • Taiwan must urgently decentralize and upgrade its energy grid and explore new credible alternatives. 
  • Due to Musk's business interest in China, the Taiwanese government is reluctant to work with Starlink as a backup telecommunication provider. However, the government must seek other reliable low-earth orbit satellite providers to ensure its communication infrastructure could work even if China severed Taiwan's undersea cables. 
  • Taiwan must also work with U.S. cloud service providers to store backups of critical data outside the island to mitigate the damage from Chinese cyber and physical attacks. 
  • The Taiwanese government must incorporate the private sector into its energy, telecommunications, information technology, and cyber defense resilience efforts. 
Help from the U.S. 
  • The U.S. assisted Taiwan in enhancing its military capabilities and deterring conventional Chinese threats. However, it must also help Taiwan in countering gray-zone aggression. 
  • The U.S. could prepare Taiwan as it did for Ukraine and help Taiwan obtain advice from NATO members in enhancing national resilience. 
  • The U.S. should help Taiwan upgrade its civil and encourage the government to incorporate its public in defense planning or exercises. 
 
回上層