作者/Author(s): Ketiain Vivian Zhang 

網站來源/Source: Texas National Security Review Vol. 7, Iss. 3 

日期/Date: 2024/夏 

關鍵字/Keywords: 制裁、經濟、政治訊號 

 

摘要：

在法國、日本、菲律賓和台灣的案例中，中國在沒有任何警告的情況下直接實施制裁，但制裁理由模糊或不明確。 
 

模糊制裁和執行制裁  

 
  • 中國大多是因為政治性原因使用模糊制裁，不屬於WTO 的國家安全是另一種例外，如台灣主權、中國與其他國家的領土爭端或聲譽問題。在大多數情況下，有關物品與中國的國家安全問題並沒有明確的聯繫。
  • 這讓中國大陸能夠否認任何責任，或模糊政府指令與商業行為之間的界限。在某些情況下，中國甚至會給出與制裁毫無關係的理由，以規避世貿組織的規定，避免遭到制裁對象的報復，同時通過其他渠道轉移貿易，維持與制裁對象的貿易往來。 
  • 中國模糊的制裁旨在最大程度合法化，同時防止其他國家違背其北京利益，或展示自己保護國家利益的決心。 
明確威脅（未執行） 
  • 中國可以把政治和安全詞語分開使用，例如將對台軍售說成是國家安全威脅，並將矛頭指向特定公司。這表明中國清楚地意識到世貿組織規則的限制，並利用國家安全豁免來闡述問題。 
  • 中國學者也鼓勵政府使用制裁來保護基本的國家安全利益，但在非安全問題使用制裁時應謹慎行事。 
  • 然而，被制裁的公司通常從事國防業務，並且與中國市場或政府沒有關聯。

其他解釋  

  • 雖然中國以「受害者」為核心的意識形態論點很重要，但中國政府實施制裁的行為並不一致，中國學者之間也缺乏討論。 
  • 官僚政治無法支持制裁模式的經驗證據。有些受訪者證實制裁由中國中央政府決定。
  • 中國政府建立新的法律架構也不能完全解釋他們為何開始明確地宣布經濟制裁。
Summary: 
In the case of France, Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan, China implemented sanctions directly without any warnings, but the justification for sanctions is vague or unspecified. 
Vague and executed sanctions 
  • When China uses vague and executed sanctions, the reasons are mainly political and do not fall under the WTO's national security exception, such as Taiwan's sovereignty, China's territorial dispute with other countries, or reputation issues. In most instances, the items in question do not have a clear linkage to China's national security issue. 
  • It allows the Chinese government to deny any responsibility or blur the lines between government-instructed or commercial actions. In some instances, China cited irrelevant causes for sanctions to avoid violating WTO regulations or retaliation from the targets. Yet, China also maintained trade with the sanctioned targets by diverting trade through other sources. 
  • China's vague and executed sanctions aim to achieve maximum target compliance, prevent other countries from defying its national interests, or show its resolve in protecting its national interests. 
Explicit Threats (not executed) 
  • China can distinguish between political and security rhetorics. Therefore, China could justify arms sales to Taiwan as a national security threat and target specific companies. It shows that China is well aware of the constraints of the WTO rules and uses the national security exemption to establish a clear relation of the issue. 
  • Chinese scholars also encouraged the government to use sanctions to protect essential national security interests but act with caution when using sanctions for non-security issues. 
  • However, the targeted companies usually engage in defense and do not have relations with the Chinese market or government. 
Alternative Explanations 
  • ​​​​​​​Although ideational-based arguments centered on the Chinese "victimhood" discourse are significant, there is incoherence in Beijing's behavior in implementing sanctions and a lack of discussion among Chinese scholars. 
  • Bureaucratic politics cannot support the empirical evidence on the pattern of sanctions. Some interviewees confirm the Chinese central government decides the sanctions. 
  • The establishment of new legal frameworks by the Chinese government also cannot fully explain China's preference for more explicitly announced economic sanctions. 
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