

美國保台的能力究竟如何？ ——看美國人怎麼說

Is The United States Capable of Protecting Taiwan?
—See What the Americans Have Said

蘇起 整理

Compiled by SU Chi

10/2022

美國保台的能力究竟如何？

——看美國人怎麼說

台灣安全與台海和平直接影響台灣所有民眾的生命財產，是極其嚴肅的課題，務需廣挖深掘、實事求是，才能接近真相。本檔案全部取自英文資料，依公開時序排列，共 56 條，絕大部分來自美國國防部、國會、前任高階官員、及重要智庫。小部分才是個別專家學者的研究。對


美國「力不足保台」的質疑是由長年接受美國政府委託、從事安全研究的蘭德公司於 2015 年率先提出。當即引起筆者的高度重視，並開始不時撰寫讀書心得，以略盡知識分子的言責。2019 年起，美國政府、智庫、及學者的警訊越來越頻密，內容越來越直白，今似已為美國政學媒界共識。國人不可不警惕。本中英文檔案均載於台北論壇網站〈<http://www.taipeiforum.org.tw>〉，敬請查閱。

Is The United States Capable of Protecting Taiwan?

—See What the Americans Have Said

Peace across the Taiwan Strait and Taiwan's security are deadly serious issues impacting directly on the lives and properties of all the people on Taiwan. Hence it requires extensive, deep, and pragmatic studies to get to the true picture. All of the following 56 items are drawn from open sources in English language, the overwhelming majority being the reports made by the Pentagon, Congress, former senior officials, and major think tanks. Only a small minority are books and articles by individual scholars. They are arranged by the order they appeared in public.

The first warning shot about the U.S. "less than fully capable of protecting Taiwan" appeared to have been fired by the RAND corporation, an esteemed think tank long devoted to security studies and mostly supported by U.S. Defense Department, in 2015. This study caught my attention immediately. To fulfill my role as a concerned intellectual, I have since written op-eds in Chinese from time to time -- and translated them into English for those who cared to read -- to elucidate the views and findings of those American officials and experts on this vital issue for the consumption of Taiwan's public who have not been made aware of the harsh truth on this existential issue by the mass media. As seen from the list below, the frequency and sense of urgency evoked by their remarks have heightened unmistakably since 2019. It is probably no exaggeration to say that the alarmist view has become the main stream among the U.S. elites today. It therefore behooves the Taiwan public to sit up and pay attention. Both the Chinese and English versions are available at the website of Taipei Forum: < <http://www.taipeiforum.org.tw> >




**2015 Eric Heginbotham et al,
The U.S.-China Military
Scorecard: Forces, Geography,
and the Evolving Balance of Power:
1996-2017**

RAND Corporation

“(The) Chinese submarine fleet has made major gains relative to U.S. defensive capabilities. Under any set of assumptions assessed within this model, the number of expected potential engagements by

Chinese submarine against U.S. carriers increase by more than an order of magnitude (and in some cases, by more than 20 times) between 1997 and 2017 ... Given the cost, the number of personnel, and symbolic importance of U.S. aircraft carriers, this level of risk could prompt U.S. commanders to hold carriers back until areas close to China could be sanitized by U.S. anti-submarine assets.” (p. 197) “By 2017, further improvements across all areas of Chinese anti-surface warfare, especially submarine capabilities, led to China’s advantage in the Taiwan case ... the Chinese advantage refers only to the situation at the first few weeks of conflict ... critically important to, for example, a ground campaign in Taiwan...” (p. 200) “The analysis presented in this chapter indicates that while the U.S. maintains unparalleled military forces overall, it faces a progressively receding frontier of military dominance in Asia ... As a result, the balance of power between the U.S. and China may be approaching a series of tipping points, first, in contingencies close to the Chinese coast (e.g., Taiwan) and possibly later in more distant locations (e.g., the Spratly Islands) ... It is difficult to state with precision when these points might be reached, but a tipping point in a Taiwan conflict might come as early as 2020.” (p. 342)



2015 年 Eric Heginbotham (MIT 研究員，時任蘭德公司研究員) 等 14 人美中軍事計分卡：軍力、地理與變遷中的實力對比：1996-2017

蘭德公司 發表

中共潛艦相對於美國戰力已有長足進步。根據本研究所用模型的任何假設，中共潛艦能與美國航母接戰的次數在 1997 到 2017 年間都成長了好多倍，在某些情況下甚至達到 20 倍之多...由於航母成本高、兵員多、象徵意義大，這種風險就使航母指揮官不願進入接近中國大陸的海域，除非先由反潛能量清掃一遍。(頁 197)

到 2017 年時，中國反艦作戰能力的全面提升，尤其是潛艦戰力，導致中共對台作戰的優勢...存在於戰事初始幾星期。這對攻台地面作戰極度重要。(頁 200)

本章以上分析顯示，美國軍力雖仍全球無敵，但在亞洲地區美國優勢的邊界線卻逐漸後縮...以致美中軍力對比正逼近一個又一個轉折點，先是離大陸最近的地方 (像台灣)，其次是較遠的地方 (如南沙群島) ...何時轉折點會出現，很難預測，但台海衝突的轉折點可能在 2020 就會到。(頁 342)



**January 2016 Michael Green,
Kathleen Hicks, Mark Garcia**

**Asia-Pacific Rebalance 2025:
Capabilities, Presence, and
Partnership: An Independent Review
of U.S. Defense Strategy in the Asia-
Pacific,**

**Center for Strategic and International
Studies**

“The reach of China’s A2/AD system is such that U.S. carrier-based assets will likely need to stay outside the most dangerous zones, at least during the initial phase of a conflict.”
(p. 130)

2016 年 1 月

Michael Green (時任喬治城大學亞洲研究主任，曾任小布希政府國安會亞洲部門資深主任)

Kathleen Hicks (曾任國防部副次長，時任戰略與國際研究中心國際安全計畫主持人，2021 出任國防部副部長，現為國防部最高女性官員)

Mark Cancian (曾任職白宮管理與預算辦公室與國防部長辦公室) 等 21 人

亞太再平衡 **2025**：能力，存在，夥伴關係

戰略與國際研究中心 發表

中共反介入 / 區域拒止能力已經達到美國航母必須停留在最危險海域以外的地步，起碼衝突初期必須如此。(頁 130)



War with China
Thinking Through the Unthinkable



2016

**David Gompert,
Astrid Struth
CevallosCristina L.
Gavafola**

**War with China: Thinking through the
Unthinkable**

RAND Corporation

“**W**ar between the two countries could begin with devastating strikes; be hard to control; last months, if not years; have no winner; and inflict huge losses on both side military forces. The longer such a war would rage, the greater the importance of economic, political, and international effects. While such non-military effects could fall hardest on China, they could also greatly harm the U.S. economy and the U.S. ability to meet challenges worldwide.” (p. xvii)

2016 年 David Gomper (曾任國家情報副總監、代理總監)
等 3 人

與中國的戰爭：想像不能想像的

蘭德公司 報告

美中戰爭可能以相互痛擊開始；一開始就難控制；就算不持續幾年，也有好幾個月；並對雙方軍事力量造成嚴重損失。戰爭持續越久，經濟、政治、及國際效應越重大。這些非軍事效應雖對中國傷害較大，但也會重創美國經濟及其因應全球其他挑戰的能力
(頁 xvii)



JUNE 28, 2017

First Strike: China's Missile Threat to U.S. Bases in Asia

By CDR Thomas Shugart, USN



June 2017

Thomas Shugart and Javier Gonzalez

First Strike: China's military Threat to U.S. Bases in East Asia

Center for New American Security

“For a preemptive strike on U.S. forces in Japan, the PLA demonstrated the precision strike capability and missile inventory it would need to strike every U.S. ship in port, more than 200 grounded U.S. aircraft; and all major fixed headquarters, logistics facilities, and runways in U.S. airbases.” (p. 13)

2017 年 6 月

Thomas Shugart (長期任職美國海軍，包括擔任核潛艦長及國防部淨評估辦公室成員)

Javier Gonzalez (長期任職海軍，曾任驅逐艦長)

第一擊：中共對美國東亞基地的軍事威脅

新美國安全中心 發表

如對美軍駐日基地實施先發打擊，解放軍已證明它的精準打擊能力與飛彈儲量足夠打擊美國駐日所有軍艦，200 架以上地面戰機，和所有主要的固定指揮所、後勤設施、以及基地上的跑道。

(頁 13)



U.S. Military Capabilities
and Forces for
a Dangerous World
Rethinking the U.S. Approach to Force Planning



December 2017

David Ochmanek et al. U.S.

**Military Capabilities and Forces for a
Dangerous World: Rethinking the U.S.
Approach to Force Planning**

RAND Corporation

“...the U.S. now fields forces that are, at once, larger than needed to fight a single major war, failing to keep pace

with the modernizing forces of great-power adversaries, poorly postured to meet key challenges in Europe and East Asia, and insufficiently trained and ready to get the most operational utility for many of its active component units. Put more starkly, assessments in this report will show that the U.S. forces could, under plausible assumptions, lose the next war they are called upon to fight, despite the U.S. outspending China on military forces by a ratio of 2.7:1 and Russia by 6:1.” (p. xii)

“In conclusion, our assessment of a future clash of arms with China suggests that ... in the 2020 timeframe and beyond, U.S. and allied forces would have to fight for advantages that, until now, they have been taken for granted ... The U.S. and allied decision-makers could lose confidence in the ability of U.S. forces to defeat aggression. Potential adversaries could be correspondingly emboldened to resort to coercion or aggression to up-end the status-quo in East Asia and South-East Asia.” (pp. 18-19)



U.S. Military Capabilities
and Forces for
a Dangerous World
Rethinking the U.S. Approach to Force Planning




2017 年 12 月

David Ochmanek (曾任國防部副助理部長)、**Peter A. Wilson** (曾任英國外交部亞太司長、駐巴西、荷蘭大使) 等 5 人因應危險世界的美國軍力：反思美國的軍力計畫

蘭德公司 報告

美國當前軍力超過打一場大戰的需要，卻不能與現代化大國對手的軍力同步，軍力配置也難同時應付歐洲及東亞的挑戰，訓練與戰備不足也讓許多常備單位不能發揮最佳戰力。講得更直白點，本報告的評估顯示，在某些特定假設下，美國可能會輸掉下一場戰爭，儘管美國國防預算是中國的 2.7 倍，俄國的 6 倍。(頁 xii)

綜上以觀，我們對未來美中軍事衝突的評估是...在 2020 年及未來，美國與其盟邦過去視為理所當然的優勢，現在都要費力才能取得...美國與盟邦的決策者可能對美國擊退侵略者的能力失去信心。潛在對手將更大膽訴諸施壓或侵略來改變東亞與東南亞的現狀。



November 2018

Eric Edelman and Gary Roughead, et al.
**Providing for Common Defense: the
 Assessment and Recommendation of the
 National Defense Strategy Commission**
 United States Institute of Peace


“The United States confronts a grave crisis of national security and national defense...

(Because) of foreign and domestic factors, America’s longstanding military advantages have diminished. The country’s strategic

margin for error has become distressingly small. Doubts about America’s ability to deter and, if necessary, defeat opponents and honor its global commitments have proliferated. Previous congressionally mandated reports, such as the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel and the 2014 National Defense Panel, warned that this crisis was coming. The crisis has now arrived, with potential dire effects not just for U.S. global influence, but also for the security and welfare of America itself.” (p. 1)

“If the U.S. had to fight Russia in a Baltic contingency or China in a war over Taiwan, Americans could face a decisive military defeat.” (p. 14)

(If) “In 2024, China undertakes a surprise attack to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence. As Chinese forces launch air and missile attacks, cripple the Taiwanese Navy, and conduct amphibious landings, it becomes clear that decisive U.S. intervention will be required. Unfortunately, America can no longer mount such an intervention at acceptable cost. China’s missile, air, surface, and undersea capabilities have continued to grow as U.S. defense spending has stagnated. Large parts of the Western Pacific have become “no-go” zones for U.S. forces. The Pentagon informs the President that American could probably defeat China in a long war, if the full might of the nation was mobilized. Yet it would lose huge numbers of ships and aircraft, as well as thousands of lives, in the effort, in addition to suffering severe economic disruptions---all with no guarantee of having decisive impact before Taiwan was overrun. (p. 15)



2018 年 11 月

Eric Edelman (曾任國務次卿及副總統國安副顧問)、**Gary Roughead** (曾任國防部次長、海軍作戰部長、太平洋與大西洋戰區司令) 等 **12** 人


提供共同防衛：(國會授權之) 國防戰略委員會致國會的評估與建議

美國和平研究所 報告

美國正面臨國家安全與國防危機...由於

種種國內外因素，美國長期的軍事優勢正在消失中，我國的戰略犯錯空間正在縮小中，而美國是否有能力嚇阻及必要時擊敗對手並維持全球承諾的懷疑也正在擴散中。過去幾個國會授權的研究報告，如 2010 年的「四年國防檢討獨立小組」與 2014 年的「國防小組」都曾預警危機的來臨。現在危機真的臨頭了，不但衝擊美國的全球影響力，而且及於美國自身的安全與福利。(頁 1)
如果美國必須在波羅的海與俄國作戰，或在台灣與中國作戰，美國將面臨決定性的失敗。(頁 14)

(假設) 中國在 2024 年對台灣發動突襲以阻止它宣布台獨。在中國軍隊發起空中與飛彈攻擊，摧毀台灣海軍，並實施兩棲登陸以後，顯然只有美軍強力介入才能保台時，不幸美國卻不再能夠在可承受成本範圍內介入。近年中國飛彈、戰機、及水面與水下兵力持續成長，而美國國防支出卻連年萎縮，以致西太平洋的大部分海域已經變成美艦禁區。五角大廈知會白宮說，如果戰事拖長而美國也願意全力投入，美國仍然會贏。但這樣做美國將損失大量戰艦戰機，犧牲數千戰士性命，連同嚴重經濟破壞。即使犧牲如此重大，也不能保證可以挽救台灣被佔領的命運。(頁 15)




2018

Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes

Red Star over the Pacific,

Naval Institute Press

“(Chinese) analysts note that the anti-ship ballistic missile’s most notable features would be its long range, high speed (Mach 3 to 15), top-attack flight profile, and strong penetration capability and destructive power ... In 2009, (Chinese) authors report that their simulations indicated that 95 percent of ASBMs would get past fleet defenders ... (Other Chinese engineers) note that a hypersonic missile could devastate a target carrier without carrying an explosive warhead, owing to the kinetic energy unleashed by the force of impact alone. If hypersonic technologies can be combined with stealth technologies, the missiles could become even more survivable ... They calculate that a missile boasting of a velocity in excess of Mach 5 could hit an enemy carrier at a range of 1000 km or more in 10 minutes or less. The Missile’s extreme velocity, range, and striking power would give the carrier scant time to take evasive maneuvers or intercept the incoming threat.” (pp. 232-234)



2018 年

Toshi Yoshihara (吉原恆淑，戰略與預算評估中心資深研究員，曾任海軍戰院亞太研究中心主任)

James Holmes (海軍戰院海洋策略主任)

太平洋上的紅星

海軍出版社 發表

(中共) 分析家說，反艦導彈最重要特色是它的長程、高速 (3-15 馬赫)、由上直下飛行途徑，與強大的穿透力及破壞力...在 2009 年時，(中共) 作者寫到，他們反艦導彈的模擬測試顯示，穿透對手反飛彈系統的機率高達 95%... (另有中共工程師) 說，一個極音速飛彈只靠它的撞擊力道，不需要攜帶爆炸性彈頭，就能擊沉一艘航母。如果極音速科技加上匿蹤科技，飛彈存活率自然更高...他們計算說，一個速度超越 5 馬赫的飛彈，擊中一艘 1000 公里或更遠的航母，只需要 10 分鐘或更短的時間。飛彈這種極端速度、打擊範圍、及力道，讓航母幾乎沒有時間做閃避或攔截動作。(頁 232-234)



March 14, 2019

Patrick Shanahan

**Acting Defense Secretary's statement
at the Senate Armed Services
Committee**

“China has made investments specifically intended to offset U.S. advantages, including robust anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) networks, more lethal forces, and new strategic capabilities. If deployed to overwhelm U.S. or allied combat power at initial stages of a conflict, these capabilities could seek to achieve a fait accompli that would make reversing Chinese gains more difficult, militarily and politically.” (p. 3)

2019 年 3 月 14 日

Patrick Shanahan (國防部代理部長)

參議院軍事委員會證詞

中共專門針對美軍做了大量投資，包括強勁的反介入 / 區域拒止系統、火力更大的武器、嶄新的戰略能力等等。在衝突初期中共軍方會用這些軍力壓倒美國及盟邦戰力，造成「既成事實」，讓（美國）很難從軍事上與政治上翻轉中共的斬獲。（頁 3）

Spring 2019

Sam Goldsmith

**U.S. Conventional Access Strategy:
Denying China a Conventional First-
Strike Capability**

Naval War College Review, Vol 72, No. 2

“ The PLA’s most significant counter-intervention capability is its inventory of long-range conventional ballistic missiles,

particularly given that the U.S. military does not field an equivalent capability. PLA DF-21 MRBMs and ASBMs have ranges around 1,500 km; PLA’s DF-26 IRBMs and ASBMs have ranges around 3,000 km...(They) would force relatively slow U.S. maritime assets to run a lethal gauntlet of PLA ASBMs while they are unable to return fire and degrade the threat. The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence has assessed that the PLA’s conventional ballistic missiles use menacing reentry vehicles (MARVs) equipped with infrared and radar seekers, enabling PLA ballistic missiles to acquire fixed or moving targets during terminal phase of light. PLA MARVs are difficult opponents because of their significant agility and high reentry speeds (around Mach 12), as well as electronic warfare, decoy, chaff and flare countermeasures...MARV penetrator warheads could sink USN ships outright, where submunition warheads could inflict a range of damage to them.” (p. 41)



2019 年 春季號

Sam Goldsmith (澳洲戰略政策研究所
紅軍研究主任)

美國傳統進入策略：拒止中國的傳統第一擊能力

(美國) 海軍戰院評論，卷 **72**，期 **2** 發表



解放軍最重要的反介入能力就是他的長

程傳統導彈，尤其美國根本不具備同樣的能力。解放軍的東風 21 中程導彈擊反艦導彈具有 1500 公里射程；東風 26 中長程導彈及反艦導彈有 3000 公里射程...美國海上武力因此將陷入解放軍反艦導彈的銅人陣中，無力回擊以降低威脅。美國海軍情報局曾估計，解放軍裝置紅外線及雷達尋標器的可變軌導彈能夠在飛行終端階段找到固定甚或移動中的目標。它們的靈活性、穿越大氣層的高速 (約 12 馬赫)、以及它們的電子作戰能力、誘餌、干擾片及熱誘彈等，讓它們很難應付...可變軌導彈的彈頭能直接擊沉美艦，次等殺傷力的飛彈也足以重創美艦。(頁 41)



May 19, 2019

Eldridge Colby,

How to Win America's Next War
Foreign Policy

The era of untrammelled U.S. military superiority is over. If the United States delays implementing a new approach, it risks losing a war to China or Russia—or backing down in a crisis because it fears it would—with devastating consequences for America's interests.


2019 年 5 月 19 日

Eldridge Colby (曾任國防部副助理部長、2018 年美國國防戰略報告主持人之一)

美國如何贏得下場戰爭

外交政策雙月刊 (電子檔) 發表

美國軍事所向無敵的時代結束了。如果美國遲不採取新的途徑，它就有輸給中國或俄國，或遇難退縮的風險，結果是美國國家利益嚴重受損。



June 2019

Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy Report

“The core diagnosis of the National Defense Strategy (2018) is that DoD’s military advantage vis-à-vis China and Russia is eroding.” (p.16)

“If our competitors decide to advance their interests through force, they are likely to enjoy a local military advantage at the outset of conflict. In a fait accompli scenario, competitors would seek to employ their capabilities quickly to achieve limited objectives and forestall a response from the U.S. and its allies.” (p. 18)


2019 年 6 月

國防部印太戰略報告

美國國防部 發表

美國國防戰略 (2018) 報告的核心診斷是：我國軍力相對於中國及俄國的優勢正在流失中。(頁 16)

如我國競爭對手決定用武力來推進它們的利益，它們可能會在衝突初期佔有局部軍事優勢。依照「既成事實」的劇本，它們會尋求快速達到有限目標並阻止美國及其盟友反應。(頁 18)



**Beating the Americans
at their Own Game**
An Offset Strategy with Chinese Characteristics
Robert O. Work and Greg Grant



June 2019


Robert Work and Greg Grant

Beating the Americans at Their Own Game: An Offset Strategy with Chinese Characteristics

Center for New American Security

“However, after considering what the Chinese military has accomplished technologically in little more than two

decades, and what it plans to do in the decades to come, any objective assessment must at least consider that the PLA may hold the initiative and control the time line, and that the U.S. Joint Forces itself may be close to being the victim of a deliberate, patient, and robustly resourced military-technological offset strategy. And those who reject this rather sobering assessment need only examine the results of extensive war-gaming the DoD has undertaken in recent years, modeling military action between the U.S. and China. The outcome of those wargames indicate that, absent fundamental changes to DoD’s planned capabilities and current warfighting concepts, the U.S. Joint Forces could face defeat at the hands of the Chinese military in plausible scenarios.” (p. 15)



**Beating the Americans
at their Own Game**
An Offset Strategy with Chinese Characteristics
Robert O. Work and Greg Grant

2019 年 6 月

Robert Work (曾任國防部副部長，
2014-2017，跨越兩黨總統及三任部
長，及海軍副部長)

Greg Grant (三任國防部長撰稿人、
駐伊拉克及阿富汗記者)




在美國設定的遊戲中打敗美國：具有中
國特色的拒止策略

新美國安全中心發表

有鑒於過去二十多年中共軍力在科技上的長足進步以及它未來的可能作為，任何客觀評估至少必須考量到解放軍已經擁有主動權並掌握時機節拍，而美軍將受制於一個思維縝密、耐力強勁、且資源豐富的軍事與科技拒止策略。任何不相信這項澆冷水評估的人，不妨仔細看看五角大廈近幾年所做的模擬美中軍事衝突的大型兵棋推演。這些推演顯示，除非我國防部改變目前的計畫兵力及作戰構想，否則美軍將在任何想像的劇本中都輸給中國。

(頁 15)



June 2019


Thomas G. Mahnken, Travis Sharp, Billy Fabian, Peter Kouretsos

Implementing a Strategy of Maritime Pressure in the Western Pacific

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

“The U.S. military has a problem in the Western Pacific: the tyranny of distance

and time...China’s military capabilities have increasingly matured to the point where, if directed by the Communist Party of China, the PLA could launch a rapid attack to change the status quo, including territorial seizure, before the U.S. could meaningfully respond, thus presenting Washington and its allies with a fait accompli...As General Robert Neller, Commander of the U.S. Marine Corps, remarked, ‘we are going to have to fight to get to the fight,’ Under these circumstances, American political leaders might face the unenviable choice of doing nothing or escalating to higher level of violence. Either way, the national interests of both the U.S. and its closest allies would suffer dramatically.” (p. 1)



2019 年 6 月

Thomas G. Mahnken（戰略與預算評估中心總裁，曾任國防部副助理部長、及淨評估辦公室成員）等 4 人

西太平洋的海上施壓策略

戰略與預算評估中心 (CSBA) 發表

美國在西太平洋的武力有個難題：地理距離與時間...中共軍力已經成熟到一個程度，如果黨中央下令，解放軍可以立即武力犯台改變現狀，包括奪佔土地，並在美國及其盟邦能反應前就造成既成事實...陸戰隊司令 **Robert Neller** 曾說過「我們必須奮力作戰才能進入作戰地區」。既然如此，美國政治領導的選擇就很困難，或者袖手旁觀，或者把戰事升高。不論哪個選擇，美國及其盟邦的國家利益都會劇烈受損。（頁 1）



November 2019

2019 Report to Congress of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission

“**B**eijing could decide to initiate a military conflict even if calculated the U.S would intervene due to its confidence it would be able to effectively deter or defeat intervening U.S. military forces.” (p. 303)

“The cross-strait military balance has decidedly shifted in China’s favor in recent years. This change presents a major challenge both to Taiwan’s ability to defend itself and to the U.S. ability to intervene effectively in a cross-strait conflict. The altered military balance has led China to act toward Taiwan with growing impunity, increasing the incidence of aggressive acts such as the March 2019 median-line crossing. This could result in an accident or miscalculation leading to unintended conflict, or even see Beijing seek an outright military confrontation to press for resolution of its political differences with Taipei.” (p. 470)



2019 年 11 月

美中經濟與安全檢討委員會致國會年度報告 (綜合 77 名專家證詞，再經委員會 12 位委員投票通過)

由於北京對自己有效嚇阻或擊敗美軍干預能力已有信心，它可能決定發動武力衝突，即使估算美軍可能干預。(頁 303)

最近幾年台海軍力平衡已經決定性地有利於中國。這種轉變同時挑戰台灣的自衛能力，與美國的有效干預能力。中共對台作為因此越來越肆無忌憚，類似 2019 年 3 月中共戰機跨越台海中線的事就越來越多。將來兩岸可能發生意外摩擦，或經由錯估而衍生武力衝突，甚至北京故意製造軍事衝撞來施壓解決兩岸政治歧異。(頁 470)



Rising to the China Challenge
Renewing American Competitiveness in the Indo-Pacific

Ely Ratner, Daniel Clines, Susanna Blum, Ruth Dicks, Chris Dougherty,
Richard Frattino, Peter Harrell, Marjorie Rawson, Elizabeth Rosenberg,
Eric Sjöberg, Dilip Singh, Paul Schmitt, and Loren DeLongo Schlessman
with
Neil Rhotiya, Ashley Wong, Joshua Pitt,
Megan Lamberth, Kristine Lee, and Ashlii Elkmen



December 2019

Ely Ratner et al.

**Rising to the China Challenge:
Renewing American Competitiveness
in the Indo-Pacific**

**Center for a New American Security,
an independent assessment for
Congress as mandated by the 2019
National Defense Authorization Act**

“While the U.S. still retains an overall military advantage over China, the gap has closed considerably over the last two decades and, absent urgent change, the regional balance may tip in China’s favor by the late 2020s or early 2030s. In certain scenarios, the military balance may already disadvantage the United States...U.S. air bases, aircraft carriers, and surface ships are too vulnerable to Chinese air and missile attacks; current U.S. C4ISR are brittle in the face of Chinese cyberattacks, electronic warfare, and long-range strikes; U.S. logistics systems, ports and airfields are vulnerable to cyber-disruptions and physical attacks; and the Joint Force lacks sufficient precision-guided munitions.” (p. 14)



Rising to the China Challenge
Renewing American Competitiveness in the Indo-Pacific

Ely Ratner, Daniel Klitman, Suzanne Blum, Noah Osofsky, Chris Dougherty,
Richard Fontaine, Peter Hain, Mattia Kramer, Elizabeth Rosenberg,
Eric Sayers, Talang Singh, Paul Schmitt, and Loren DeGregorio Schmitt
with
Neil Bhartiya, Ashley Hong, Joshua Pitt,
Megan Lamberth, Katherine Lee, and Aleksei Mironov



2019 年 12 月

Ely Ratner (時任新美國安全中心執行副總裁，曾任拜登副總統副國安顧問，現任國防部助理部長及最新國防戰略報告主持人) 等 19 人

奮對中國挑戰：重振美國的亞太競爭力

新美國安全中心 發表 (依據 **2019** 國防

授權法呈報之獨立研判)

目前美國整體軍力雖然仍對中國握有優勢，兩國差距已在過去二十年大幅縮小。如不立即改善，區域整體平衡可能在 2020 年代末或 2030 年代初就轉成對中國有利。在某些劇本下，軍力平衡現已不利於美國...美國空軍基地、航空母艦、水面艦隻面對中共的空中及飛彈攻擊已過度脆弱；現有的「指管通資情監偵」面對中共的網路攻擊、電子作戰、及長程打擊也極危殆；美國的後勤系統、港口及機場更容易遭受網路及實彈攻擊；美軍也缺乏足夠的精準打擊武器。(頁 14)

DANGEROUS DECADE

TAIWAN'S SECURITY AND
CRISIS MANAGEMENT

BRENDAN TAYLOR



2019

Brendan Taylor

Dangerous Decade: Taiwan's Security and Crisis Management

**International Institute of
Strategic Studies**

“ ... the strategic geography of this flashpoint overwhelmingly favors China. Taiwan is approximately 11,000 km from the continental U.S. By contrast, it is a mere 160 km from mainland China at its

closest point. Consistent with this, China has almost 40 air bases within an unrefuelled-fighter range of approximately 800 km from the island. The U.S. has only one (Kadena Air Base) within that range, and just three bases within 1,500 km.” (p. 58)

“ U.S. Air Force bases on Okinawa and Guam are especially vulnerable to China's growing missile capabilities. (Oriana Mastro and Ian Easton) estimated that the U.S. would lose 70 % of its aircraft at the first-line air base in Kadena, Japan during the opening salvos of a conflict over Taiwan. The same is true of another major facility – at Anderson Air Base on Guam – which is technically within range of DF- 26s. Hence, through successfully executing the A2/AD approach, Beijing could ultimately stymie U.S. intervention in a Taiwan scenario.” (pp. 53-54)

DANGEROUS DECADE

TAIWAN'S SECURITY AND
CRISIS MANAGEMENT

BRENDAN TAYLOR



2019 年


Brendan Taylor (澳洲國立大學戰略研究中心教授)

危險的十年:台灣的安全與危機管理
倫敦國際戰略研究所 發表

這個衝突熱點的戰略地理態勢壓倒性地對中共有利。台灣離美洲大陸大約 11000 公里遠，離中國大陸僅 160 公里。

中共在離台灣不需空中加油的 800 公里距離內佈有 40 個空軍基地，而美國只有位在沖繩的一個嘉手納基地，另有三個相距 1500 公里。（頁 58）

美國位在沖繩及關島的空軍基地特別脆弱。(Oriana Mastro 與 Ian Easton)估計說，台海戰事一發生，在嘉手納基地的七成戰機在第一波攻擊中就被摧毀。在關島的安德森空軍基地亦然，因為它落在中共東風 26 飛彈的射程以內。所以北京透過它的反介入 / 反區域拒止策略，足夠在台海作戰中阻止美軍援台。（頁 53-54）



2019

Jacob Cohn, Timothy A. Walton, Adam Lemon, Toshi Yoshihara,

**Leveling the Playing Field:
Reintroducing U.S. Theater-
Range Missiles in a Post-INF
World**

**Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments**

(CSBA)


“CSBA’s review of the missile options available to the U.S. finds that although costs vary depending on the technological maturity and sophistication of the missiles, operationally relevant numbers of different ground-launched missiles could be fielded within 5-10 years.” (p. ii)

2019 年

Jacob Cohn (戰略與預算評估中心研究員) 等 4 人

以其人之道還治其身：在中程飛彈協議廢除後再引進中程飛彈
戰略與預算評估中心 發表

本中心研究美國飛彈各種方案後的結論是，雖然依據技術成熟度及飛彈精密度而導致成本不一，美國要在未來五到十年才能部署數量足以作戰的不同型別的岸置飛彈。（頁 ii）



2019

Robert Spalding

Stealth War: How China Took over While America's Elite Slept

(Portfolio/Penguin, 2019)

“For as long as most readers will remember, the U.S. has maintained a considerable military advantage over any potential rivals on the planet. This is no longer the case. As a former career officer in the U.S. Air Force, it hurts to

write those words. But the U.S. military needs a reality check, and has needed one for the past two decades.” (p. 80)

“ (China’s) Dong-Feng-26 ballistic missiles ... was designed to obliterate aircraft carriers. The DF-26 has a range of 2,500 miles, which means it can strike U.S. warships in the Western Pacific Ocean... While the U.S. Navy has SM-6 interceptor missiles, thought to be capable of destroying a DF-26, the sheer amount of smaller, long- range ballistic missiles at China’s dispersal and the blazing speed (6,000 miles in 30 minutes)...It is conceivable that an undetected conflict might end in thirty seconds. Game over.” (pp. 87-88)


“Looked at from an economic standpoint, the PLA constructed a \$ 1 billion missile system designed to destroy a \$ 30 billion ship. There is no doubt our carriers are valuable and powerful machines. But their effectiveness in policing the Pacific is now extremely limited.” (p. 88)

“ China has built a very sophisticated command and control network, known as the C4ISR (Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) in the Pacific...Think of the C4ISR as the most sophisticated alarm and response system on the planet...The U.S. armed forces do not have a fully operated C4ISR equivalent in the Pacific, but we need one...” (p.

89)

“Our most impressive fighting machine, the F-35, has also been stripped of its power by Chinese technology...” (p. 89)

“The Air Force’s state-of-the-art stealth bomber, the F-35, a highly computerized machine built with systems accessible from the ground, is a victim of Chinese infiltration of U.S. technology. Some of the parts used to build F-35s are actually manufactured in China...Army intelligence has concluded that the Chinese stole all the plans for the F-35s.” (p. 111)



2019 年

Robert Spalding (川普政府國安會
業管戰略計畫的前資深主任、國家安
全戰略報告的主要設計人、三軍聯席
參謀首長會議主席的主要策士、退役
空軍將領)

匿蹤戰：美國菁英酣睡時中國接管

Portfolio/Penguin 出版社

在多數讀者的記憶中，美國一直佔有
比它在地球上任何敵手相當大的優勢。可惜此景已經不再。作為
美國空軍過去的一員，讓我說出這句話，實在痛苦無比。但美國
真的需要好好檢視它的軍事力量。現在這樣做已經晚了二十年。

(頁 80)

(中共的)東風 26 導彈...本來就是為了消滅航母而設計的。它有
2500 哩的射程，足以打到西太平洋的所有美艦...美國海軍擁有
自認可以攔截它的 SM-6 標準飛彈，但以東風 26 的數量及速度
(30 分鐘飛 6000 哩) ...可能察覺它飛來 30 秒後戰爭就結束了。
玩完

了。(頁 87-88)

從經濟角度看，解放軍花費十億美元設計出的飛彈系統，足以摧
毀三百億美元的美國航母。我們航母毫無疑問是價高且力強的戰
爭機器，但它們巡護太平洋的效用現已極度有限了。(頁 88)
中國已在太平洋建立了非常精密的「指管通資情監偵」體系...
指

管通資情監偵是地球上最精密的預警及回應體系...美國在太平洋還缺一個能完整運作的指管通資情監偵體系，真的需要建立一個。（頁 89）

我們最令人讚嘆的戰鬥機器，F-35 戰機，也被中國科技奪去了它的戰鬥力。（頁 89）

空軍最先進的F-35 轟炸機，高度電腦化，能直接連結地面，卻受害於中共對美國科技的滲透。用來組裝 F-35 的部分零件居然是在中國製造...陸軍情報單位的總結是，中國偷了 F-35 的所有藍圖。（頁 111）



January 2020

Robert

Blackwill

Implementing Grand Strategy toward China

Council on Foreign Relations Report No.85

“It is also crucial to understand that the cross-strait military balance has fundamentally changed. In eighteen consecutive unclassified war games simulating U.S.-China military conflict

over Taiwan, the U.S. reportedly has never prevented China from conquering the island, which profoundly calls into question the persuasiveness of U.S. deterrence on the issue in Beijing.” (p. 30)


2020 年 1 月

Robert Blackwill （ 曾任小布希白宮國安會副顧問、駐印度大使、
副助理國務卿 ）

對中大戰略的執行

對外關係協會 發表

關鍵是，台海軍力對比已經根本改觀了。在連續十八次模擬美中
在台海軍事衝突的兵棋推演中，美國居然完全無法避免中共佔領
台灣。這著實讓人懷疑美國能不能嚇阻北京。（ 頁 30 ）



April 2020

Christian Brose

Kill Chain: Defending America in the Future of Hi-Tech War


N.Y.: Hachette, 2020

“It is unlikely, for example, that a U.S. President would send an aircraft through Taiwan Strait in a significant crisis with China the way President Bill Clinton did in 1996. U.S. carriers would probably not

even operate within a thousand miles of the Chinese coast in the event of a conflict.” (pp. 189-190)

“Once the war started, U.S. carriers in the region would immediately turn east and sail away from China, intent on getting more than a thousand miles away from the opponents’ long-range anti-ship missiles. But from that far away, none of the aircraft on the flight deck would be capable of reaching their targets without aerial refueling, so the Navy would find itself on the horns of the same dilemma the Air Force faced: its stealthy fighter jets would be pushed so far back that could only get to their targets with the help of non-stealthy, defenseless refueling aircraft that would be shot down in large numbers.” (p.xiv)

“American forward bases in places like Japan and Guam would be inundated with waves of precision ballistic and cruise missiles...have no defense against Chinese hypersonic weapons.” (p. xiii)



2020 年 4 月

Christian Brose (曾任參議院軍事委員會幕僚主任、及 McCain 參議員資深顧問)**擊殺鍊：在高科技的未來捍衛美國**

Hachette 出版社 出版

如果 1996 年台海危機重現，美國總統將不可能像柯林頓總統那樣派航母前往

台灣海峽。美國航母恐怕根本不會出現在離中國海岸 1000 哩的海域。（頁 189-190）

戰爭一開始，美國留在這海域中的艦隻將立即向東駛去，遠離中國，力求到達中共 1000 哩射程飛彈不及之處。問題是一旦到了那麼遠的定點，所有艦載機沒有空中加油就不可能接近目標進行攻擊。匿蹤戰機的困境也一樣。它匿蹤，但它的加油機卻不匿蹤，且毫無自衛能力，必定傷亡慘重。（頁 xiv）

美國在日本及關島的前進基地必然承受精準導彈及巡弋飛彈的飽和攻擊...對中共極音速飛彈也沒有任何防護力。（頁 xiii）

April 17, 2020

Richard Bernstein

RealClearInvestigation

n

“**W**hat could happen if China launched an all-out military effort to seize Taiwan? Does the U.S. possess the wherewithal to meet the obligations of the Taiwan Defense Act? These questions are hotly debated among military specialists and within the Pentagon... ‘We are playing an away game against China,’ RAND’s David Ochmanek

said, ‘when bases are subject to repeated attacks, it makes it exponentially more difficult to project power far away.’ ‘The casualties that the Chinese could inflict on us could be staggering,’ said Timothy Heath, a senior international defense researcher at RAND and formerly a China analyst at the U.S. Pacific Command headquarters in Hawaii, ‘anti-ship cruise missiles could knock out U.S. carriers and warships; surface-to-air missiles could destroy our fighters and bombers.’... ‘They are giving a lot of signals about how this campaign would unfold,’ Lyle Goldstein, a China and Russia specialist at the Naval War College in Rhode Island, told RCL, ‘they are talking a lot about airborne assault in two varieties, by parachute and by helicopter...Amphibious assaults is old school. It may be necessary, but it’s not the main effort. The new school is to bring lead elements by air, secure the terrain and then bring in more forces over the beach...There would be 15, maybe 20 different landings on the island, east, west, north, and south, all at once, some frogmen, some purely airborne troops...The Taiwan command is looking at this amid decapitation attempts and massive rockets and air assaults. The Chinese would seize several beachheads and airports. Their engineering prowess will come into play in deploying specialized floating dock apparatuses to ensure a steady flow of supplies and reinforcements – a key element. My appraisal is that Taiwan would fold in a week or two.’ ‘Once Taiwan was occupied, the option of retaking it with an amphibious assault of our own would be very unattractive,’ Goldstein has likened the American commitment to defend Taiwan as to be a kind of Cuban Missile Crisis in reverse.”

“Others, like Goldstein, fully agree that China would be reluctant to go to war, but they argue also that if war should happen, it’s unrealistic –indeed, Goldstein says it’s dangerously deluding – to think that the combined forces of Taiwan and the U.S. would prevail.”

2020 年 4 月 17 日

Richard Bernstein (知名紐約時報及時代雜誌記者)

RealClearInvestigation 網站 發表

如果中共發動全面犯台，美國有能力盡到台灣防衛法所規定的義務嗎？軍事專家及國防部都在熱烈討論這個議題...「我們玩的是逃離遊戲」，蘭德公司的 **David Ochmanek** 說，「當基地被痛擊時，還要投射軍力到遙遠地方談何容易」。「中國能帶給美國的傷亡難以想像」，曾在夏威夷美軍太平洋總部任職，現在蘭德公司擔任分析員的 **Timothy Heath** 說，「反艦巡弋飛彈能夠擊沉美國航母與戰艦；地對空飛彈能擊落我們的戰鬥機及轟炸機」...「他們對如何攻台放出很多訊號」，海軍戰院的中俄問題專家 **Lyle Goldstein** 說「他們常講兩種空中攻擊方式：跳傘降落或直升機降落...兩棲登陸早是老派思維了，它仍必要，但已不是主要。新思維是從空中攻進台灣，奪佔要地，然後才從海灘大批擁上岸...可能同時在全島各地，或東，或西，或南，或北，有 15 乃至 20 處地點，同一時間登陸，有的用蛙人，有的用傘兵...台灣指揮中心忙著注意這些（海空）攻擊時還要應付斬首行動，大量火箭及空中襲擊。中共部隊會奪佔幾個灘頭與機場。他們會發揮兵工能量，迅速建造浮動碼頭，確保人員物資源源不絕上岸。我的估計是台灣在一兩個星期內就結束了」。「台灣一旦被佔，美國就不太會想發動兩棲登陸把它奪回」。**Goldstein** 把美國對台承諾比喻為古巴危機的翻轉版。其他接受訪談的專家全都同意，中國並不想走向戰爭；但萬一發生，美台聯軍要想獲勝，幾乎如 **Goldstein** 所形容的「自欺欺人」。

August 2020

James Winnefeld and Michael

Morell, *The War that Never Was?*

Proceedings, Vol. 146/8/1,410

Proceedings recently asked several frequent contributors how the next conflict might start. This essay is the first in the series:

“**T**he (Chinese) operation unfolded quickly, beginning on the evening of 18 January, two days before the scheduled U.S. presidential inauguration...on the afternoon of 19 January ... the U.S. National Security Council Principles Committee hastily convened a meeting to consider the situation...The committee was deeply divided...The meeting broke up after two hours of acrimonious debate with no resolution other than to make a strong statement condemning Chinese action and expressing support for Taiwan...On the morning of 20 January in Taiwan...Taiwan’s government realized that... Taiwan was on the brink of a bloodbath, Tsai Ing-wen reluctantly capitulated to Xi’s demands...the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs walked into the regularly scheduled session on 21 January...he asked three questions: What just happened? What do we do now? And what the hell should we have been doing differently? He was answered by silence...After a few moments the CIA Director said, ‘Twenty years of focusing on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, rather than our peer competitors, has come home to roost.’” (p. 5-9)

2020 年 8 月


James Winnefield (退役海軍上將，曾任三軍參謀首長聯席會議副主席及北方司令部司令)

Michael Morell (曾任中情局副局長，兩度代理局長)

尚未發生的戰爭？

紀事錄，卷 **146/8/1410**。本期紀事錄邀請幾位經常撰稿的作者設想下一場衝突將如何發生。本篇是該系列首篇。

中共犯台快速啟動，選在一月十八日傍晚，美國新總統就職大典前兩天...一月十九日下午，美國國安會緊急召開首長會議研議最新情勢...與會人士意見紛歧...兩小時激烈爭辯沒有結論就草草結束，僅發表一份譴責中共、支持台灣的聲明...一月二十日上午...台灣政府意識到自己將面臨一場血洗災難，蔡英文不情願地同意接受習近平的要求而投降...美國三軍首長聯席會議主席在一月二十一日走進例行會議...他問了三個問題:到底怎麼回事？我們要做什麼？過去究竟做錯了什麼？沒有人接他的話...過了好一會兒中情局局長說，「二十年來我們專注反恐與反動亂，忘了練習怎麼與高手對決，現在終於嘗到苦果了」。(頁 5-9)




September 2020

Department of Defense's Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC

“China has a range of options for military campaign against Taiwan, from air and maritime blockade to a full-scale amphibious invasion to seize and occupy islands.” (p. 112) some or all of Taiwan or its offshore

China could pursue a measured approach by signaling its readiness to use force or conduct punitive actions against Taiwan. The PLA could also conduct a more comprehensive campaign designed to force Taiwan to capitulate to unification, or unification dialogue under China's terms. Notably, China would seek to deter potential U.S. intervention in any Taiwan contingency campaign – capabilities that the PRC highlighted during its October 2019 military parade celebrating its 70th anniversary. Failing that, China would attempt to delay and defeat intervention in an asymmetric, limited war of short duration. In the event of a protracted conflict, China might choose to escalate cyberspace, space, or nuclear activities in an attempt to end the conflict, or it might choose to fight to a stalemate and pursue a political settlement. The PLA could initiate the military options listed below individually or in combination: Air and Maritime Blockade ... Limited Force or Coercive Options ... Air and Missile Campaign ... Invasion of Taiwan.” (pp.113-114)



2020 年 9 月

國防部致國會年度報告：


中華人民共和國相關軍事與安全發展

Hachette 出版社 出版

中國已經擁有整套針對台灣的作戰選項，從空中及海上封鎖，到全面兩棲侵入，到奪取並佔領部分或全部的台灣島

或外島。（頁 112）

關於中國可能對台採取的行動...它可能用步步進逼的方式，釋放動武訊號或採用處罰性的動作。解放軍也可能採用大舉進犯方式，迫使台灣接受統一或依中共開出的條件接受統一談判。最值得注意的是，中國將設法使用它在 2019 年 10 月國慶軍演中展示的武力來嚇阻美國不得介入台海戰事。如果嚇阻不了，中共就會企圖用某種非對稱、有限、速戰速決的戰爭方式，來延遲或擊敗美國的干預。它還可能選擇升高到網路、太空、或核武作戰層次，來終結戰事，或打成僵局，最終由政治解決。解放軍可能啟動以下四種戰法之一，或混合打擊：空中與海上封鎖...有限打擊與脅迫手段...空中與飛彈攻擊...入侵台灣本島。（頁 113-114）



September 2020

Representative Kevin McCarthy and 14 other House Representatives

China Task Force Report

“(A)s of 2020, the PLA Navy is the largest navy in the world. The PLAN consists of over

300 ships, making it larger than the 293 vessels comprising the deployable battle force of the U.S. Navy. ...The PLA Air Force is closing the gap across a broad range of

capabilities, such as aircraft performance, C2, electronic warfare, and advanced air-to-air long-range munition development and procurement....The PRC is leading in hypersonic technology due in part to Beijing’s strategic investments in its industrial base, exploiting U.S. research centers, and IP theft...Some of the PRC’s most significant developments have been in air-to-air missiles, which have wide range and electronic radars that make evasion difficult for fighter jets. In 2017, combat modeling by RAND Corporation found that, for the first time, the PRC had achieved parity with the U.S. in air superiority for a conflict close to its mainland, including over Taiwan...The PRC now has more than 1,250 ground-launched ballistic missiles, while the U.S. ‘fields one type of conventional ground- launched ballistic missile with a range of 70 to 300 kilometers.’ The PRC possesses ground-launched cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, while the U.S. does not field any ground- launched cruise missiles...the PRC has already achieved parity with –or even exceeded – the U.S. in several military modernization areas, according to the DoD.” (p. 29)



2020 年 9 月

Kevin McCarthy 等 15 位聯邦眾議員聯合提出

中國專案小組報告

(本報告由 15 位共和黨籍眾議員徵詢 130 名專家，包括 60 名跨黨籍現任與前任官員，歷經 5 個月研討完成。民主黨

籍眾議員均拒絕參與)

2020 年解放軍海軍已是世界最大的海軍。它擁有超過 300 艘軍艦，多於美國的 293 艘。...解放軍空軍也在好幾個領域，如戰機性能、指揮管制、電子戰、空對空飛彈發展及採購等，大幅縮小與美軍的差距...中國還在極音速科技上領先美國，借助它對工業基礎的大量投資、竊取美國的高深研究成果與智慧財產。...中國空對空飛彈的發展深值重視。它的射程及電子雷達使美國戰機很難躲閃。2017 年蘭德公司的兵棋推演已發現，中國戰機的戰力在大陸周邊，包括台灣上空，已能與美機同等較量。...中國現有超過 1,250 岸置導彈，而美國「只有一種 70 到 300 公里射程的

岸置導彈」。中國另有射程在 500 到 5500 公里的岸置巡弋飛彈，而美國完全沒有任何岸置巡弋飛彈。...總之，根據我國防部分析，中國軍事現代化已在好幾個領域取得與美國平手甚至超越的地位。(頁 29)

October 2020

Jonathan D. Caverley and Peter Dombrowski

**Cruising for Bruising: Maritime Competition in an Anti-Access
Age** *Security Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 4.

“We argue that, based on its fleet design (a navy’s combined material capabilities and operational culture), the U.S. Navy, regardless of the relative costs of a sea denial versus a more aggressive power-projection or sea control strategy, will operate in a familiar way for decades to come. Given this stickiness, we argue that current U.S. Navy and PLA Navy fleet designs may interact to risk a crisis or even war where much of the U.S. fleet is endangered. Such a conflict could, ironically, speed the loss of the military advantage underpinning American hegemony...” (p. 672)

“Emerging technologies such as long-range ballistic missiles, swarms of multiple drones and cruise missiles, and eventually hypersonic weapons, all seem to further favor the shore and the missile over the ship. By this standard, the offense-defense balance has shifted decisively toward the latter.” (p. 676)

2020 年 10 月

Jonathan D. Caverley (海軍戰院戰略與作戰研究教授、曾為潛艦軍官)

Peter Dombrowski (海軍戰院戰略與作戰研究教授、海軍戰院評論主編)

為撞而闖：反介入世紀中的海上競爭

爭安全研究季刊 發表，卷 29，期 4

本文主張，美國海軍艦艇的設計（綜合物資能量及作戰文化）決定它未來幾十年都將沿襲舊的作戰方式，不管採用攻擊或防守為主策略的成本為何。基於這種惰性，我們認為當前美國海軍與解放軍海軍的艦艇設計將把它們的互動推向危機甚至戰爭。諷刺的是，這場戰爭將加速美國霸權長年賴以維繫的軍事優勢的喪失。

(頁 672)

最新科技如長程導彈、大批多樣無人機、巡弋飛彈、與極音速飛彈等，全都有利於陸地力量，而不利於海上力量。換言之，攻守平衡已經決定性地向陸地傾斜。（頁 676）

October 2020

Jonathan D. Caverley and Peter Dombrowski

**Too Important to be Left to the Admirals: the Need to study
Maritime Great Power Competition**

Security Studies, Vol.29, No. 4.

“In this sense, the most important Chinese maritime capability is not its navy, but its air force and strategic rocket force. If as Nelson observed, a ship is a fool to fight a fort, how much more foolish is a fleet to fight a nuclear-armed continental landmass” (p. 586)

2020 年 10 月

Jonathan D. Caverley (海軍戰院戰略與作戰研究教授、曾為潛艦軍官)

Peter Dombrowski (海軍戰院戰略與作戰研究教授、海軍戰院評論主編)

不能只交給海軍上將：亟需研究大國海上競爭

安全研究季刊 發表，卷 29，期 4

從這角度看，中共最重要的海上力量不是它的海軍，而是它的空軍和戰略火箭軍。誠如早年尼爾遜大將的名言，「只有笨的船艦才會想去攻打岸上堡壘」，現在的海軍艦隊要多笨才會想去攻打擁有核武的大陸國家啊。（頁 586）

October 2020

Paul van Hooft,

All-In or All-Out: Why Insularity Pushes and Pulls American GrandStrategy to Extremes,

Security Studies, Vol 29, No. 4

“Transit time for most surface ships from Hawaii and the West Coast to Western Pacific – and within the theater – are measured in weeks. Nuclear powered carriers might remain at sea, but the support ships that protect it requires refueling and ammunitions. During a conflict, available fuel, the low speed of logistics ships, and access to munitions would constrain combat power. The conflict would also make serious demands on the limited number of dry docks in the Pacific. Likewise, the amount of offensive airpower that can be delivered from U.S. territory could be limited by long flight time and massive aerial tanker support.” (p. 714)

2020 年 10 月


Paul van Hooft (MIT 博士後研究員)

全身投入或全部撤出：

為什麼美國的地理隔絕總把它的大戰略推向極端

安全研究季刊 發表，卷 29，期 4

大多數艦艇從夏威夷及美國西岸航行到西太平洋的時間都要以星期來計算。核子動力航空母艦可以在海上停留許久，但保護它的支援艦艇卻必須重新加添燃料及彈藥。在戰時，燃料存量、後勤艦隻的慢速、彈藥的取得管道等，都會限制航母的戰力。戰事也會提升太平洋現存有限乾場的重要性。同理，美國空軍的攻擊力道也會受到飛行距離及空中加油能量的限制。（頁 714）




December 2020

2020 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission

“The U.S. Department of Defense assess that the PLA is capable of carrying out a range of military operations against Taiwan short of a large-scale amphibious operation to punish Taiwan or accomplish other military objectives. These operations include

an air and maritime blockade of Taiwan, air and missile strikes against targets across the island, or a seizure of Taiwan’s offshore islands, all options that could be implemented individually or in combination. The PLA could supplement these options with actions designed to disrupt critical infrastructure on Taiwan or its offshore islands, or use special operations forces to assassinate Taiwan’s leaders....The PLA’s most immediate limitation in executing a Taiwan campaign is a shortage of troops the PLA needs to successfully subjugate the island...the PLA is currently capable of transporting the main combat elements (though not all personnel and equipment) of one or two infantry brigades and two armored and/or mechanized brigades. (pp.464-465)

“In the face of such robust capabilities, Taiwan’s government has given varying estimates of how long the island could hold out against a PLA attack before help from the United States arrived, ranging from two weeks to one month.” (p. 471)



2020 年 12 月

美中經濟與安全檢討委員會致國會年度報告

(綜合 62 名專家證詞並經委員會 12 位委員投票通過)

美國國防部評估中國解放軍已有能力對台灣執行除了大型兩棲登陸以外的所有

軍事行動，以處罰台灣或追求其他軍事目的。這些軍事行動包括空中及海上封鎖台灣，飛機及飛彈攻擊島上目標，或奪取台灣外島。它們可以個別或同時執行。解放軍也可藉打擊台灣關鍵基礎設施或用特種部隊暗殺台灣領導人來輔助這些軍事行動的進行。（頁 464-465）

面對（解放軍）如此強勁的軍力，台灣政府對自己能支撐多久讓美軍救援趕到，給了兩週至一個月的評估。（頁 471）



December 17, 2020

Chas Freeman

Remarks by video link to a Salon of the Committee for the Republic


“The PLA, according to some U.S. military and intelligence experts, could now destroy Taiwan at will and take it in as little as three days. Retaking the island – if that were possible – would take many tens of thousands of U.S. casualties. It would also require air and missile strikes on the Chinese homeland that would justify counterstrikes on ours. If U.S. recovery of Taiwan were successful, the Mainland would just bide its time, rebuild strength, and try again. As was true with Hanoi, Beijing is determinedly nationalist opponent that enjoy the balance of fervor in the struggle to end the American backed division of its country.” (p. 8)

2020 年 12 月 17 日

Chas Freeman (曾任國防部助理部長、駐沙烏地大使、尼克森總統訪中國翻譯員)

共和委員會視訊致詞

某些美國軍事與情報專家說，解放軍現已能夠隨意毀滅並在三天內拿下台灣。美國反過來如想奪回台灣，假定做得到，要犧牲好幾萬人，還要從空中結合飛彈攻擊大陸本土。這麼一來，中共就會打擊美國本土。就算我們成功奪回台灣，中共將靜待時機，重新整備，再度嘗試攻台。中共像當年的北越，是鐵了心的民族主義者，滿腔熱情要終結美國造成的國家分裂。（頁 8）



2020

Rebecca Lissner and Mira Rapp-Hooper

**An Open World: How American Can Win
the Contest for Twenty-First-Century Order**

Yale University Press, 2020

“**T**he military requirements of openness will be most intense in Asia – the region where Chinese ascendance has already ended American global military primacy.” (p. 132)

2020 年

Rebecca Lissner (海軍戰院助理教授、能源部副部長特別顧問)

Mira Rapp-Hooper (國務院政策計劃室資深顧問)

開放世界：美國如何打贏廿一世紀秩序爭奪戰耶

魯大學出版社 出版

要在亞洲維持開放，所需要的軍事條件最困難，因為中國的崛起已經結束了美國的全球獨霸。（頁 132）



CHINA-US 2039: THE ENDGAME?

BUILDING TRUST OVER FUTURE DECADES

ADMIRAL BILL OWENS

2020

Admiral Bill Owens

China-US 2039 ; The Endgame ?

“The most important security issue affecting the United States and China relationship is Taiwan...In fact, given the military imbalance, there is little doubt that China could overtake Taiwan by force in ten days. Little can be done through U.S. presence or military sales.

So, the efficacy or importance of arms sales, especially of high technology systems, has little real effect on the military outcome, other than symbolic signaling...Washington plays into this game that caters to our own military-industrial complex, which leads to sales of the most modern F-16 fighters and modern air defense systems...The military-industrial complex should not be enriched by this situation. ”

(p. 56)

2020 年

Bill Owens 上將 (曾任三軍參謀首長聯席會議副主席，第六艦隊司令，【軍事事務革命】主導人)

2039 中美關係：殘局

影響美中關係最重要的問題就是台灣.....事實上，從當前軍力失衡的狀況看，中共幾乎毫無疑問能在 10 天內拿下台灣。美國不管是用駐軍或軍售都不可能挽救。所以美國軍售的效益或重要性，尤其是高科技產品，對作戰結果的影響是微乎其微...華府為了迎合軍工複合體的需要而出售 F-16 及現代防空系統給台灣...軍工複合體實在不應該撈這種錢。(頁 56)



February 2021

Robert Blackwill and Philip Zelikow,

The United States, China, and Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War

a Council on Foreign Affairs Report

“We know of no credible expert who assesses that, in the last three years (since the release of the 2018 National Defense Strategy report) as Chinese capabilities have advanced, U.S.


defense strategy is now, on balance, more capable of performing a conventional defense of Taiwan.” (p. 43)

“If the U.S. response to quarantine or invasion is for the U.S. military to fight its way through to rescue or liberate a besieged or embattled Taiwan, we do not see a credible conventional military solution by Washington in response to either. We do not think Taiwan, or the U.S., or Japan should rely on a campaign plan that simply prolongs the fighting near Taiwan ‘long enough for U.S. forces to arrive on station to help repulse the assailants.’ We do not believe the U.S. is able to sustain lasting sea and air warfare at the edge of the Western Pacific, especially given that the available number of U.S.-flagged cargo ships has diminished and the existing ships are old and poorly maintained.”(p.42)

“If missiles rule, Chinese missiles will keep the cavalry from riding to the rescue. As a pessimist analyst put it, ‘a more likely outcome of that scenario would be that Washington is forced to capitulate after ideological twaddle comes crashing against the harsh and unforgiven rocks of reality in the form of the actual military balance of power’.” (p. 43)

“Our current conclusions concerning U.S. vital national interests and Taiwan are as follows:

1. Is a Chinese takeover of Taiwan per se a threat to U.S. vital national interests? No.
 2. Would it be a threat to the vital national interests of Japan? Probably. The Japanese should answer this question.
 3. Would a violent Chinese conquest or subjugation of Taiwan, unresisted by the U.S., threaten U.S. vital interests? Perhaps, depending on assessments of China, Taiwan, Japan, and others, and not just on a reflexive incantation about American credibility.
 4. Would the corollary threat of Chinese subjugation of Japan be a threat to the vital interests of the United States? Yes.
 5. Should the U.S. assume direct responsibility for the defense of Taiwan? No.
 6. Should the U.S. help Taiwan defend itself? Yes.
 7. Should the U.S. and Japan supply Taiwan in a crisis, confronting Chinese attempts to deny access and therefore, at a minimum, risk the outbreak of local fighting and loss of life? Perhaps. The U.S., Japan and others should credibly plan to be able to do this in order to have the choice; and in a crisis, they could well implement that plan.
 8. If China attacks U.S. and Japanese resupplying forces and thereby widens the war, should the U.S. and Japan escalate to general war and mobilize to reconquer Taiwan? No.
 9. But if China attacks U.S. and Japanese resupplying forces and thereby widens the war, should the U.S. and Japan freeze Chinese assets and mobilize for the heightened danger of general war? Yes.”
- (p. 62-63)



Robert Blackwill (曾任小布希白宮國安會副顧問、駐印度大使、副助理國務卿)

Philip Zelikow (維吉尼亞大學教授，曾任老布希國安會幕僚、萊斯國務卿助理、911委員會主持人)

美國、中國與台灣：避戰之策

外交關係協會 發表

如果台灣被封鎖或侵入，需要美軍去解救，我們實在看不出有用傳統武力達到目的的可能。我們不認為台灣、美國、或日本應該設法拖延戰事，「拖到讓美軍能夠趕來救援」。我們也不認為美國能夠在西太平洋支撐一個長期的海空戰事，尤其掛美國旗的貨輪越來越少，而現有的船隻船齡又老，維修又差。(頁 42)

中共的飛彈將使美軍不敢過去解救台灣。一個悲觀分析家曾說，到時候最可能的結局是，華府說了一堆意識形態的廢話，碰到殘酷無情軍力對比的現實，只有低頭。(頁 43)

我們不知道有任何專家敢說，在過去三年 (公布 2018 國家國防戰略報告至今) 中國軍力持續躍進之時，美國國防戰略變得比過去更能保衛台灣。(頁 43)

關於台灣是否牽涉美國重大國家利益的問題，我們的結論是：

1. 中共接管台灣是否威脅到美國重大國家利益？No。
2. 是否威脅到日本重大國家利益？Probably，要看日本怎麼看。

3. 美國未出手而中共武力征服台灣，是否威脅美國重大國家利益？ **Perhaps**。要看中台日及別國怎麼看，而不能直接跳躍成美國信用問題。
4. 如果中共附帶屈服了日本，是否威脅到美國重大國家利益？ **Yes**。
5. 美國應該對台灣防衛負起直接責任嗎？ **No**。
6. 美國應該協助台灣自衛嗎？ **Yes**。
7. 危機爆發而台灣對外通路阻斷，美日應該冒局部戰爭及生命損失的風險提供物資援台嗎？ **Perhaps**。應平時做好準備，屆時評估後才執行。
8. 如果中共攻擊美日的物資供應，以致戰事擴大，美日應該升高至大戰並奪回台灣嗎？ **No**。
9. 如果中共攻擊美日的物資供應，以致戰事擴大，美日應該凍結中國資產並為大戰可能升高而動員嗎？ **Yes**。(頁 62-63)



February 2021

Lonnie Henley

**PLA Operational Concepts and Centers
of Gravity in a Taiwan Conflict**

**Hearing on “Deterring PRC Aggression
toward Taiwan”**

**2021 US-China Security and Economic
Review Commission’s Annual Report to
Congress**

“As of 2020, the PLA has already built the initial capabilities it believes necessary to invade Taiwan and with a war against U.S. forces.” (pp. 1-2)

“A failed Taiwan landing would not end the war. China would continue the conflict by whatever means available, primarily blockade. The PLA would have the advantage in that extended phase of the conflict even after severe losses. Most of the operational approaches available to

U.S. forces would not serve to end the war: 1. Defeating amphibious landing; 2. Destroying the PLA Navy and Air Force; 3. Cutting of China’s international trade; 4. Trying to spark internal unrest or crises on China’s periphery; 5. Other ‘cost imposition’ strategies. If we cannot defeat the blockade, we will not prevail.” (p. 1)



2021 年 12 月

Lonnie Henley （在軍情單位從事東亞軍事情報研析四十年，現為喬治華盛頓大學教授）

解放軍作戰理念與台海衝突的重力中心

2021 年在國會「美中經濟與安全檢討委員會」證詞

至 2020，解放軍已經具備它自認能夠入侵台灣並擊敗美軍的初步能力。（頁 1-2）

就算解放軍登陸台灣失敗，戰爭也沒有結束，因為中國會動用一切資源延續衝突，主要用封鎖的方式。在這場延長賽中，解放軍即使蒙受重大損失，也將擁有優勢。美國能使用的以下手段都不可能結束戰爭：1. 阻止解放軍登陸台灣；2. 摧毀解放軍的海空軍；3. 切斷中國的國際貿易；4. 試圖在大陸內部或周邊地區引發不安；5. 其它「強加成本」策略。我們如不能破解中國對台灣的封鎖，就贏不了這場延長賽。（頁 1）



February 2021

Oriana Skylar Mastro,

**Precarious State of Cross-Strait
Deterrence** in Hearing on “Deterring
PRC Aggression Toward Taiwan”
**2021 US-China Security and Economic
Review Commission’s Annual Report to
Congress**

“**M**any U.S. experts are concerned with a fait accompli, a scenario in which China takes Taiwan before even the most resolved U.S. could react decisively.” (p. 2)

“Improving Taiwan capabilities is important to buy U.S. time, but nothing else. Taiwan will not be able to defend itself alone against mainland China, even with all the asymmetric capabilities in the world.” (p. 7) “

“If the U.S. demands Taiwan independence after a military victory, we will be stuck fighting China for decades or Beijing will escalate to levels of violence we are unwilling to match or absorb.” (p. 7)



2021 年 12 月

Oriana Skyler Mastro (史坦福大學及
美國企業中心研究員)

兩岸嚇阻的微妙狀態

2021 年在國會「美中經濟與安全檢討
委員會」證詞

許多美國專家擔心「既成事實」劇本，
也就是說中國會在美國做出決定性反應前就拿下台灣。(頁 2)
台灣強化自衛能力很重要，可以替美國爭取一點時間，但僅此而
已。台灣根本不可能單獨對抗中國，就算具備今天全世界所有的
不對稱戰力。(頁 7)
如果美國在打敗中國以後要求台灣從此獨立於中國之外，我們就
將面對與中國幾十年的戰爭，或者北京將把戰事升高到我們不願
意承受的地步。(頁 7)



February 2021

Thomas H. Shugart III

Adjunct Fellow, Center for a New American Security

in Hearing on “Deterring PRC Aggression Toward Taiwan,”

2021 US-China Security and Economic Review Commission’s Annual Report to Congress

“The mid-to-late 2020s may be the period of greatest peril for a failure of cross-strait deterrence. This timeframe will see the trailing edge of a period of mass retirement of late Cold-War-era U.S. platforms, combined with the continued growth and modernization of China’s counter-intervention forces. In particular, the retirement of the Navy’s oldest cruisers, at nearly the same time as that of its guided missile submarine will result in a significant drop in the available number of vertical-launch missile tubes that could be deployed in support of a Taiwan intervention.” (p. 1)

2021 年 12 月

Thomas Shugart (新美國安全中心兼任研究員，曾任核潛艦長及國防部淨評估辦公室成員)

2021 年在國會「美中經濟與安全檢討委員會」證詞

2020 年代的中期及晚期是台海風險最高的時期。屆時美國冷戰後期出廠的大量作戰載台將同時大批除役，而中國反介入武力的增長與現代化則方興未艾。尤其是美國最老的一批巡洋艦與導彈潛艦同時退場，將使美國驟然失去支撐台海作戰的垂直發射飛彈的能力。(頁 1)



March 9, 2021

Admiral Philip Davidson

**Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific
Command, Testimony at the Senate
Armed Services Committee**

“In 2019, I reported to this Committee we had lost a quantitative advantage and our qualitative advantage was shrinking across several domains as the People’s

Liberation Army (PLA) fields higher quality systems.”

“In August 2020, for example, the PRC conducted coordinated DF-21D missile launches into the South China Sea. These mid-range, anti-ship ballistic missiles are capable of attacking aircraft carriers in the Western Pacific, and their employment during a large-scale PLA exercise demonstrates the PLA’s focus on countering any potential third-party intervention during a regional crisis.”

“The U.S. military forces deploying from the West Coast of the U.S. would need three weeks of transit to the First Island Chain, and 17 days from Alaska, to conduct operations within the Second Island Chain, west of Guam.”



2021 年 3 月 9 日

Philip Davidson 上將（美國印太司令）

在參議院軍事委員會證詞

2019 年我就向貴委員會報告，我們相對於解放軍已經失去了數量上的優勢，而在好幾個領域我們也已喪失質的優勢，

因為他們一直在部署更高端的武器系統。

2020 年 8 月中共向南海試射了東風 21D 的導彈。這些中程反艦導彈能夠攻擊西太平洋的航空母艦。解放軍把它們放進大型軍事演習中顯示其焦點正是阻止外力介入區域危機。

美國艦隊從美國西岸出發，需要三個星期的航行，從阿拉斯加則需要 17 天，才能抵達第一島鏈，在第二島鏈也就是關島以西執行作戰任務。



March 2021

Lyle Goldstein

a professor at Naval War College

**Beijing Has a Plethora of
Military Options against
Taiwan after 2022**

The Hill

“Biden’s new national security team needs to put Taiwan first among all its priorities...It is no exaggeration to say that

intervention in a Taiwan scenario could result in a devastating U.S. military defeat, or even put the planet in peril, if there is a widespread resort to nuclear weapons.”


2021 年 3 月

Lyle Goldstein （海軍戰院教授）

2022 後北京武力犯台選項齊全

國會山報 發表

拜登的新國安團隊應該把台灣放到所有議題的第一優先...絕不誇張地說，如果中共犯台而美國介入，美國必將慘敗，或置整個地球於險境，如最終動用大量核武的話。



July/August 2021

Oriana Skylar Mastro

The Taiwan Temptation: Why Beijing Might Resort to Force

Foreign Affairs

“Beijing is preparing for four main campaigns that its military planners believe would be necessary to take control of the island. The first...joint PLA

missile and airstrikes...The second...a blockade operation...The third...missile and airstrikes against U.S. forces deployed nearby...The fourth...island landing.” (p. 62)

“Among defense experts, there is little doubt about China’s ability to pull off the first three of the campaigns...But China’s fourth and final campaign...is far from guaranteed...What everyone agrees is that China has made significant strides in its ability to conduct joint operations in recent years and the U.S. needs adequate warning to mount a successful defense. As Beijing hones its spoofing and jamming technologies, it may be able to scramble U.S. early warning systems and thereby keep U.S. forces in the dark in the early hours of an attack...In light of these enhanced capabilities many U.S. experts worry that China would take control of Taiwan before the U.S. even had a chance to react. Recent wargames conducted by the Pentagon and the RAND Corporation have shown that a military clash between the U.S. and China over Taiwan would likely result in a U.S. defeat, with China completing an all-out invasion in just days or weeks.” (pp. 62-63)

“What might dissuade Xi from pursuing armed unification, if not U.S. military might?...Arguments about the cost of armed unification are based more on American projections and wishful thinking than on facts...Even if China found itself in a protracted war with the U.S.,

Chinese leaders may believe they have social and economic advantages that would enable them to outlast the Americans. They see the Chinese people as more willing to make sacrifices for the cause of Taiwan than the American people...Chinese leaders have good reason to suspect that international isolation and opprobrium would be relatively mild.” (pp. 64-65)


“The risk that a bloody insurgency in Taiwan will drag on for years and drains Beijing of resources is no more of a deterrent – and the idea that it would be says more about the U.S. scars from Afghanistan and Iraq than about likely scenarios from Taiwan. The PLA’s military textbooks assume the need for a significant campaign to consolidate power after its troops have landed and broken through Taiwan’s coastal defense, but they do not express much concern about it. This may be because although the PLA has not fought a war since 1979, China has ample experience with internal repression and dedicates more resources to that mission than its military...Compared with the military task of invading and seizing Taiwan in the first place, occupying it probably looks like a piece of cake.” (p. 66)

“These realities make it very difficult for the U.S. to alter China’s calculus on Taiwan. (Some) have argued that the U.S. could improve cross-strait deterrence by ending its long-standing policy of ‘strategic ambiguity.’ ...But the main problem is not U.S. resolve, since Chinese leaders already assume the U.S. will intervene. What matters to Xi and other Chinese leaders is whether they think the PLA will prevail even in the face of U.S. intervention.” (pp. 66-67)

“The attractiveness of a full-on invasion from China’s perspective lies in the possibility of surprise: the U.S. may not be able to respond militarily until after Beijing has taken control of the island and the war is over.” (p. 67)

“The most effective way to deter Chinese leaders from attacking Taiwan is also the most difficult: to convince them that armed

unification would cost China its rejuvenation. And the U.S. cannot do this alone. Washington would need to persuade a large coalition of allies to commit to a coordinated economic, political and military response to any Chinese aggression. And that, unfortunately, remains a remote possibility, since many countries are unwilling to risk their economic projects, let alone a major-power war, in order to defend a small democratic island. Ultimately, then, there is no quick and easy fix to the escalating tension across the Taiwan Strait...Unfortunately for Taiwan, only now is the U.S. waking up to the new reality.” (p. 67)



2021 年 7 月/ 8 月

Oriana Skylar Mastro (史坦福大學及
美國企業中心研究員)

台灣的誘惑：為什麼北京可能動武

外交事務雙月刊 發表

北京正準備四種犯台軍事行動。第一...
飛彈與空中聯合打擊。第二...封鎖。第

三...飛彈與空中打擊附近的美軍戰力。第四...登陸。(頁 62)

在軍事專家中，幾乎沒有人懷疑中共完成前三項的能力...第四項則不確定...大家同意的是中共這幾年在執行聯合作戰方面取得長足進步，而美國需要足夠的預警時間才能組建成功的防衛。由於北京一直在強化它的電子干擾能量，它已能打亂美國的早期預警系統，讓美軍在戰事初起的幾小時內又聾又瞎...正因如此，許多美國專家擔心中共會在美國根本來不及反應時就已經拿下台灣。最近多次五角大廈與蘭德公司合辦的兵棋推演都得出美軍戰敗而中共在幾天或幾週內完全佔領台灣的結論。(頁 62-63)

如果美國武力不能嚇阻武統，到底什麼能？...關於武統成本過高的說法多半是美國自己的想法，沒有事實根據...就算美中戰爭遷延時日，中國領導人也會堅信他們比美國人擁有更大的社會與經濟優勢，因為中國人民比美國人民更願意為台灣付出成本...中國領導人也有好理由相信，國際孤立及譴責都會相對溫和。
(頁64-65)

也有人說，台灣內部的血腥抗爭若拖幾年可能拖垮北京的資源。這說法恐怕也嚇不倒北京。它反映的其實是美國人自己經歷阿富汗及伊拉克挫敗後留下的傷痕，與台灣關係不大。解放軍教科書裡面一直假定他們突破台灣岸防而登陸後一定會需要一段鞏固的時期，但他們卻不曾展現太多關注。或許因為他們自 1979 年後雖然沒有太多戰爭經驗，但壓制內部動亂卻經驗豐富，而且每年動用的資源不亞於軍事支出...相對於攻下台灣，佔領對他們應像吃豆腐一樣簡單。（頁 66）

這些現實使美國很難改變中國對台灣的算計。（有人說）美國應該終結長年堅持的「戰略模糊」來增強兩岸嚇阻力道...問題是，美國的決心對中共來說從來不是疑問，他們本就一直假定美國會干預。習近平和其他領導人在乎的是解放軍在美軍干預時是否仍能取勝。（頁 67）

全面犯台對中共最有吸引力的因素就是突襲，在美國軍事反應以前北京已經佔領了全島，戰爭結束。（頁 67）

讓中國領導人不犯台最有效的辦法，也是最困難的辦法，就是說服他們武統會傷害中華民族的復興。這件事美國不可能單獨完成，必須拉攏一大群盟友，協調彼此經濟、政治、經濟作為，來應對中共的侵略。不幸的是，它成功機率非常小，因為許多國家都不願冒自身經濟風險，更別說大國戰爭的風險，來保衛一個小小的民主島嶼。說到底，台海緊張沒有一個快速簡單的解決方法...對台灣而言，不幸美國直到現在才明白這個道理。（頁 67）

July 2021

Gil Barndollar

**GLOBAL POSTURE
REVIEW 2021:
AN OPPORTUNITY FOR
REALISM AND
REALIGNMENT**

GIL BARNDOLLAR
SENIOR FELLOW, DEFENSE
PRIORITIES

JULY 12, 2021

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KEY POINTS

1. The 2021 Global Posture Review now underway should move the nation

**Global Posture Review 2021:
An Opportunity for Realism and
Realignment** **Defense Priorities**

“A 2017 analysis of a potential Chinese missile attack on U.S. forces in the Pacific, authored by two U.S. Navy officers, makes for grim reading: U.S. missile defenses overwhelmed, almost every fixed headquarters

struck within minutes, all major airbases cratered, all pierside ships in Japan hit by ballistic missiles...Analysts at the Pentagon’s Office of Cost Assessment and Program Analysis (CAPE) and office of Net Assessment are also reportedly pessimistic about the survivability of U.S. forces facing Chinese missiles and rocket attacks.” (p. 3)

“The simplest way for the U.S. to respond to the Chinese threat is to push Asian allies to arm themselves with thousands of cruise and ballistic missiles...Taiwan’s military, once a well-trained and serious

force, has failed to keep pace with China’s. In 2017, Taiwan reduced its conscription term of service to a wholly inadequate and basically symbolic four months. Taiwan’s reserves, supposedly two million men strong, have been described as “a pure fantasy”: poorly organized, armed only with rifles, and commanded by inexperienced officers.” (p. 5)

2021 年 7 月

**GLOBAL POSTURE
REVIEW 2021:
AN OPPORTUNITY FOR
REALISM AND
REALIGNMENT**

GIL BARNDOLLAR
SENIOR FELLOW, DEFENSE
PRIORITIES

JULY 12, 2021

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Gil Barndollar (國防優先順序基金會資深
研究員)

**2021 全球佈署檢討：現實主義及再結盟的
機會**

國防優先順序基金會 發表

KEY POINTS

1. The 2021 Global Posture Review now
underway should move the nation

2017 年兩位海軍現役軍官曾撰文指出，中共飛彈如果攻擊美國太平洋武力，結果堪慮：美國飛彈防禦被完全壓制，幾乎所有指揮所在幾分鐘內遭到襲擊，所有空軍基地被打出大洞，所有停駐日本軍港的美國戰艦被導彈重擊...五角大廈的「成本估算與計畫分析辦公室」以及「淨評估辦公室」對美國武力承受中共飛彈及火箭打擊的存活率也非常悲觀。(頁 3)

美國應對中共威脅最簡單的方法就是促使亞洲盟邦佈署幾千枚導彈及巡弋飛彈...過去訓練精良、態度嚴謹的台灣軍方，沒能跟上中共的進步。2017 年台灣把徵兵制縮短為完全無用、只有象徵性質的四個月兵役。表面兩百萬人，實際卻是「純虛幻」兵力，組織散漫，只配備步槍，還由全無經驗的軍官率領。(頁 5)



Fall 2021

Rananah M. Joyce and Becca Wasser **All About Access: Solving America's Force Posture Puzzle** Washington Quarterly

“To date, the U.S. has demonstrated its presence to enhance deterrence in the Indo-Pacific through its existing network of bases, freedom of

navigation operation, joint and multinational exercises, and enhancing security cooperation activities with allies and partners. But administration officials have noted that current U.S. posture lacks the types of forces and the regional capabilities to adequately deny China's regional primacy...Almost all of the new operational concepts envision solutions to A2/AD problem by dispersing forces and bases to multiple locations...There is presently little appetite (among allies and partners) for hosting large, permanent bases or forward deployments of troops.” (pp. 51-52)



2021 年秋季號

Rananah M. Joyce (Brandeis 大學

助理教授，曾任國防部研究員)


Becca Wasser (新美國安全中心研

究員)

通路最關鍵：解決美軍佈署之謎團

華盛頓季刊 發表

美國至今依靠它的基地網、自由航行權、聯合雙邊或多邊演習、提升軍事合作活動等等，來維繫它在印太地區的嚇阻能力。但政府官員已經指出，目前美國的軍力佈署缺乏能夠阻止中共掌控區域優勢的武器與能力...面對中共反介入/反區域拒止的策略，美國新應對方案是分散基地及武力到多個地點...但美國盟邦與夥伴卻沒有胃口接納美國大型且永久性的基地或前進佈署。(頁 51-52)




September 24, 2021

Hal Brands and Michael Beckley

The U.S. Needs to Prepare for a Major War, Not Because its Rival Is Rising, but But Because of the Opposite Foreign Policy

“ China’s rise is no mirage...Most alarming, think tank assessments and U.S. Defense Department reports show China’s increasingly formidable

military now stands a real chance of winning a war against the U.S. in the Western Pacific....Most troubling of all, China will be sorely tempted to use force to resolve the Taiwan question on its terms in the next decade before Washington and Taipei can finish retooling their militaries to offer a stronger defense...When the military balance shifts temporarily further toward China’s favor in the late 2020s and as the Pentagon is forced to retire ageing ships and aircraft, China may never have a better chance of seizing Taiwan and dealing Washington a humiliating defeat.”



2021 年 9 月


Hal Brands (約翰霍普金斯大學教授，曾任國防部長特別助理)

Michael Beckley (Tufts 大學副教授，美國企業研究院兼任研究員)

美國需準備打場大戰，不是因為它的對手崛起，而是相反

外交政策雙月刊 發表

中國的崛起已不是幻覺...更值警惕的是，智庫評估與美國國防部報告都顯示中國很有機會在西太平洋戰爭中打贏美國...最讓人不安的是，中共很有動機想在未來十年內，在華府及台北還來不及完成軍力修整之前，就用武力解決台灣問題...在未來十年的後期，軍力對比將更有利於中國時，恰好五角大廈必須大量汰除美國老舊艦艇與戰機。恐怕中共再也找不到一個奪取台灣並給華府羞辱式痛擊的更好時機。



September 2021

Bob Woodward and Robert


Costa**Peril**

N.Y: Simon & Schuster

“**I**f an adversary like China ever desired, he (General Mark Milley) said, they could choose to do what’s called a ‘first-strike advantage,’ or ‘Pearl Harbor’ and conduct a strike.” (p. xv)

“The Chinese were already on high alert about U.S. intentions. On October 30 (2020), four days before the presidential election, sensitive intelligence showed that the Chinese believed that the U.S. was plotting to secretly attack them. The Chinese thought that Trump in desperation would create a crisis, present himself as the savior, and use the gambit to win reelection...Milley had then called General Li (Zuocheng) on the same back channel to persuade the Chinese to cool down...But now, two months later, on January 8, it was evident China’s fears had only been intensified by the insurrection (of the January 6 assault on the Capitol by Trump supporters).” (pp. xiii-xiv)

“Li fired off questions to Milley...It took an hour and a half—45 minutes of substance due to the necessary use of interpreters--to try to assure him.” (p. xiii)



2021 年 9 月

Bob Woodward (曾揭穿水門案的華盛頓郵報資深記者)

Robert Costa (CBS 電視首席記者，曾任職華盛頓郵報、NBC、PBS)

危殆

Simon & Schuster 出版社 出版

他(**Mark Milley** 上將，時任亦現任三軍參謀首長聯席會議主席) 說，如中國動念，他們可以選擇「先發制人」，發動「珍珠港」式的攻擊。(頁 xv)

中國當時對美國動機已經高度關注。(2020 年) 十月三十日，美國總統大選前四天，機敏情報顯示中國相信美國正在謀劃秘密攻擊中國。他們認為川普可能狗急跳牆，故意製造一個危機，然後把自己包裝成危機救星，最終勝選連任...**Milley** 就透過兩國熱線，致電中國的對口李作成將軍，試圖說服他們冷靜一下...兩個月後，一月八日 (一月六日川普支持者衝進國會大廈的後兩天)，很明顯中國的疑懼更加提升。(頁 xiii-xiv)

(**Milley** 再打電話)李丟出一大堆疑問給 **Milley**...**Milley** 花了一個半小時--扣除翻譯，實質 45 分鐘——才讓李安心。(頁 xiii)



November 2021

Department of Defense's Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC Repeating almost verbatim the Taiwan section in the 2020 version of the DoD Report, as follows.

“China has a range of options for military campaign against Taiwan, from

air and maritime blockade to a full-scale amphibious invasion to seize and occupy some or all of Taiwan or its offshore islands.” (p. 115)

Except the following paragraph : “Based on changing public sentiment in Taiwan, according to recent polling data, PRC leaders may perceive a closing window of opportunity to subjugate Taiwan under the pretenses of Beijing’s “one country, two systems” framework. The PRC has increasingly resorted to an aggressive pressure campaign against Taiwan and the Tsai administration to curtail Washington-Taipei ties and deter “Taiwan independence.” The PRC conducting persistent military operations near Taiwan—and training for a Taiwan contingency—likely signals a greater urgency for the PLA to continue to develop and perfect its strategy and capabilities should PRC leaders look to a military option to achieve their objectives.” (p. 115)



2021 年 11 月

國防部致國會年度報告：中華人民共和國相關軍事與安全發展

台灣相關部分逐字逐句重複 **2020** 年版內容，如下：

中國已經擁有整套針對台灣的作戰選項，從空中及海上封鎖，到全面兩棲侵入，到奪取並佔領部分或全部的台灣島或外島。（頁 115）

除以下段落，有鑒於台灣民意的轉變（據近月民調），中國領導人可能覺得他們把台灣置於「一國兩制」框架下的機會之窗正在縮小。中國因此越來越積極向台灣及蔡政府施壓以削弱美台聯繫並嚇阻「台灣獨立」。中國在台灣附近持續進行軍事活動，同時也為一旦衝突預作操練，顯示中國想完善其對台策略及能力的緊迫感正在提升，以備軍事選項的啟動。（頁 115）



November 2021

2021 Report to Congress of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission

“U.S. analyses published in 2000 determined that the PLA would not be able to invade Taiwan even without U.S. military support of the island.” (p. 234)

“In 2008, Department of Defense assessed that the PLA had achieved the capability

necessary for firepower strikes and a limited blockade of Taiwan...In 2015, ...a full military blockade...Between 2008 and 2015...offensive cyber operations against military networks and critical infrastructure in Taiwan and continental U.S. Since 2018, DoD has suggested

that...the PLA has a military option to invade Taiwan.” (p. 393)

“Today public sources suggest that the PLA has the military air and sea lift capacity for a first-echelon invasion force of more than 25,000 troops.” (p. 395)

“China had undertaken a massive shipbuilding drive that in 2019 alone produced more civilian and military ships than the U.S. produced over the four years of World War II.” (p. 397)

“Over the next five years, U.S. plans to retire older platforms in anticipation of a smaller, more modern force may appear to Chinese leaders as a ‘window of opportunity’ during which the U.S. military ability to intervene is at its weakest. The U.S. has scheduled a mass retirement of 48 active-duty ships and 256 aircraft by 2026, including one aircraft carrier, 11 cruisers, and 13 submarines.” (p. 421)



2021 年 11 月

美中經濟與安全檢討委員會致國會年度報告

(綜合 **75** 名專家證詞並經委員會 **11** 位委員投票通過)


2000 年美國所有分析都確信中共沒有攻台能力，即使美國不協防。(頁 234)

美國國防部評估，2008 年解放軍已具備對台火力打擊及有限封鎖的能力...。2015 年...可以全面封鎖...。2008-2015 年...可以網路攻擊台灣及美國本土的軍事網絡與重要基礎設施。2018 年迄今，五角大廈一直表示解放軍已經具備武力犯台的選項。(頁 393)

現在公開資料顯示，解放軍具有第一波運送超過 25000 兵力入台的能力。(頁 395)

中國具有大量製造船艦的能力。僅 2019 一年，它製造的民用與軍用船艦總數就超過美國在第二次世界大戰四年間生產的總數。(頁 397)

未來五年內，美國計畫汰除一批老舊武器載台，希望將來改用更小、更現代化的武器取代。這青黃不接階段可能會被中國領導人認為是美國軍力最低潮的「機會之窗」。美國現擬在 2026 年前汰除 48 艘軍艦及 256 架戰機，其中包括一艘航母、11 艘巡洋艦、和 13 艘潛艦。(頁 421)



December 2021

Robert Work

A Slavish Devotion to Forward Presence Has Nearly Broken the U.S. Navy

Proceedings, Vol. 147/12/1426

“The Navy cannot claim it can prevent any war, any more than it can guarantee it will win all future wars.” (p. 10)

2021 年 12 月

Robert Work (曾任國防部副部長 2014-17，跨越兩黨總統、三位部長，及海軍副部長)

死守前進部署理念幾乎摧毀美國海軍

紀事錄，卷 **141/12/1426**

我海軍已不再能宣稱它能阻止任何戰爭，或保證打贏未來所有戰爭。(頁 10)



2021

Dakota Wood, ed.

**Index of U.S. Military
Strength**

Foundation

“In the aggregate, the U.S. military posture is rated ‘marginal.’ The 2021 Index concludes that the current U.S. military force is likely capable of meeting the demands of a single major regional conflict while also attending to various

presence and engagement activities but that it would be very hard-pressed to do more and certainly would be ill-equipped to handle two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies.” (pp. 523 -524)


2021 年

Dakota Wood(傳統基金會資深研究員，曾任職國防部淨評估辦公室)主編

2021 美國軍力索引

傳統基金會

總體而言，美國軍力整體態勢算「差強人意」。「2021 索引」的結論是：美國軍力可能滿足一場大型區域衝突的需要，並同時照顧數個小型接觸，但確定無力處理兩個同時發生的大型區域性衝突。（頁 523-524）



2021

Eldridge A. Colby

**The Strategy of Denial: American
Defense in An Age of Great Power
Conflict**

New Haven: Yale University Press, 2021

“**T**he optimal form of this (China’s) strategy is the fait accompli whereby China seizes vulnerable U.S. confederates such as Taiwan or the Philippines while deterring a sufficiently strong defense by the U.S. and by other states that might participate. Applied sequentially this strategy could undermine U.S. differentiated credibility and weaken the coalition until it collapses, opening the way for China to become the regional hegemon.” (pp. xiv-xv)

2021 年

Eldridge A. Colby (曾任國防部副助理部長、2018 年美國國防戰略報告主持人之一)

拒止策略：大國衝突時代的美國國防

耶魯大學出版社 出版

中國最佳策略就是「既成事實」，即奪取美國的脆弱夥伴，如台灣或菲律賓，同時嚇阻美國及其它有意加入者的介入。如順利一一執行，這策略就會削弱美國的可信度，嚴重打擊甚至崩潰它的盟國體系，並為中國成為區域霸權鋪路。（頁 xiv-xv）

JOURNAL ARTICLE

The Tyranny of Distance: Assessing and Explaining the Apparent Decline in U.S. Military Performance

Get access

M Patrick Hulme, Erik Gartzke

International Studies Quarterly, Volume 65, Issue 2, June 2021, Pages 542–550,

<https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaa067>

Published: 14 September 2020

Cite Permissions Share

Abstract

There is a growing sense that US military effectiveness has been on the wane in recent years. Is this the case? If so, what are the reasons for the decay in American combat performance? We first examine the available systematic evidence for American military decline, showing that the United States has indeed experienced a drop in the quality of outcomes of its military contests. Observers have offered a number of explanations for declining American military success, most predominantly an increase in interstate conflict after the Second World War. After showing that a decline in performance is observed even after fully excluding interstate conflict, we propose an alternative explanation: the increasing distance from home at which the United States has been fighting. Distance is tyrannical: it saps military strength and increases the cost of contests, even as it reduces US expertise and motivations to prevail. We then show that the distance from home at which the United States fights is the best predictor of the outcome of the conflict. We conclude by noting some avenues for future research and policy implications as the world returns to great power competition.

Issue Section: Research Note

2021

M. Patrick Hulme and Erik Gartzke

The Tyranny of Distance: Assessing and Explaining the Apparent Decline in U.S. Military Performance

International Studies Quarterly, No. 65

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Issue Section: Research Note

2021

M.Patrick Hulme (加州大學聖地牙哥校區政治所博士生)

Erik Gartzke (加州大學聖地牙哥校區教授)

無情的地理距離：評估並解釋美國軍力的明顯流失

國際研究季刊，第 65 期 發表，

越來越多專家感覺到美國近年武力使用的效果一直流失。是這樣嗎？如是，什麼因素造成美國戰力的衰微？作者先系統性檢視了現有資料，顯示美國作戰結果的品質確實在下降。不同觀察家對此提出不同解釋。最普遍的是，美國在二戰後參與的國際戰事太多。本文在適當排除備多力分的理由後，提出了新的解釋。那就是離美國本土越遠，美國的作戰效果就越差。地理距離是無情的：它削減美國的軍事力量，增加對抗的成本，更降低美軍的專業程度與求勝動機。所以從戰場與美國本土的距離最能預測美國出戰的結果。（頁 542）



November/December 2021

Richard Haass

**The Age of America First:
Washington's Flawed New Foreign
Policy Consensus Foreign Affairs**

“The old foreign policy paradigm grew out of WWII and the Cold War... The new paradigm dismisses the core of that

approach: that the U.S. has a vital stake in a broader global system, one that at times demands undertaking difficult military interventions or putting aside immediate national preferences in favor of principles and arrangements that bring long-term benefits... Today, notwithstanding Biden's pledge ‘to help lead the world toward a more peaceful, prosperous future for all people,’ the reality is that Americans want the benefit of international order without doing the hard work of building and maintaining it.” (p. 86) “In the face of looming domestic problems, including decaying infrastructure and faltering public education, foreign involvement came to be viewed as a costly distraction.” (p. 88)

“There is considerable bipartisanship when it comes to foreign policy. The problem is that the consensus is woefully inadequate... rife with self-defeating contradictions, especially when it comes to China. Detering China will require sustained increase in military spending and a greater willingness to use force (since successful deterrence always requires not just the ability but also the perceived will to act). Many Republicans but a few Democrats back the former; few in either Party seem ready to sign up for the latter... While the Biden administration has talked about its support for alliances, U.S. allies are in many cases unprepared to do what the administration believes necessary to counter China.” (p. 96)



2021 年 11 月、12 月

Richard Haass（對外關係協會會長，曾任國務院政策規劃辦公室主任及鮑爾國務卿幕僚，對北愛爾蘭問題特使）
美國第一的時代：華府新外交共識的缺陷

外交事務雙月刊

舊的外交政策典範來自二戰及冷戰...其核心理念：美國極度關切大範圍的全球體系，有時為了維護這體系願意付出干預的代價，或願意犧牲自己短期的國家利益，來換取可能帶來長期利益的原則及安排...這理念被新典範拋棄了。今天，拜登政府雖然誓言「要協助領導世界走向更和平繁榮的未來」，但真實情況是，美國希望得到世界秩序帶來的好處，卻不願付出辛勞來整建並維護這個秩序。（頁 86）

面臨包括基礎建設傾頹及教育崩壞等眾多國內難題，國際事務的介入越來越被視為高成本的分心事。（頁 88）

談到外交政策，美國好像有很大共識。其實共識遠遠不足...充滿了種種矛盾，尤其在對中國政策上。要嚇阻中國，美國不但要長期投資軍事，還要有使用武力的更大意願（因為成功的嚇阻靠的不只是能力，還有看得見的決心）。關於前者，許多共和黨人支持，但民主黨卻不熱心。關於後者，兩黨都沒人敢站出來背書...拜登政府一直講要結合盟友，但盟友好像都不願做抗中該做的事。（頁 96）



December 16, 2021

Hal Brands and Michael Beckley, **Washington Is Preparing for the Wrong War with China: A Conflict Would Be Long and Messy** Foreign Affairs

“A war over Taiwan is likely to be long rather than short, regional rather than local, and much easier to start than to

end. It would expand and escalate, as both countries look for paths to victory in a conflict neither side can afford to lose. It would also present severe dilemmas for peacemaking and high risks of going nuclear. If Washington doesn't start preparing to wage, and then end, a protracted conflict now, it could face catastrophe once the shooting starts.

2021 年 12 月 16 日

Hal Brands (約翰霍普金斯大學教授兼美國企業中心研究員)**Michael Beckley**(特福茨大學教授兼美國企業中心研究員) **華府備戰方向錯了：衝突將持久又混亂**

外交事務雙月刊電子檔

台海戰爭將持久，而不快速；牽動整個區域，而非台海局部；開戰容易結束難。由於美中都輸不起，都要贏，所以戰爭會擴大，會升高。開打後要謀和將非常困難，走向核戰的風險也非常高。如果華府不開始準備打一場長期戰爭，槍聲一響，它就大難臨頭了。



December 2021

Graham Allison and Jonah Glick-Unterman **The Great Military Rivalry: China vs. the U.S.**

Belfer Center, Harvard University

“The era of U.S. military primacy is over: dead, buried, and gone – except in the minds of some political leaders and policy analysts who have not examined the hard facts.” (p. 1)

“If in the near future, there is a limited war over Taiwan or along China’s periphery, the U.S. would likely lose – or have to choose between losing and stepping up the escalation ladder to a wider war.” (p. 2)

2021 年 12 月

Graham Allison (哈佛大學教授，曾任國防部助理部長)

Jonan Glick-Unterman (哈佛大學研究助理，曾任職於聯合國與眾議院)

中國與美國軍事大對決

哈佛大學貝爾弗中心 出版

美國軍事獨霸的紀元已經結束:死了、埋了、消失了，只殘存於一些不願面對硬事實的政治人物及分析者心中。(頁 1)

如在最近的將來，一場有限戰爭爆發於台灣或中國周邊，美國可能被打敗，或被迫在戰敗及戰事升高中做出選擇。(頁 2)

Defending Taiwan is a worthy goal. But are we ready for heavy casualties?

Politicians are saying the U.S. must protect Taiwan against a Chinese invasion, but few talk about the potential costs.



For the past four decades, the United States and China have maintained a delicate compromise regarding Taiwan. The United States describes its relationship with the island as "robustly unofficial" and affirms the Chinese view that "there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China" — and for that reason does not support explicit Taiwanese independence. Its unofficial relationship with Taiwan, however, extends to selling the government American weapons, sending a limited number of advisory troops to the island, and maintaining a "cultural" presence (the Institute, economic and cultural office that set to do more enthusiastically). U.S.

January 24, 2022

Jacqueline Schneider

Defending Taiwan is a worthy goal. But are we ready for heavy casualties?

Washington Post

---Selling a narrative to the American public that the United States can come to the rescue of Taiwan without significant loss of life is potentially dishonest, bad for

deterrence and disastrous for military effectiveness. Washington runs the risk of falling into traps that confounded the U.S. in both South Korea and Vietnam...It would be a grave mistake for the U.S. to promise to defend Taiwan without preparing its public - and its soldiers - for the tough fight they could face.

2022 年 1 月 24 日

Jacqueline Schneider (史丹佛大學胡佛研究所研究員)

保衛台灣有正當性，但我們準備好承受重大傷亡嗎？

華盛頓郵報

向美國民眾推銷美國要拯救台灣，卻不告訴他們必須承受大量生命傷亡，既不誠實，也嚇阻不了中共，更會造成軍事災難。華府會冒當年掉進南韓及越南戰爭陷阱同樣的風險...美國向台灣承諾要保衛它，卻不告訴自己百姓及軍人必將面對多艱難的戰爭，將是一個重大的錯誤。



January 31, 2022

Michael J. Green and Evan S. Medeiros

Can America Rebuild Its Power in Asia: Biden Started Strong, But Progress is Halting

Foreign Affairs

“U.S. defense policy faces different but equally formidable challenges. The Biden administration has clearly made gains at deterring China by strengthening its alliances, but it has been less purposeful

about the types of military capabilities it deploys in Asia---and where it puts them. The Global Posture Review resulted in almost no significant additions to U.S. military forces in the Indo-Pacific beyond what the Trump White House already had planned. The administration and Congress have failed to properly fund the new Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI), legislations that was designed for much needed capabilities in the Indo-Pacific theatre.”

“On defense policy, the administration...should provide U.S. military commanders in Asia with the capabilities they have requested, including by working across the aisle to secure funding for the PDI at the levels and in the manner requested by Indo-Pacific Command. Washington should also align these resources with Indo-Pacific Command’s vision for dispersing forces, hardening facilities, and building redundancies in the U.S. regional posture.”

“(The) administration must articulate its comprehensive China policy, something it has yet to publicly do...It has not shared its diagnosis of the China challenge, and it is unclear if the administration has a prescription and an endgame or if it simply aims for steady strategic competition. The White House appears to be inching toward a strategy of competitive coexistence with Beijing, but the content remains inchoate...On Taiwan, it is clear that demands of deterrence are rising, but Washington will have to settle on a clear and consistent approach as Beijing continues testing Taiwanese resilience and U.S. resolve.”



2022 年 1 月 31 日

Michael Green (喬治城大學亞洲研究主任，曾任小布希政府國安會亞洲部門資深主任)

Evan S. Medeiros (喬治城大學教授，曾任歐巴馬政府國安會亞洲部門資深主任)


美國能在亞洲恢復實力嗎:拜登起手有力，但後勁斷續

外交事務雙月刊電子檔

美國國防政策面臨不同（於經濟政策）但同樣嚴重的挑戰。拜登政府很明顯在強化盟邦連結以嚇阻中共上頗有斬獲，但對在亞洲究竟要部署何種武力，在何處部署，卻一直含糊不清。最能展現國防部決心的「全球軍力部署檢討」報告竟端不出超越川普白宮規劃的任何項目。拜登的行政部門及國會也沒有適當撥款給用意為提升印太戰力的「太平洋嚇阻計畫」。

在國防方面...政府必須要給美國在亞洲的軍事指揮官他們希望獲得的軍力，包括兩黨合作通過「太平洋嚇阻計畫」所需的經費及其使用方式。華府也該用這些資源讓印太總部能夠分散軍力部署、強化設施防衛力，提高物資的備存量。

拜登政府還必須說清楚它的整體對中政策究竟是什麼。可惜它至今還沒這麼做，沒有與公眾分享它對中國挑戰的診斷。一般人不清楚它有沒有藥方，它希望美中關係的最終狀態是什麼。看起來它想小步走向與北京的「競爭式共存」，但其內容仍未成形。...關於台灣，美國嚇阻中共的需要很明顯在上升，華府必須要找出一條清晰且前後一致的途徑，因中共會繼續考驗台灣的耐力及美國的決心。



February 2022

Mike Gallagher

Taiwan Can't Wait: What America Must Do to Prevent a Successful Chinese Invasion

Foreign Affairs

“At present, the United States is on track to lose a war over Taiwan. Yet it is not too late to change course. With the targeted redirection of existing and readily obtainable military resources, effective planning, and the leveraging of crucial alliances, the U.S. has the capacity to prevent and, if necessary, to win a war over Taiwan as soon as the middle of this decade.”


2022 年 2 月

Mike Gallagher (威士康辛州選出的聯邦參議員，參議院軍事委員會成員、共和黨籍)

台灣不能等：美國該做什麼來防止中共成功犯台

外交事務雙月刊電子檔 發表

現在看來美國可能即將輸掉針對台灣的戰爭，但還有時間扳回劣勢。如果美國開始重訂軍事資源的備戰方向，擬訂更有效率計畫，動員關鍵盟邦，那麼到了 2020 年代中期，美國就有能力阻止甚至在台海作戰中打敗中國。



2022.6

Zack Cooper and Sheena Chestnut Greitens
Asian Allies and Partners in a Taiwan

Contingency : What the United States Should Expect? in Kori Schake and Allison Schwartz, eds.

Defending Taiwan (AEI)


In short, despite the United States' large number of regional allies and partners, if a

major contingency erupts between China and the United States over Taiwan, Washington should expect to find itself working actively with only a small handful of willing contributors. Furthermore, it should expect that even those contributors may avoid the use of their forces or significantly restrain U.S. access to their bases. (p. 115)

Elaine McCusker and Emily Coletta, Is the United States Military Ready to Defend Taiwan? In Kori Schake and Allison Schwartz, eds, Defending Taiwan (AEI)

The U.S. military has four key barriers to success:

1. Defense is not a priority for the current administration, demonstrated by the fiscal year 2022 budget request and further emphasized with the FY23 proposal for defense that does not keep pace with rising inflation.
2. Delays in annual appropriations and authorizations reduce buying power, hinder readiness, and delay the pursuit of a competitive advantage.
3. The definition of defense has been expanded to allow diversion of defense resources and diffusion of attention to nondefense priorities.
4. Institutional and statutory rules and processes do not promote speed and agility in testing, procuring, and integrating modern capabilities. (pp. 124-125)



2022 年 6 月

Zack Cooper (曾任職白宮及國防部，現任教普林斯頓大學)

Sheena Chestnnt (德州大學副教授)

美國應如何期待亞洲盟邦與夥伴在台灣衝突中扮演角色？

保衛台灣

美國企業研究院出版

簡言之，美國雖有大量區域盟邦與夥伴，但一旦美中為了台灣而爆發重大衝突，華府可能會發現只有少數國家願意挺身幫忙。即使這些少數國家也會避免使用它們自己的武力，並強力限制美國使用它們的基地。(頁 115)

Elaine McCnseer (曾任國防部代理副部長) 及 **Emily Coletta** (AHI 國防未來模擬計劃主持人)

美軍準備好保衛台灣了嗎？

美軍達成目標有四大障礙：

- 1.現在的拜登政府沒有優先看待國防。這個預算年度的國防預算及 2023 年的國防預算提案都趕不上通貨膨脹的速度。
- 2.每年撥款與授權的延宕都降低購買力，阻礙戰備，拖延競爭力提升的努力。
- 3.「國防」的定義被擴大到容許挪用國防預算並把注意力轉到非國防事項。
- 4.制度與法規的相關規定及程序不鼓勵測試、採購、整合現代能力的速度及靈活性。(頁 124-125)

