作者/Author(s): Jude Blanchette and Hal Brands 

網站來源/Source: Center for Strategic & International Studies 

日期/Date: 07/25/ 2024 

關鍵字/Keywords: 灰色地帶戰爭 
 

情境三：離島被奪 

  • 除了澎湖和台灣本島外，美國並沒有義務保護其他離島，這些離島可能成為中國的目標。奪取這些離島並不一定是全面入侵台灣，可能是考驗美國和台灣的風險承受能力，以及華盛頓保護台灣的承諾和可信度。
  • 東沙島人口稀少、防禦薄弱，對台灣本身戰略價值不大，是一個高機率被中國奪取的目標。如果奪島過程中傷亡數量很小，可能不會引起報復行動，但會讓美國和台灣陷入兩難。
  • 然而，如果中國的最終目標是要吞併台灣，東沙島對他們而言幾乎沒有戰略價值。而且奪取東沙島行動中可能會驚動鄰國，迫使它們對中國採取更強硬的立場。 
情境四：偽旗行動 
  • 在偽旗行動情境中，中國可能會挑釁台灣攻擊其船隻和飛機，或使用假訊息戰術，製造出台灣想要發起攻擊的情勢，藉機作為中國大規模且果斷攻台的藉口，或迫使台灣屈服。 
  • 這不僅讓美國和台灣的決策變得複雜，中國也能藉機展示其在台灣周圍的壓倒性優勢，創造新的現狀。 
  • 然而，美國卓越的情報能力可能會在中國採取偽旗行動之前就先攔截它們，或至少在情勢升級之前釐清事情。 
結論 
  • 無論採取何種手段，灰色地帶的脅迫都可能引起戰略反彈。中國可能會利用台灣的弱點，考慮進行有限的侵略，將風險最小化。此外，中國可能會為台灣和美國製造政治困境。 
  • 除了加強軍事嚇阻外，台灣和美國也應設計非動能懲罰措施，在不造成更大軍事衝突的前提下對台灣進行打擊。美國也可以與其理念相近盟友協調這些懲罰措施。 
  • 美國應該警告北京任何在台灣海峽現狀上進行重大脅迫性改變的後果。 
  • 在不爆發戰爭的衝突中，台灣對美國的信心以及自我韌性是挫敗北京的關鍵 
Scenario 3: Offshore Island Seizure 
  • Apart from Penghu and the Taiwan main island, the US does not have a binding agreement to protect other outlying islands, making them potential targets for Chinese takeover. The takeover does not necessitate the beginning of a full-scale invasion, but it may test the US and Taiwan's risk appetite and Washington's commitment and credibility in protecting Taiwan. 
  • Pratas Island (東沙島) is an attractive target due to its small population, sparse defense, and little inherent strategic value to Taiwan. If there are no or low casualties, a Chinese seizure of the island might not incite any retaliations but could put the US and Taiwan in a dilemma. 
  • Yet, it also poses little or no strategic value for China if the ultimate aim is to annex Taiwan. Further, taking over the island may alarm neighboring countries and compel them to be tougher against China.  
Scenario 4: False Flag 
  • In the "false flag" scenario, China would provoke Taiwan to attack its ships and planes or use disinformation tactics that blame Taiwan's attack. Then, China could justify its large-scale and decisive attack on Taiwan or pressure Taiwan into submission. 
  • This scenario not only complicates the US and Taiwan's decision-making, but it also allows China to showcase its overwhelming dominance around Taiwan and create a new status quo. 
  • However, the US's exceptional intelligence capabilities may foil Chinese false flag operations before they can happen or at least clear things up before the situation escalates. 
Conclusions 
  • Regardless of the means, gray-zone coercion may invite strategic blowback. However, China may exploit Taiwan's weaknesses and consider limited aggression because the risks are lower. Further China could create a political dilemma for Taiwan and the US. 
  • Besides reinforcing military deterrence, Taiwan and the US should devise non-kinetic punishment that could inflict damage on Taiwan without creating a larger military conflict. The US could coordinate the punishment with its close allies too. 
  • The US should also warn Beijing of the implications of significant coercive change in the status quo of the Taiwan Strait. 
  • In a contest short of war, Taiwan's confidence in the US and its self-resilience is the key to thwarting Beijing. 
 
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