作者/Author(s): Raphael J. Piliero and Elliot S. Ji 

網站來源/Source: Foreign Policy 

日期/Date: 08/26/2024 

關鍵字/Keywords: Diplomacy, Political Signalling外交、政治訊號、美中競逐 

摘要：

中國以往在較弱勢的時候，常會藉反外國抗議來表達其不滿，甚至向其他國家施壓。現在，即使中國面對嚴重的外交危機，也很少發動民族主義示威，甚至反過來壓制網路上的抗議聲音。比起抗議施壓，習近平選擇展現中國軍事力量，對台灣施壓並重新定義兩岸現狀。 

  • 前幾任中國領導人經常利用群眾抗議作為談判工具。通常對手會選擇屈服，因為他們擔心會威脅到國內的政權穩定。 
  • 在習近平的統治下，中國的外交危機節節攀升，但軍事演習的次數取代了群眾的公開抗議。習近平衡量過不同政治訊號的可能效果，最後決定利用軍事力量，既可以取悅國內觀眾，又能表達中國的不滿，並與外國對手進行談判。 
  • 習近平時常會壓制示威，因此在他任內的實際示威活動非常少。但是貿易抵制和軍事演習等其他形式的抗議偶爾會發生。 
  • 中國內外的政治驅動了北京行為的變化。 
  1. 習近平對中國國力有信心，但對政權穩定沒信心。在習近平的計算中，抗議活動與他的想法不同，甚至可能會對他的統治帶來額外風險。
  2. 弱小的國家會利用抗議來表達對其他強國行動的不滿。習近平坐享鄧小平 韜光養晦 的果實，利用中國地位的提升擴張其地緣政治野心，領土爭端和外交政策危機因而頻生。然而，中國作為大國，也是危機的發起者，國內抗議相比軍事強迫的效力更小。 
  3. 除此之外，近期許多國內抗議活動主要針對中國的經濟和政治困境，而非外交事件。北京政府建設了大量監控和審查技術來監視鎮壓抗議，大力逮捕抗議者，公眾更難以動員。 
  • 習近平展示解放軍力量的做法，反而可能會提升國際危機風險。而美國也經常通過軍事演習來展示其軍事優勢和決心。由於中美雙方都不願退讓，台海周邊的軍事演習恐成常態。
  • 理想的情況是，中美兩國都意識到其行為的危險性，共同合作避免危機升級。然而美中雙方的既得利益不同，他們不太可能修補分歧。中美兩國應進行安全對話，以制定紅線和危機管理機制。
  • 另一種情況是，美中雙方回應的惡性循環可能持續加劇。雖然美中雙方都不願表現出弱勢，但這會更難處理外交關係，甚至可能出現混亂新常態。 
 
Summary: 
China used to incite anti-foreign protests to show its displeasure and pressure other countries when it was a weaker power. Now, China rarely invokes nationalist demonstrations regardless of the severity of foreign policy crises and even quelled any online outcries. Instead, Xi opted to show China's military muscles to coerce Taiwan and redefine the cross-strait status quo. 
  • Chinese leaders before Xi often used mass protests as a bargaining tool. Their opponents usually bow down because they fear the consequences of a regime-threatening instability. 
  • Under Xi, China's diplomatic crises increased, but public protests dwindled and were replaced with military exercises. Xi calculated the prospects of different political signaling and decided that a show of force could please domestic audiences while demonstrating China's ire and bargaining with its foreign counterparts. 
  • Physical demonstrations were rare under Xi's tenure and his administration even suppressed them. However, other forms of protests, such as trade boycotts and military drills happened. 
  • China's domestic and international politics drove the change in Beijing's behavior.
  1. Xi is confident about China's national power but is afraid of his regime's stability. Therefore, protests are incompatible with Xi's calculation and risky to his rule. 
  2. A weaker country will use protests to communicate its disapproval of the actions of other greater powers. Xi reaped the fruits of Deng's "hide and bide," using China's improved position to expand his geopolitical ambitions, resulting in frequent territorial disputes and foreign policy crises. Yet, since China was the initiator of the crisis and was the greater power, domestic protests became more ineffective than military coercion. 
  3. Further, many recent domestic protests in China were directed at Chinese economic and political difficulties, not diplomatic incidents. In these protests, the Beijing government deployed surveillance and censorship technologies to monitor and suppress protests or capture protesters, making it harder for the public to mobilize. 
  • Xi's showcase of the PLA's strength would increase the risks of accidental international crises. However, the US often responded using military drills also to signal its primacy and resolve. With neither China nor the US wanting to back down, military exercises around the Taiwan Strait will become normal. 
  • Ideally, the US and China should recognize the dangers of their behavior and cooperate to limit crises. However, they are unlikely to mend differences due to different vested interests. Nevertheless, the US and China should conduct security dialogues to lay down the redlines and crisis management mechanisms. 
  • Alternatively, the US and China could continue their downward spiral and escalate each response. Neither side wants to appear weak, but it will lead to unamenable diplomatic relations and worse, a chaotic new normal. 
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